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Philosophers have always taken an interest not only in what is actually the case, 
but in what is necessarily the case and what could possibly be the case. These are 
questions of modality. Epistemologists of modality enquire into how we can know 
what is necessary and what is possible. This dissertation concerns the meta-
epistemology of modality. It engages with the rules that govern construction and 
evaluation of theories in the epistemology of modality, by using modal empiricism 
– a form of modal epistemology – as a running example. In particular, I 
investigate the assumption that it is important to be able to meet the integration 
challenge. Meeting the integration challenge is a source of serious difficulty for 
many approaches, but modal empiricism is supposed to do well in this respect. 
But I argue that once we have a better grasp of what the integration challenge 
is, it is not obvious that it presents no problem for modal empiricism. 
Moreover, even if modal empiricism could be said to be in a relatively good 
position with respect to integration, it comes at the cost of a forced choice 
between far-reaching partial modal scepticism and non-uniformism about the 
epistemology of modality. Non-uniformism is the view that more than one 
modal epistemology will be correct. While non-uniformism might not in itself 
be unpalatable, it must be defined and defended in a way which squares with 
the modal empiricist’s other commitment. I explore two ways of doing so, both 
involving a revised idea of the integration challenge and its role for the 
epistemology of modality. One involves a bifurcation of the integration 
challenge, and the other a restriction of the integration challenge’s relevance. 
Both ways are interesting, but neither is, as it turns out, a walk in the park.

 Acknowledgements 
To begin with, I have been immensely lucky with my supervisors – 
this book would not have come about without them patiently sharing 
their valuable time, expertise, views and experience, with me. The 
many shortcomings of this dissertation are despite their efforts, and 
all due to me. 
Anna-Sofia Maurin has been my main supervisor and I absolutely 
could not have wished for a better one. She has given generously of 
her time – far, far beyond what duty demands and what she gets paid 
for – and always with the greatest effort and commitment. Her ability 
to see through a wall of confused text or a messy presentation, and 
tell you what it is that you wanted to say all along has helped me out 
of many seeming dead-ends, and continues to be a great inspiration 
to me whenever I am asked comment on the work of others. Also, 
she has never once expressed a doubt that I could write this 
dissertation, and do it well. That encouragement has been really 
important to me. So, Anna-Sofia – thank you, thank you, thank you. 
My assistant supervisors Sören Häggqvist and Daniel Giberman 
have also helped me a lot, at various times during my project. Sören, 
thank you for providing knowledgeable comments and conversation 
on the texts I have been throwing your way. Your input was very 
important in the process that shaped the final argumentative outline 
of my dissertation. In fact, any reader of this book should also send 
Sören a grateful thought, in light of all the grammatical errors and 
language-related mistakes that his careful eye has saved me from 
making. And thank you, Dan, for extensive comments on all sorts of 
texts that sometimes did and sometimes did not end up being part of 
this book, and for your support during my first confused year at 
FLoV. 
Other people have also kindly given my work careful considera-
tion, for which I am very grateful. First, I am so glad that Tuomas 
Tahko agreed to comment on the first full draft of the dissertation 
manuscript for my final seminar. He did a great job and provided 
encouragement, interesting discussion and insightful input that has 
been important to me during the completion of this book. 
A recurring arena for presenting my work has been provided by 
the Gothenburg Research Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy. Thanks 
to Susanna Andersson, Andrew Brenner, John Eriksson, Gustavo 
Fernandez Walker, Ragnar Francén, Paul Gorbow, Martin Kaså, Felix 
Larsson, Helge Malmgren, Ana Maria Mora Marquez, Kristin 
Mickelson, Seyed Mousavian, Stellan Pettersson, Susanna Salmijärvi, 
Alexander Skiles, Alva Stråge, Naomi Thompson, Marco Tiozzo, 
Anders Tolland, Kelly Trogdon, Maximilian Zachrau, and everyone 
else who has participated throughout my years in Gothenburg. 
Thanks to all my colleagues at FLoV who helped by making the 
day-to-day struggle of being a doctoral student into so much more of 
a pleasure; to Anton Broberg and Johan Gross for peaceful times of 
office co-habitation; to Moa Ekbom for listening to my complaining 
and contributing some in return. Also, thanks to all those who have 
helped me with the administrative side of my doctoral studies. Finally, 
Susanna Radovic once told me about her horseback riding metaphor 
for writing good philosophical text: think about it as making the horse 
strike off into nice, collected canter (much, much harder than it 
seems!). I found that picture enormously useful in writing this book 
– even though it might not always show through.  
During my time as a PhD student I also had the opportunity to 
present thesis-related work at some workshops and conferences: at 
the Directions in the Epistemology of Modality Workshop in Stirling, 
October 2015, where I also received generous feedback from my 
commentator Bob Hale; at the Stockholm Graduate Conference in 
April 2017, where I especially want to thank my commentator Peter 
Pagin for his encouragement and feedback; at the Epistemology of 
Metaphysics Workshop III in Helsinki in August 2017; at Filosofi-
dagarna 2015 in Linköping; and Filosofidagarna 2017 in Uppsala. I 
want to thank the organisers and audiences at all of these events. 
I originally hail from the Department of Philosophy at Lund 
University, where I have had something of a second home during my 
time as a PhD student. There are many people there to which I owe 
thanks. First, to the organisers of and participants in the PhD Seminar 
in Philosophy at Lund University for letting me present there multiple 
times, generously commenting on my texts, and to all my other 
friends at the department for letting me hang out there with you, 
 discuss things philosophical and non-philosophical, and borrow 
desks in your offices. Second, thanks to all the people that sat with 
me on the Board of the Philosophical Society of Lund between 2013 
and 2018, I really enjoyed all the fun times we had in between the 
sometimes-frustrating ones. Finally, two Lund-related people deserve 
special mention. Jeroen Smid – for all stimulating conversation, 
helpful advice and most importantly for giving me the first experience 
of actually having fun, rather than being scared and intimidated, while 
discussing philosophy with a peer. Frits Gåvertsson – who has time 
and again, ever since I was a philosophy undergraduate, encouraged 
and convinced me to do various things I would otherwise have shied 
away from. 
Throughout the years, in addition to those already thanked above, 
my thesis work has benefited from rewarding conversation with 
Albert Casullo, Phil Corkum, Bob Fischer, Rebecca Hanrahan, Felipe 
Leon, Sanna Mattilla, Sónia Roca-Royes, Andreas Stephens, Margot 
Strohminger, Anand Vaidya, Tobias Wilsch, and several others who I 
forget to mention but who I am nonetheless indebted to. I also want 
to extend a thanks to Arianna Betti for giving a very inspiring course 
some years ago, where I managed to get a grasp on what I take to be 
a really nice way of doing philosophy, and for encouraging me to 
pursue the subject further. 
And of course, thanks to all my friends and family for keeping me 
sane. Some of you through being supportive, others by not giving a 
damn about theoretical philosophy in general or my thesis in 
particular but just wanting to go for a walk, hang out, or get drunk. 
Thanks to Johanna for sharing her horse Pelle with me. My parents, 
of course, who always believe in me, help me out, and never ques-
tioned the ridiculous choice to pursue a PhD in philosophy of all 
things – thank you. Finally, I want to thank Eric Brandstedt for end-
less support, encouragement and patience. Apart from being a 
wonderful partner he has also been a useful and inspiring 
commentator and sounding board for ideas big and small that have 
found their way into this book. Few things infuriate me more than his 
comments on my texts but once the dust settles, I usually realise he 
has a point. Thank you so much for always putting up with me.  

 Contents 
1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Modality, Epistemology of Modality, and the Meta-
Epistemology of Modality ................................................................... 2 
1.2. How to Think of Meta-Theoretical Requirements ................ 12 
1.3. The Integration Challenge ......................................................... 14 
1.4. Modal Empiricism and Modal Rationalism ............................ 20 
1.5. Chapter Overview ....................................................................... 23 
2. THE INTEGRATION REQUIREMENT ................................................ 27 
2.1. The Vertical Follow-up Question ............................................. 28 
2.2. A Central Assumption: METAPHYSICS MATTERS .................. 30 
2.3. POSITIVE: A Strong Sense of ‘Integration’ .............................. 36 
2.3.1. POSITIVE: An Explanatory Demand ................................ 39 
2.3.2. POSITIVE: The Explanandum Fact ..................................... 41 
2.3.3. POSITIVE: The Right Sort of Explanation ....................... 44 
2.3.4. POSITIVE: CAUSAL BLUEPRINT and NEUTRALITY .......... 48 
2.4. Contrasting Two Framings ........................................................ 50 
2.5. The Deferral Strategy and Its Constraints ............................... 56 
2.5.1. The BULGE IN THE CARPET-constraint ........................... 58 
2.5.2. METAPHYSICS MATTERS, again .......................................... 62 
2.6. Conclusions .................................................................................. 63 
3. MODAL EMPIRICISM: PROMISES AND PROBLEMS .......................... 67 
3.1. The Promise of Modal Empiricism .......................................... 68 
3.2. Integrating Modal Empiricism .................................................. 70 
3.2.1. Induction-based Modal Empiricism ................................ 74 
3.2.2. Abduction-based Modal Empiricism ............................... 78 
3.3. Three Worries .............................................................................. 85 
3.3.1. First Worry: Black-Boxing ................................................. 86 
3.3.2. Second Worry: METAPHYSICS Still MATTERS ................. 88 
3.3.3. Third Worry: The Limitation Problem ............................ 90 
3.4. The Tension Problem ............................................................... 100 
3.5. Conclusions ................................................................................ 102 
4. EASING THE TENSION: METAPHYSICAL NON-UNIFORMISM .... 105 
4.1. Uniformism and Non-Uniformism at a Glance ................... 106 
4.2. Two Ways to Construe the Conflict ...................................... 110 
4.2.1. A Conflict over Proper Domain Restriction ................ 112 
4.2.2. A Conflict over Abductive Inference ............................ 115 
4.3. Strong or Weak Non-Uniformism? ........................................ 118 
4.3.1. In Favour of Strong Non-Uniformism ......................... 119 
4.3.2. Strong Non-Uniformism and the Tension Problem ... 124 
4.4. Looking for Metaphysical Heterogeneity in the Modal Realm: 
The Abstract/Concrete Distinction .............................................. 128 
4.4.1. The Way of Essentialism ................................................. 135 
4.5. Conclusions ................................................................................ 140 
5. A RATIONALIST SHORTCUT? ........................................................... 143 
5.1. The Role of Necessity and the One-Sided Explanation ..... 146 
5.2. Implication: METAPHYSICS MATTERS is False ....................... 150 
5.3. Two Distinct Explanatory Tasks ............................................ 154 
5.4. Why Switch Explanatory Tasks? ............................................. 156 
5.4.1. Something Wrong with the Original .............................. 156 
5.4.2. NEUTRALITY is Misguided ............................................... 158 
5.4.3. The Sceptical Framing ...................................................... 162 
5.5. Conclusions ................................................................................ 163 
6. AVOIDING THE TENSION: AXIOLOGICAL NON-UNIFORMISM . 169 
6.1. The Ordinary/Extraordinary Distinction ............................. 170 
6.2. A Tale of Two Epistemological Projects ............................... 174 
6.2.1. Van Inwagen’s Analogy ................................................... 174 
6.2.2. The Relevance of Being Extraordinary ......................... 177 
6.3. Lightweight but Strong Non-Uniformism ............................ 180 
6.4. Epistemic Value Pluralism ....................................................... 182 
6.4.1. Another Isomorphism Assumption ............................... 184 
6.4.2. Disjunctive Epistemic Value Pluralism ......................... 186 
6.4.3. An Argument from Axiological Heterogeneity ............ 188 
6.5. Axiological Heterogeneity Along the Ordinary/Extraordinary 
Distinction ......................................................................................... 190 
6.5.1. If Not Truth, Then What? ............................................... 190 
6.5.2. The Context of Extraordinary Modal Claims ............... 194 
 6.5.3. The (Ir)relevance of Epistemic Responsibility ............. 199 
6.5.4. Against the Truth-Aim ..................................................... 205 
6.5.5. Rationalist Methods and Epistemic Responsibility ..... 211 
6.6. Conclusions ................................................................................ 215 
7. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION ............................................................. 219 
7.1. The Role of Scepticism ............................................................ 220 
7.2. Should We Care About Integration? ...................................... 225 






This is a thesis in the meta-epistemology of modality. It investigates the 
rules that govern theory-construction and theory-evaluation in the 
epistemology of modality – what they are, what they dictate, whether 
and why we should keep them on. In particular, an issue known as 
the integration challenge for modality will be of central importance. Also 
central is the question of whether we should be uniformists or non-
uniformists in theorising about modal knowledge, and how this issue 
interplays with questions related to the integration challenge.  
I scrutinise and clarify these meta-issues, using modal empiricism as a 
running example. ‘Modal empiricism’ is not one theory, but a label 
for a family of theories that all take experiential knowledge to play the 
key role in the way our beliefs about modal matters are justified. This 
approach to the epistemology of modality has gained some popularity 
in recent years, partly because it – with ease – lives up to the require-
ment that the integration challenge for modality must be met. Or at 
least, that seems to be a wide-spread assumption. That assumption 
will be evaluated in this book. As it turns out, given a clear(er) under-
standing of what that requirement amounts to, it is not as obvious as 
is often supposed, that modal empiricism has no problem with the 
integration challenge. I argue that much work remains on the empir-
icist’s behalf before we can say that empiricist modal epistemologies 
have the ability to meet the integration challenge, and in particular 
before we can say that empiricism is better off in this respect than 
competing accounts. Moreover, even if modal empiricism is said to 
be in a relatively good position with respect to the integration chal-
lenge, integration comes at the cost of forcing the empiricist to 
choose between far-reaching partial modal scepticism and so-called 
non-uniformism about the epistemology of modality. I explore what 
the modal empiricist can say in order to make the option of non-
uniformism into a virtue rather than a cost.  
One upshot, captured in the title of this book, is that modal 
empiricism does not offer an easy resolution to one of the most 
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difficult and ultimately important issues in the philosophy of modal-
ity. Nor is it easy for a modal empiricist to overcome the threat from 
partial scepticism by endorsing non-uniformism. And while this indi-
cate that I will also engage in first-order modal epistemology in the 
sense of raising certain challenges for modal empiricism, my aim is 
not to argue that modal empiricism should be abandoned, or to pro-
mote any particular modal epistemology as the correct one. The over-
arching theme in the book are questions that firmly belong to the 
meta-epistemology of modality. Modal empiricism is just the guinea 
pig, albeit a useful and interesting one.  
The purpose of this chapter is to set the stage for what is to follow. 
In doing so, I begin by introducing the broader notions ‘modality’, 
‘epistemology of modality’ and ‘meta-epistemology of modality’ and 
a number of stipulations and assumptions, both terminological and 
more substantial, that I will work under during the course of the book. 
Then, I provide a provisional description of the integration challenge 
and how first-order theories in the epistemology of modality can be 
understood in relation to it, and in particular theories classified as em-
piricist modal epistemologies. I conclude with a brief chapter over-
view.  
1.1. Modality, Epistemology of Modality, and 
the Meta-Epistemology of Modality 
Let’s start by considering the ‘modality’ part of this book’s topic, and 
work from there. The canonical examples of modal statements are 
statements about what is necessarily the case and what could possibly 
be the case, as opposed to what is (merely) actually the case1, such as: 
1. It is possible for this wooden desk to break. 
2. 2 is necessarily a prime number.  
                                    
1 If something is actually the case, it follows that it is possibly the case. Actuality entails 
possibility, that is. But the philosophy of modality typically focuses only on nonactual 
possibility, and so will I. However, the fact that actuality does entail possibility will be 
of some importance for one of the empiricist theories I scrutinise in detail.  
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3. Aleister Crowley could have had a brother, but could 
not have been born to different parents. 
4. It is possible that the world is gunky (i.e. has no mere-
ological bottom level). 
But modal statements also include for instance statements about dis-
positions, powers and potentialities, causal connections, and the 
essences of things.2  
It is commonplace among philosophers to talk about modality in 
terms of possible worlds. To claim that p is possible is to claim that 
there is some possible world in which p; to claim that q is necessary is 
to claim that in all possible worlds, q. I will sometimes also talk in 
terms of possible worlds, but intend this talk in a non-committal 
manner as to whether there actually are some possible worlds in our 
ontology or not. I just follow many others in using the possible 
worlds-vocabulary as a useful representational tool.  
There are a variety of different modalities we may speak of, or per-
haps rather a variety of senses in which something can be possible or 
necessary. The modal claims of interest in this book are all alethic. 
They are not about what one can or must think or believe (epistemic 
or deontic modalities), or about how one can or must act (practical or 
normative modalities). More precisely, the focus will be on metaphysical 
modality. The notion of metaphysical modal truth can be contrasted 
with other alethic modal notions. First, metaphysical modality is dis-
tinct from (narrow) logical modality. Truths of narrow logical modal-
ity, I take it, hold in virtue of the rules of logic. A claim like “It is 
possible that something is simultaneously green all over and red all 
over” is true when intended as a claim of narrow logical modality, 
because the rules of logic do not preclude it. Second, I will assume 
that metaphysical modality is distinct from what some philosophers 
                                    
2 There is a growing tendency, following Fine (1994) and Lowe (2008), to say that 
essence-claims are not themselves modal, but have modal implications. On such a 
broadly Aristotelian notion of ‘essence’, not all necessary truths about an entity e are 
essential truths about e, although all necessary truths are true in virtue of some 
essential truth(s) about some entity/ies. This contrasts with the view, often associated 
with the works of Kripke and Putnam, according to which an essentialist truth just is 
a de re necessary truth about a particular entity. 
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call conceptual modality. Truths of conceptual modality hold in virtue 
of the nature or meaning of a concept. I take metaphysical modality 
to differ from these two species of modality in virtue of the underly-
ing metaphysics. That is, I take it that metaphysical modal truths are 
not generally true in virtue of the meaning of words or concepts, or 
principles of logic. I will neither be concerned with narrow logical 
modality nor conceptual modality in what follows.  
Instead, I will be concerned with alethic modal truth about the 
world; about what it can or must be like, objectively speaking. One 
alethic notion of modality, which seems to be like that, is nomological 
modality. This is most easily understood as the kind of modal claims 
that turn somehow on the laws of nature. Consider a claim like “It is 
possible to travel faster than the speed of light”. This is not a nomo-
logical modal truth, because the laws of nature preclude it. In no pos-
sible world governed by the same laws of nature that govern our 
world is there something that travels faster than the speed of light. 
But there is a sense (and not a logical or conceptual sense) in which it 
is possible – let’s assume – to travel faster than the speed of light. So 
we might say that “It is possible to travel faster than the speed of 
light” is a truth of metaphysical modality. That is, there are some 
possible worlds where something travels faster than the speed of light. 
Not ones governed by the same laws of nature that govern our world, 
to be sure, but others. This more unrestricted, metaphysical sense of 
‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ is what I will be concerned with here. Some 
philosophers do not agree that nomological and metaphysical 
modality come apart. So-called necessitarians hold that the laws of 
nature are metaphysically necessary (e.g. Bird 2005; Swoyer 1982), and 
hence all nomological necessities are metaphysical necessities, and all 
metaphysical possibilities are nomological possibilities. They will take 
the proposition <It is metaphysically possible to travel faster than the 
speed of light> to be false. But the important thing here was to mark 
out that I am interested in the most unrestricted form of possibility 
and necessity about the world. Necessitarians can accept this, but hold 
that this modality allows fewer possibilities than what others think 
there are.  
I will often assume, for the sake of argument, that there are meta-
physical possibilities that are not nomological possibilities and that 
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not all nomological necessities are metaphysical necessities. I will also 
assume that all unqualified possibility claims that are true when read 
as nomological possibility claims are true also when read as meta-
physical possibility claims.3 Thus, when I say that I am interested only 
in metaphysical modality, this includes not only claims like <It is pos-
sible to travel faster than the speed of light>, but also <It is possible 
that my bike could have been another colour>, even though the latter 
is still true when read as a nomological, or an even more restricted, 
necessity. Statements 1–4 above are all intended as statements of 
metaphysical modality, and so will the rest of the example statements in 
this book be, unless otherwise is indicated. 
I will be assuming that a modal statement or a modal claim – I use 
these interchangeably for expressions of a modal proposition – is true 
because it corresponds in some sense to a modal reality. One may also 
express this guiding thought as (modal) truth being dependent on the 
(modal) facts. Indeed, I will often speak of ‘modal facts’ as that which 
our modal beliefs are about. But I do not intend with this usage of 
the fact-terminology, or with the assumption that truth depends on 
being in a broad sense, to assume an ontology of structured facts or 
to commit myself to truth-maker theory (on both of these issues, see 
e.g. Armstrong 1997). 
In making this assumption, I am setting aside some available views 
on modality. One is Amie Thomasson’s (2007, 2013) normativism 
about modality, where modal claims are not descriptively about any-
thing, but are claims indicating how to use language. Another is 
Thomas Holden’s (2014) expressivism about modality, according to 
which modal talk is not descriptive but rather expresses what we find 
                                    
3 Kit Fine (2002) argues that we cannot understand nomological necessity as a 
restricted or relative form of metaphysical necessity. Part of his reasons for thinking 
so concern what he takes to be the “sources” of nomological and metaphysical 
necessity, i.e. they concern modal metaphysics, I take it. I am not sure to what extent 
(if any) I am required to assume that Fine is wrong in what I will go on to say later in 
this book. But I certainly do not think that this particular assumption requires me to 
assume that Fine is wrong, since it says nothing about whether or not one can be 
defined in terms of the other, and says nothing about what the underlying metaphysics 
are. Either way, I will continue to talk of nomological modality as a “restricted 
modality”, meaning with this that there is a less restricted sense of objective modality 
concerning the world, namely metaphysical modality. 
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imaginable. There are close relatives to these accounts though, which 
are not excluded. One might hold that modal discourse describes 
norms, conventions, facts about what is e.g. imaginable, or what is 
the case according to a certain fiction.4 That is to say, I am not 
meaning to exclude accounts of modality where there are modal facts, 
which we attempt to capture with modal language, but these facts are 
mind-dependent in the way conventions, fictions or imaginings might 
be. Mind-dependent facts are facts too, and they can be described by 
modal claims that are true or false.  
Whether the modal facts to which metaphysical modal statements 
correspond in some way are mind-dependent or mind-independent, 
and what their more precise nature is, is a question for metaphysicians 
of modality. Putting forward a view on this, is to put forward a modal 
metaphysics. I am going to refer to those who take modal facts to be 
mind-independent5 as ‘modal realists’ in what follows. There are many 
candidate theories of modal metaphysics to choose from. Among the 
realist alternatives there is great variety of different views on what 
things must be like in order for a modal claim to be true. Several of 
the more traditional modal metaphysics operate with the idea that 
modal statements are literally about possible worlds: Lewis’ (1986) 
theory of concrete possible worlds, Adams’ (1974) view of possible 
worlds as sets of propositions, Plantinga’s (1978) theory of possible 
worlds as states of affairs, and Stalnaker (1976) who took possible 
worlds to be properties. Recently, it is becoming more popular to turn 
away from the possible worlds metaphysics, and instead seek to 
account for all modality in terms of essences or dispositions of 
individual objects, see e.g. Borghini and Williams (2008), Hale (2013), 
Jacobs (2010), Lowe (2008), and Vetter (2015). 
The metaphysics of modality will often play an important role in 
what follows, although it is not the main topic. Although I will not 
commit myself to any particular metaphysics, I will often, for the sake 
                                    
4 See Nolan (2016) for an overview of different ways to understand modal 
fictionalism.  
5 To be mind-independent here means to not depend in any interesting way on 
thinkers’ minds. Of course, even according to a modal realist, there will be mind-
dependent modal facts in some sense, most obviously modal facts concerning minds, 
and entities that are mind-dependent.  
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of argument, assume that some realist theory is correct – this reflects 
the fact that most modal epistemologists assume a realist view. Again, 
I intend my use of ‘modal facts’ to be neutral between different meta-
physical theories, and refer to whatever it is that modal claims are true 
in virtue of, whether mind-independent or mind-dependent. That 
modal truths are true in virtue of modal facts should be taken as com-
patible with any view according to which modal facts can be reduced 
to or ultimately explained in terms of, strictly speaking, non-modal 
facts such as facts about what is the case at Lewisian worlds. As 
above, I intend this to be completely neutral on the issue of whether 
the modal ontology include any structured entities like Armstrong’s 
“state of affairs” or similarly. 
A different question one might ask about modal statements, and 
one that has often come up in relation to modal metaphysics, in 
particular realist accounts of it, is: how can we know them to be true?6 
And especially: how can we know them to be true given that such-
and-such is what it takes for them to be true? Throughout a lot of its 
contemporary history, philosophy of modality proceeded in a meta-
physics-first manner, and issues pertaining to our knowledge of 
modal truths and our ability to support modal claims were a sideline 
to the project of providing a theory of modal metaphysics. The recent 
two decades or so, this has changed and today the question of modal 
knowledge has a research field of its own: the epistemology of 
modality. The epistemology of modality then, is the inquiry into how 
we can know modal truths, and make justified modal judgements.  
I will for current purposes assume that not much of interest to the 
epistemology of modality hinges on the difference between modal 
knowledge and justified true modal belief. I will thus alternate 
                                    
6 A class of modal statements where this question has an obvious answer is possibility-
claims about actual states of affairs, i.e. if I know that my skirt is actually maroon then 
I can trivially derive from this that it is possible that my skirt is maroon, since actuality 
implies possibility. Such trivial modal knowledge is typically not part of what modal 
epistemologists target (although as mentioned in footnote 1 above, the inference from 
actuality to possibility often plays a role in modal empiricist theories). Similarly for 
what we might (a bit inaccurate, but still) call analytic modal truths, i.e. modal 
statements that are true in virtue of the meaning of the words or concepts, such as 
“Necessarily, all vixens are female”. Arguably, the general claim that actuality entails 
possibility is also an analytic or conceptual truth in this sense. 
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between talk of modal knowledge and modal justification (with which 
I intend justification of a modal belief). I make this assumption in line 
with most contemporary modal epistemologists. To be clear, I also 
intend ‘justification’ in modal justification to be quite broadly under-
stood and not presuppose any particular theory of justification to be 
correct.7 What I will assume is the following. Epistemic justification 
is one of several species belonging to the genus ‘justification’. Other 
species include moral, pragmatic, and legal justification. Modal 
justification, in turn, is an instance of epistemic justification, so what-
ever goes generally for the latter carries over to the former. I take it 
that a belief’s having the property of being justified is not to be under-
stood as a primitive state of affairs, i.e. when it obtains it does so in 
virtue of some more basic circumstances or other. The literature on 
epistemic justification largely concerns what these circumstances are, 
i.e. what conditions must be satisfied in order for a belief to be 
justified, and this is where I will not assume anything more specific at 
the outset of the discussion to be had in the book. I will not, for 
instance assume anything about e.g. whether internalism or external-
ism about justification is correct. When I speak of ‘modal justifi-
cation’, I just mean whatever circumstances must obtain in order for 
a modal belief to be justified, and specifying these circumstances is 
one way of understanding what modal epistemologists are doing 
when they formulate their candidate modal epistemologies.  
I will also assume that we actually do have some true justified 
modal beliefs – that is, I set full-blown modal scepticism aside in this 
book (this too is in line with much contemporary modal episte-
mology). That said, the possibility of partial modal scepticism, in vari-
ous guises and to various extents, will be of some importance. Finally, 
a terminological point that I will try to stay in line with: when I talk 
of ‘the epistemology of modality’ I will intend the research area in 
general, and when I talk of ‘a modal epistemology’ I will intend a 
particular theory in the epistemology of modality. Sometimes I will 
                                    
7 Although I will make finer distinctions and discuss the relevance of them during the 
course of this book, see especially chapter 6.  
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make that even clearer by talking of ‘individual modal epistemologies’ 
or a ‘candidate modal epistemology’.8 
The research questions (many of them importantly intercon-
nected) in the epistemology of modality include: How is modal 
knowledge possible? How much and what kind of modal knowledge 
do we have? How can someone be justified in believing a proposition 
like <It is possible for this wooden desk to break>? What other 
beliefs, or what else if not further beliefs, can epistemically support 
modal beliefs? How are different kinds of modal knowledge related 
to each other? Most effort has gone into trying to answer the 
questions of what is required to be justified in holding a modal belief, 
i.e. into spelling out the route to modal knowledge. This corresponds 
to what I spoke of above as the specifying of circumstances that must 
obtain in order for a modal belief to be justified. This may be done in 
terms of what reasons an epistemic subject must have for thinking 
that such-and-such is possible, for instance, and/or in terms of what 
cognitive mechanisms or processes must be involved, and/or in 
terms of how the epistemic subject must be related to various external 
factors, and so on, depending on what sort of modal epistemology is 
being put forward. My broad term for this will be ‘method’ (or 
‘method for supporting modal belief’), and I intend this to be neutral 
between different sorts of theories of modal justification. Thus, 
modal epistemologies outline methods for supporting modal belief. 
Here are some examples of theories – candidate modal epistemol-
ogies – that have been offered in response to the question of how we 
can be justified in believing a modal proposition. Let’s take as an 
example the claim that it is possible for this wooden desk to break. 
Conceivability theories hold that if a subject can conceive of a 
scenario s that verifies <This wooden desk breaks>, the subject is 
justified in believing that it is possible for this wooden desk to break, 
on basis of the conceivability of s. Intuition-based theories hold that 
if a subject has a non-sensory/intellectual intuition that this wooden 
                                    
8 To immediately remove a possible cause for confusion: in parts of the more general 
analytic epistemology literature, ‘modal epistemology’ is used to designate a theory of 
knowledge that explicates the link between truth and belief in cases of knowledge in 
modal terms (cf. Becker 2018). This, it should be clear, is not how I use ‘modal 
epistemology’.  
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desk could break when entertaining the relevant question of the 
modal status of <This wooden desk breaks>, then the subject is, on 
basis of that intuition, justified in believing that it is possible for this 
wooden desk to break. An essence-based account might hold that if 
a subject knows the essence of the relevant entities involved (e.g. the 
wooden desk) and nothing in their essences is incompatible with a 
situation in which it is true that this wooden desk breaks, she can 
deduce that that it is possible for this wooden desk to break.9 A 
similarity-based account holds that if a subject has categorical 
knowledge of sufficiently and relevantly similar entities (e.g. other 
wooden desks, other wooden furniture or complex artefacts) actually 
having the property under consideration (i.e. being broken) she is jus-
tified in believing that that it is possible for this wooden desk to break. 
A theory-based account holds that a subject is justified in believing 
that that it is possible for this wooden desk to break if she is justified 
in believing a theory which implies that it is possible for this wooden 
desk to break.  
These are only crude simplifications of rather complex and some-
times very detailed epistemologies.10 But they give a rough idea of 
what epistemologists of modality are in the business of doing, and 
they are to be understood as distinct methods, in the broad sense 
indicated above.  
Many modal epistemologists also work within a paradigm, in the 
sense that they assume that something in the neighbourhood of e.g. 
                                    
9 There are a some very diverse approaches to how we might know the essence of a 
thing. Some – in particular so-called dispositional essentialists like Bird (2007), hold 
that essentialist knowledge is a fairly straightforward product of empirically acquired, 
scientific knowledge. This is a result of their understanding the laws of nature to be 
metaphysically necessary, and essentialist truths to be de re necessary truths. Hence, 
this is the route to de re possibility knowledge via knowledge of de re necessity. On a 
more Aristotelian understanding of essences (cf. my footnote 2 above), modal 
knowledge is derivative of essentialist knowledge, and essentialist knowledge requires 
a different treatment, see e.g. Oderberg (2007), and Tahko (2018) for discussion.  
10 See e.g. Yablo (1993) or Chalmers (2002) for proposals of rationalist conceivability 
theories and Kung (2010) for an ‘imagination-based’ modal epistemology with 
empirical underpinnings, Bealer (2002) for an intuition-based account, Lowe (2012) 
or Hale (2013) for essence-based modal epistemology, Roca-Royes (2017) for a 
similarity-based account, Fischer (2017b) for a theory-based account.  
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conceivability theory or essence-based deduction is correct and 
proceed by attending to quirks and problems for such accounts, and 
by doing so they improve, fine-tune, and flesh out the details of the 
theory. The objective of this book is not to present a new candidate 
modal epistemology, or to fine-tune any existing such. Nor am I going 
to weigh in on the actual or possible scope of our modal knowledge. 
Instead, I am primarily going to focus on issues concerning how the 
merits and demerits of candidate theories in the epistemology of 
modality should be systematically assessed (and in particular on how 
this plays out for a certain family of theories).  
This is where the meta-epistemology of modality enters the 
picture. As we saw, first-order theories – candidate modal epistemol-
ogies – address questions about how someone can have knowledge, 
or be justified in holding certain beliefs, etc., but with respect to 
modal matters specifically. The meta-epistemology of modality is one 
“level up” from that theorising. Think of it as a form of second-order 
theorising about the first-order theorising. It inquires into the first-
order theorising by asking questions (many of them importantly inter-
connected) like: What are the aim(s) of the epistemology of modality? 
What are the aim(s) of modal enquiry? What should a candidate 
modal epistemology accomplish in order to be a successful, or good, 
theory? How are we to decide between different modal epistemolo-
gies? What desiderata or requirements do we, or should we, call upon 
in evaluating and comparing candidate modal epistemologies? Why is 
it often assumed that the epistemology of modality faces an especially 
difficult task? 
In particular, this book focuses on a candidate desideratum, a 
characteristic of a successful or good theory, namely that it meets the 
so-called integration challenge. The idea is that if a theory can meet 
the integration challenge, we have reason to prefer it over theories 
that fail to meet the integration challenge. I will introduce this desidera-
tum in more detail in 1.4 below. But quite generally, one might say that 
this book concerns the justification of theories, i.e. of candidate modal 
epistemologies. Seeing that a modal epistemology can meet the 
integration challenge is a reason in favour of endorsing it, roughly 
speaking. This is not to be confused with the justification of individual 
modal beliefs, which is what these theories are typically saying some-
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thing about – e.g. what reasons do we have for accepting a given 
account of how we can be justified in holding modal beliefs; what 
reasons do we have for rejecting some other account as less good? In 
the next section, I discuss in some more detail why I consider this 
question of theory justification important and what sort of answers 
one can expect.  
1.2. How to Think of Meta-Theoretical 
Requirements 
There are, nowadays especially, many different modal epistemologies 
on the market. It is thus vital that we have tools for assessing, com-
paring, and evaluating them, using some sort of standard. The hope 
is that this book can contribute to that end, facilitating theory-
evaluation by clarifying some issues regarding what is sometimes said 
to be requirements on modal epistemologies. But one needs to be 
clear on what the expected outcomes are of an investigation like the 
one to be undertaken in this book, and this section is meant to 
elucidate that.  
One needs to be careful when one starts to inquire into what sort 
of requirements for theorising in the epistemology of modality we 
should be looking for. Because on the one hand, it seems wrong to 
set up a framework for theorising about modal justification that is 
going to rule out a lot of substantial modal epistemologies, seemingly 
legitimate positions, from the get-go. So there is a sense in which we 
might want to be as neutral as possible, for fairness’ sake, and in the 
interest of making for a fruitful, forward-moving debate. On the other 
hand, in order to be able to say anything useful at all as to whether 
one sort of theory is to be preferred over another, we need to know 
what we are comparing them with respect to. In short, one wants a 
general framework, but not too general because then we will not be 
able to say very much of interest.  
It is vital to be aware that meta-theoretical claims are not ever 
going to be neutral in any useful sense of that word. When we settle 
on requirements that we take it a theory should fulfil, we settle on 
those requirements for a reason. That reason may or may not be 
acceptable to some theorists – like most reasons, it can be rejected. 
CHAPTER ONE 
13 
Therefore, it is important to be transparent about the meta-theoretical 
commitments that make up the framework within which we are to 
construct, compare and evaluate individual modal epistemologies. 
The point is not necessarily to find neutral requirements that everyone 
will accept. The point is to find useful requirements that may be 
supported by good reasons – useful in the sense that they will be 
general enough as to be acceptable to a critical mass, preferably quite 
large, of theorists in the field, while also allowing us to say interesting 
things about first-order theories.11 There is always going to be a 
difficult balance between generality and usefulness. The important 
thing, in my view, is to be clear and open about what assumptions are 
guiding the discussion. This book will hopefully contribute to the 
clarity as regards some assumptions that are arguably in play in the 
first-order debate as it is.  
This insight should also help answer a question that might be 
raised once a move to the meta-level is made: do we need to hold off 
with doing first-order epistemology of modality until we have settled 
the meta-questions? No, we do not. Indeed, I do not think we should. 
There is no neutral, non-negotiable, way to formulate the framework 
for theorising which will satisfy everyone, so meta-epistemological 
theorising will not be “done”, once and for all, allowing us to get on 
with first-order theorising in peace, knowing what the rules are. In 
addition, much of interest to the meta-discussion can be gleaned from 
what goes on at the first-order level – what requirements there are on 
theories is often revealed in the form of objections to particular 
theories that fail to live up to such-and-such a requirement or do 
justice to this or that aspect. My personal view is that we need to do 
meta-level work alongside the first-order work, go back and forth be-
tween them, in order to get on in the most fruitful way. Again, the 
most important thing with doing something like the meta-epistemol-
ogy of modality is to clarify and motivate the assumptions that one 
takes to guide the debate. Not everyone will agree, and most things 
are up for discussion, but as long as we are clear on what is at stake, 
                                    
11 Note that the reasons theorists have for accepting a given requirement may vary. I 
do not mean to imply that they need to be, or typically are, pragmatic. 
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there won’t be any invisible meta-theoretical disagreement lurking 
under the surface, impeding first-order progress.  
What we can hope for, as far as the upcoming discussion about the 
integration challenge and its role for the epistemology of modality is 
concerned, is thus not a final verdict on whether or not it is a good 
requirement to place on modal epistemologies, or a completely 
neutral characterisation of it. Rather, the aim is to provide an en-
hanced understanding of how different characterisations of it play out 
very differently when we are to judge modal epistemologies with 
respect to it, which in turn will be helpful for each modal epistemol-
ogist when she is to take a stand on whether or not she considers it a 
fruitful meta-theoretical assumption.  
1.3. The Integration Challenge 
It is common to frame a central issue in the epistemology of modality 
in terms of what is known as “the integration challenge”. The 
integration challenge was conveniently named (although not dis-
covered) by Christopher Peacocke (1999). Very briefly, the integra-
tion challenge for modality is the challenge to provide an epistemol-
ogy of modality which harmonises with the metaphysics of modality 
– to “reconcile” metaphysics and epistemology, as Peacocke would 
have it (1999, 1). 
This challenge, of course, is not unique to modality. In fact, it is a 
challenge that is common to all domains of philosophical interest, as 
long as we think that claims about that domain are truth-apt and that 
we can be justified in believing some of these claims. However, it is 
certainly the case that ‘challenge’ may not be a suitable term for the 
task of outlining the relationship between metaphysics and epistemol-
ogy in all domains. Sometimes it seems really easy. It might thus be 
useful to think of integration as a desideratum or a requirement placed 
on theories pertaining to any truth-apt domain, and ‘integration 
challenge’ as a name for the task when achieving integration appears 
difficult for the domain in question. Modality is certainly among the 
domains that has been widely agreed to labour under an integration 
challenge, along with for instance mathematics and ethics. What I will 
inquire into is the nature of the requirement or desideratum on modal 
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epistemologies that it should enable us to meet the integration 
challenge for modality. I refer to this as the integration requirement in 
what follows. I will study how modal epistemologies of a particular 
variety, modal empiricist theories, perform in relation to this integra-
tion requirement, and how the issue of integration is interconnected 
with another issue, namely that of whether we should be uniformists 
or non-uniformists about the epistemology of modality.  
A very important thing to note about the integration requirement 
is its connection with the common idea that getting to the truth is the 
goal or aim of enquiry. One might also express this idea in terms of 
epistemic value: the final epistemic good is true belief and error avoid-
ance. That believing the truth and avoiding error is the epistemic good 
is a fairly common doctrine in epistemology, and comes in different 
guises: Goldman (1999) calls it “veritism”, Pritchard (2011) calls it 
“epistemic value T-monism”, and many, including Ahlström-Vij and 
Grimm (2013) and Kvanvig (2003) talk about “truth monism”. I will 
go with the latter of the three terms in what follows. On this view, 
true belief is the only final epistemic good. This does not mean that 
other things that seem epistemically valuable – reliability, knowledge, 
justification, rationality, and so on – are not epistemic goods. It is just 
that they are non-final, i.e. instrumental, epistemic goods. That is, they 
are valuable only in relation to the final epistemic good of getting to 
the truth. Note that truth monism leaves open whether true belief, 
while the final epistemic good, is an instrumental good in relation to 
other, non-epistemic goods – say, practical or moral goods. 
Just about everyone agrees that epistemic justification is something 
epistemically valuable. And if true belief is the final epistemic good, 
then it is natural to think that epistemic justification should somehow 
further this aim, and that it is epistemically valuable because it does. 
That is, according to truth monism, justification is an instrumental 
epistemic good in relation to the final epistemic good of true belief. 
This is a particular version of a consequentialist approach to justifi-
cation, according to which whether something is a justificatory 
method or not depends on whether the consequences of applying it 
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are generally the right ones.12 For the truth monist, the right conse-
quences are true beliefs. That is the good towards which enquiry 
strives, so to speak. So whether a particular method is a good 
candidate for conferring justification on a belief will depend on 
whether it is conducive towards the goal of enquiry, namely true 
belief. Modal justification being a species of epistemic justification, 
this all carries over to the epistemology of modality: if true modal 
belief is the aim of our epistemic activities with respect to modality, 
then modal justification should somehow further this aim. Modal 
epistemologies, as I said above, put forward candidate accounts of 
modal justification. They suggest what might be involved in holding 
a justified modal belief. Whether or not a method is a good one, i.e. 
is able to confer modal justification, depends on whether it furthers 
the aim of having true modal beliefs. Modal justification, in short, has 
to do with being linked somehow to modal truth, insofar as we accept 
truth monism.  
What does all this have to do with the integration requirement? 
Well, in short, the integration requirement is best seen as a request 
that a theory make good on the promise it makes in claiming that 
such-and-such a method is justificatory with respect to modal 
matters. Claiming that such-and-such a method is a justificatory one 
is, with truth monism in the background, to claim that the method in 
question is somehow related to modal truth, and modal metaphysics 
tells us what is required for a modal claim to be true. It thus seems 
natural to be concerned about having one’s view of modal justifi-
cation and one’s view of modal facts in line with each other. If, 
instead, the goal of (modal) enquiry was, say, to believe only what the 
gods would approve of one believing, then there would be a 
corresponding challenge in integrating one’s theory of modal justifi-
cation with one’s theory of what sort of stuff the gods approve of, in 
order to make it plausible that the method in questioned steered 
modal belief in that direction. But the integration requirement as 
                                    
12 To see this, compare with moral consequentialist theories such as utilitarianism, 
according to which an action or a rule is morally justified only if the consequences of 
performing/applying it are generally the right ones – in that case, resulting in more 
overall net well-being than alternatives. 
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relevant to the epistemology of modality is, chiefly, a requirement 
which assumes that truth is the aim of (modal) enquiry.  
The integration challenge has been discussed quite a bit in the 
epistemology of modality, although not always in the form of a re-
quirement that modal epistemologies are held to. As will be further 
elucidated in chapter 2, the presumed difficulty of living up to the 
integration requirement has played a large role in shaping the modal 
epistemology debate. For one, it is often thought that modal 
knowledge is an especially difficult kind of knowledge to account for. 
Why? A hot candidate for an answer is that it is precisely because our 
hypotheses about modal justification and our hypotheses about what 
modal reality is like just won’t line up – that is, it is difficult to meet 
the integration challenge.  
Relatedly, we find ample criticism of theories to the point that they 
do not do well with respect to integration. Consider the example of 
conceivability theory in order to see this. Conceivability theory is, one 
may safely say, the most traditional modal epistemology, with roots 
in the writings of Descartes and Hume. Contemporary conceivability 
theories vary in strength and detail, but what they all have in common 
is that they aim to account for our modal justification in terms of our 
ability to conceive of scenarios, saying for instance that the fact that 
a world which verifies <p> is conceivable, is a justifier for the belief 
that p is possible. Conceivability theory has an impressively long 
history, but the history of criticism against it is equally long. One of 
the most pressing questions for the conceivability theorist is what 
Vaidya (2015) calls the Connection Question: How is conceivability 
connected to possibility? Clearly, that there is some connection or 
other is a central claim of any conceivability theory.13 But unless we 
also get to hear something more about the nature of this connection, 
something that enlightens us on why we may suspect that such a 
connection exists, we tend to be quite dissatisfied with conceivability 
theory. Especially considering the fact that at least pre-theoretically 
we tend to understand ‘conceivability’ in fundamentally epistemic 
terms, so that whether some p is conceivable or not is relative to 
                                    
13 Although see Lam (2017) who questions the need for and appropriateness of such 
an assumption. I will come back to this discussion in chapter 6 of this book.  
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thinkers and depends on what they know or believe – if we are realists 
about modality, it is highly unclear how such a relativised notion can 
link up with mind-independent possibility. What is going on here 
seems to be that a theory is criticised because it does not manage to 
say anything about why conceivability theory is a suitable epistemol-
ogy for modal matters, given the way we understand modal truth.  
This also seems to be the spirit of Kung’s (2010) argument against 
the idea that what he calls “non-sensory imaginings” can provide 
modal justification (although he is an optimist about the justificatory 
power of “sensory imaginings”). The problem, according to Kung, is 
that we have no reason to think that the (few) restrictions there are 
on what we can imagine in a non-sensory manner, do not seem in any 
way related to modal truth. Similar issues can and have been raised 
for other candidate modal epistemologies. The take-home message is: 
an integration requirement does act as a desideratum in the epistemol-
ogy of modality, i.e. it is being used as a standard by which to evaluate 
theories in the field.  
Against the claim that the integration requirement is of clear 
importance in the first-order debate, one could object that in other 
parts of the contemporary literature on the topic, it is assumed that 
one can do a lot of epistemology of modality without attending to the 
integration challenge. Bob Fischer explicitly registers and endorses 
this assumption in a recent book.  
In the last 40 years, though, the vast majority of those who have written 
about modal epistemology haven’t worried about the Integration 
Challenge. Taking some form of realism about modality for granted, 
they’ve simply proceeded with their epistemological projects. They 
seem to think that we can do a lot of theorizing about the sources and 
scope of our modal knowledge without being able to explain our 
epistemic successes. I assume that this approach is legitimate (2017b, 
6). 
How to understand this? Is it a threat to the guiding assumption of 
the integration requirement’s importance that motivates my investi-
gation? Well, note that there are two ways to not worry about 
integration when doing epistemology of modality. The first, which 
seems to be what Fischer has in mind, is rather weak: It admits that 
the integration challenge is a worry, but suggests that we worry about 
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it later and concentrate on other things for now. As Fischer himself 
says in connection with the above quote: “There is indeed an 
Integration Challenge, but I devote little attention to it here” (2017b, 
6; see also Yablo 1993, 3-4). The other way to not worry is more radi-
cal, and is rather the idea that we do not ever need to attend to 
something like the integration challenge when engaging in modal 
epistemology. 
Clearly, the “not now” approach does not threaten the relevance 
of digging into how the integration requirement is to be understood. 
I am concerned here with how we do and should evaluate modal 
epistemologies. But before one can get on with evaluating, there must 
be some theories on the table in the first place, and these theories 
must be developed. One can certainly spend one’s whole career in the 
epistemology of modality doing this developing, without ever 
engaging explicitly with the integration challenge. There is nothing 
wrong with that in principle (although of course it might be useful to 
have integration in mind from the start if the integration challenge is 
going to be an issue at some point), and so there is indeed a sense in 
which a lot of modal epistemology can be done without worrying 
about the integration challenge. But this in itself does not lessen the 
importance of an account’s ability to meet the integration challenge 
at the end of the day. This becomes especially evident when we note 
that although it might well be true that (many) contemporary modal 
epistemologists do not explicitly worry about the integration 
challenge when they develop their own accounts, they have certainly 
worried about it in criticising and identifying problems for competing 
theories – that is, when they evaluate modal epistemologies. We have 
already seen examples of that when briefly considering the criticism 
against conceivability theories above, and will see more of it in chapter 
2. So, if one wants to challenge the relevance of the integration 
challenge, one needs to go for the stronger “not ever” interpretation, 
which is not what Fischer appears to have in mind, and I do not know 
of anyone who have explicitly defended it. 14 As we will see in chapter 
                                    
14 As mentioned in footnote 13 above, Lam (2017) suggests rejecting the idea that 
modal justification needs to be truth-conducive, in which case the integration 
requirement would not apply. Again, see my discussion in chapter 6.  
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5 however, one strain in the debate can be interpreted as tending to-
wards this conclusion, but in order to understand that reasoning, one 
needs to know better what the integration requirement is supposed to 
be. And so even for those who ultimately might wish to reject it, it is 
of great importance to have a good grasp of what it is supposed to 
be. 
Despite the fact that the integration requirement is a widely recog-
nised, if often tacitly so, issue of importance for the epistemology of 
modality, there is ample room for improvement as far as our grasp of 
what it really amounts to is concerned. In the next chapter, I will 
sketch a conception of the integration requirement and the demands 
it places on modal epistemologies, which I take to be fairly standard, 
in the sense of being friendly to several prevalent assumptions and 
judgements about the integration challenge in the literature. Again, 
that certainly does not mean that I am trying to formulate a neutral 
version of the integration requirement. Along the way, I will be setting 
possible ways to understand the integration requirement to the side. 
That is as it should be. As I noted above, in order to usefully theorise, 
one must tether oneself to certain claims, and this will limit the 
options one allows as legitimate. The important thing is to be trans-
parent about what these claims are and what reasons one has for 
tethering oneself to them rather than other possible ones.  
1.4. Modal Empiricism and Modal Rationalism 
The main task modal epistemologists undertake is to outline the 
method(s) – in the broad sense from above – they take to be able to 
confer modal justification. An issue which has received much atten-
tion in the epistemology of modality is that of whether modal 
justification is a priori or a posteriori. It is thus common to classify indi-
vidual modal epistemologies as either rationalist or empiricist.15 
                                    
15 There are, of course, certain candidate that resist being classified clearly as either, 
sometimes called “hybrid” epistemologies. Moreover, some prefer to work with the 
labels ‘rationalist’ vs ‘non-rationalist’ rather than ‘rationalist’ vs ‘empiricist’, typically 
because they think experience may play an important role in an epistemology without 
warranting the label of ‘empiricism’ in the sense I specify below. See e.g. Williamson 
(2007) and Jenkins (2010).  
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Above I gave some brief examples of what such first-order theories 
in the epistemology of modality can look like, of what sort of methods 
have been put forward as candidates. Among them were both ration-
alist and empiricist epistemologies. Modal epistemologies of a more 
traditional cut, including e.g. modal intuitionism (Bealer 2002), 
Peacocke’s understanding-based view (1999), and the conceivability 
theories of Yablo (1993), Menzies (1998) and Chalmers (2002), are 
versions of modal rationalism. They take modal justification to be an 
a priori affair, i.e. relevantly independent of experience and experien-
tial knowledge. 
In recent years though, modal empiricism has sailed up as a very 
attractive candidate. I take it to be defining of modal empiricist theo-
ries that experience, or experiential knowledge, plays an active justifi-
catory role with respect to modal beliefs. Experience, we might say, 
provides evidence of modal truth, according to these accounts. This 
is typically distinguished from more indirect roles that experience can 
be allowed to play even in a rationalist modal epistemology. Bob 
Fischer stresses this difference in the following way: 
Experience does not merely play an enabling role in modal justification; 
it isn’t simply that experience explains how, say, we acquire the relevant 
concepts. Rather, the view is that modal claims answer to the tribunal 
of experience in roughly the way that claims about quarks and quails 
answer to it (2017a, 263). 
Most empiricist theories are versions of what Fischer (2017a), fol-
lowing McGinn (1999), calls “liberalised empiricism”. That is, they do 
not claim that modal beliefs are justified directly via experience. 
Rather, it is non-modal, experientially justified beliefs together with 
some ampliative principle that do the work. An ampliative principle 
in this context is a principle of reasoning which allows the epistemic 
subject who possesses the right empirically justified, non-modal 
beliefs, to transcend actuality and draw a modal conclusion. Examples 
of such principles that have been appealed to in the literature include 
induction, abduction, and (although not strictly speaking an amplia-
tive principle) deduction. A modal empiricist may of course hold that 
we can have “direct” empirical justification of modal beliefs. Perhaps 
Margot Strohminger’s (2015) perception-based epistemology of non-
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actual possibilities is an example of this. However, I will mostly set 
such approaches aside here and focus on liberalised empiricism. Some 
examples of empiricist theories in this sense are Stephen Biggs’ (2011) 
abduction-based account, Crawford Elder’s (2004, chapter 2) episte-
mology of essences based on the method of “flanking properties”, 
Sònia Roca-Royes’ (2017) similarity-based epistemology of de re 
possibilities for concreta, and Felipe Leon’s (2017) “Moorean” 
approach which features a mixed bag of ordinary inference-patterns 
(e.g. induction, analogy) applied to uncontroversial knowledge of the 
actual world.16  
To be clear, I do not reserve the term ‘modal empiricist’ for those 
who are empiricists about knowledge quite generally. Indeed, as will 
become clear towards the end of chapter 3, one can even be a modal 
empiricist in my sense, without holding that all modal knowledge is 
empirical. All I mean by a ‘modal empiricist’ is someone who think 
that an empiricist modal epistemology is correct.  
It should also be noted that while appeal to the a priori/a posteriori 
and rationalism/empiricism distinctions in modal epistemology is 
very common, not everyone thinks it is worth making a big number 
of them. Williamson (2007) and Jenkins (2010) have both suggested 
that experience can (and does, according to their respective accounts) 
play a role that is more than purely enabling but less than evidential. 
I will set aside discussions about the usefulness of the a priori/a poste-
riori distinction here, although I am sympathetic to some of their 
reservations. What interests me, in my focus on modal empiricism as 
a study object, is how casting experience in something like an eviden-
tial role might or might not help with meeting the integration require-
ment. Whether or not the rationalism/empiricism distinction is ulti-
mately useful to make or not, and whether experience may help with 
integration in some other sense, for theories that cast it in some other 
                                    
16 I also want to mention the work of Barbara Vetter (2016) here. She defends an 
epistemology of metaphysical modality based on gradual extrapolation from 
knowledge of everyday ‘can’-statements (e.g. I can reach the mug; That horse can 
jump a 1m fence). She does not give her own account of how we know ‘can’-
statements but points to the work of e.g. Strohminger and Roca-Royes, so presumably 
it is supposed to be empirically grounded.  
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role, I take it that this is an interesting matter to examine. For 
simplicity, I will continue to use the distinction here.  
It is commonly thought that rationalist theories have a difficult 
time with the integration requirement, in the sense that it is unclear 
what they can offer by way of meeting it. Arguably, modal empiricism 
is better off in this respect. That is, modal empiricism seems to be in 
a better position to meet the integration requirement, and if this is 
true then that is a major advantage for empiricist theories of modal 
justification. The prospects of modal empiricism in relation to the 
integration requirement will be a recurring theme throughout this 
book. I will investigate whether the integration requirement is indeed 
met given modal empiricism, and if so, how it is met, and whether 
there are any serious costs tied to this. As it turns out, there are doubts 
about whether enough had been done to show that it can be met, and 
even bracketing those doubts, there are costs of trying to meet it in 
this way. In particular, I will argue, modal empiricists find themselves 
in an awkward position where they have to choose between accepting 
a rather far-reaching partial modal scepticism, and defending a meta-
theoretical thesis known as non-uniformism. Non-uniformism might 
not be problematic in itself, but the rub is that defending non-
uniformism, as it turns out, involves having to concede that some 
rationalist theory can meet the integration requirement after all, which 
appears to undermine part of the original motivation for empiricism. 
I discuss the various options available to the empiricist in dealing with 
this issue. 
But in order to see why rationalism and empiricism are thought to 
be in different positions with respect to the integration requirement, 
we need to have a better grasp on exactly what sort of desideratum the 
integration requirement is, and that will be the topic of the upcoming 
chapter 2. I end this introductory part with a brief overview of the 
chapters of this book.  
1.5. Chapter Overview 
I begin in chapter 2 with an enquiry into the question of what sort of 
desideratum the integration requirement really is – what is it that we are 
after when we say that a modal epistemology should be able to meet 
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the integration challenge? I sketch and defend a particular under-
standing of the integration requirement as the relevant one. In 
particular, I suggest that the integration requirement should be under-
stood as the demand for an answer to what I call the vertical follow-
up question: “why does suggested method m confer justification on 
modal beliefs?”. The “why” should be read as a request for an expla-
nation in terms of the metaphysical underpinnings of the assumed 
fact that m is able to confer justification on modal beliefs. The idea is 
to preserve and sharpen the idea that the integration challenge is an 
issue of meta-theoretical justification, i.e. an issue of justification of 
theories about modal justification, and draw out the consequences of 
this.  
Chapter 3 concerns the way in which modal empiricist theories are 
supposed to be able to meet the integration requirement, assuming 
modal realism After arguing that being able to meet the integration 
requirement is supposed to be a major advantage of empiricist modal 
epistemologies, I attempt to elucidate the details of how this is 
supposed to be happening, something which has so far been missing 
from the literature. Once these more detailed stories are on the table, 
I point out that there are gaps that arguably would need to be filled 
in, in order for the task to really be completed. In short, meeting the 
integration requirement on modal empiricism seems more demanding 
than one might have thought. Moreover, the way in which the 
integration requirement is supposedly met on empiricist modal 
epistemologies makes them seriously limited in the sense that they can 
only account for a subset of all cases of modal justification. In 
particular, empiricism cannot account for justified modal beliefs 
about abstracta, and not for justified extraordinary modal beliefs. I call 
this the Limitation Problem. The Limitation Problem forces the em-
piricist to choose between rather wide-ranging partial modal scepti-
cism and a position known as non-uniformism. Non-uniformism is 
the view that more than one modal epistemology tells a correct story 
of modal justification. While perhaps not an unattractive view in itself, 
the relevant form of non-uniformism appears to commit the 
empiricist to the view that a non-empiricist theory can also meet the 
integration requirement. This is a dialectically odd position for the 
empiricist to find herself in, and I refer to it as the Tension Problem.  
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Chapter 4 argues that a particular way of conceiving of the uni-
formism/non-uniformism issue and defend the non-uniformist 
position, can help the empiricist dissolve the Tension Problem. I call 
the resulting non-uniformist claim ‘strong non-uniformism’ and the 
argumentative strategy to get there ‘the argument from metaphysical 
heterogeneity’. In a nutshell, the idea is to argue that give a meta-
physical heterogeneity in the modal realm, we can expect there to 
really be two separate integration challenges for modality, and thus it 
is only natural that two very different modal epistemologies (one em-
piricist and one non-empiricist) will be correct and able to meet the 
integration requirement in very different ways. I discuss at length the 
prospects and problems of applying this strategy to the Limitation 
Problem with respect to modal beliefs about abstract entities. At the 
end of the day, the main problem for empiricists gone non-uniformist 
in the face of the Limitation Problem is still that they are committed 
to the claim that some rationalist modal epistemology can meet the 
integration requirement, and it is unclear what this solution is 
supposed to look like. Again, more work is required.  
Therefore, chapter 5 is spent investigating a strategy that has been 
discussed quite a bit in the philosophy of mathematics. This strategy 
is supposed to show that the integration challenge is less challenging 
for rationalist epistemologies than we might think when the domain 
is one of necessary truths, which is arguably the case for e.g. 
mathematics and modality. I argue that as it turns out, the sort of 
explanation favoured by this strategy addresses a distinct explanatory 
task than that identified in chapter 2 as relevant to the integration 
requirement. Endorsing it thus requires one to endorse the change to 
another explanatory task, which threatens to undermine the goodness 
of modal empiricism due to its being able to meet the original 
integration requirement. This is problematic from the point of view 
of the modal empiricist. What is needed is rather a limited version of 
this endorsement, enabling one to say that empiricism and rationalism 
are aimed at different explanatory tasks. Reflection on this will point 
us in the direction of a new potential strategy for being a non-
uniformist, namely with appeal to a heterogeneity on the level of what 
we value from an epistemic point of view, rather than on the 
metaphysical level.  
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Chapter 6 explores this new way of being a non-uniformist, in 
particular as a way of dealing with the aspect of the Limitation 
Problem that concerns extraordinary modal beliefs. This approach is 
available to anyone open to rejecting truth monism about epistemic 
value in favour of a pluralism where true belief is one out of several 
(or two, at least) final epistemic values, and justification can be under-
stood in relation to either of these values. That is, a method can be 
justificatory either in virtue of being instrumental to the aim of true 
belief or in virtue of relating to the other final epistemic good. Since 
the integration requirement is only relevant when true belief is the 
relevant final epistemic good, this opens up for saying that a modal 
epistemology is correct for some modal beliefs even if it has not met 
the integration requirement, as long as true belief is not the relevant 
epistemic good for those modal beliefs. I explore how it might be 
argued that enquiry about ordinary and extraordinary modal matters 
are typically governed by different epistemic aims, in a way supposed 
to be helpful to the modal empiricist who is bothered by implied 
scepticism about extraordinary modal matters. In chapter 7, the last 
of this book, I conclude by clarifying and discussing some 





2. The Integration Requirement 
Christopher Peacocke introduces the integration challenge as a 
“problem of reconciliation”. He writes:   
In a number of diverse areas of philosophy, we face a common 
problem. The problem is one of reconciliation. We have to reconcile a 
plausible account of what is involved in the truth of statements of a 
given kind with a credible account of how we can know those state-
ments, when we do know them (1999, 1).  
What is to be reconciled is thus the epistemology and the metaphysics 
of, in our case, modality. When considered from the perspective of 
the epistemology of modality specifically, we might say that the 
integration challenge is the challenge to provide an epistemology 
which is adequate for knowing modal truths in particular, given the 
modal metaphysics that underwrite these truths. But what does this 
mean? How does one make sure that one’s epistemology and meta-
physics are adequate for each other? What counts as having succeeded 
in the reconciliation, i.e. as having met the integration challenge?  
Despite the fact that the integration challenge is commonly under-
stood to be a tricky issue that indeed faces modal epistemologists, and 
despite the fact that appeal to an integration requirement seems to be 
at the heart of certain common objections in the literature on the 
epistemology of modality, there are no easy answers to these 
questions. There is no clear statement of, and hence probably no clear 
consensus on, exactly what sort of a requirement is really being placed 
on modal epistemologies when we agree that they should provide a 
way to meet the integration challenge for modality. In what follows, 
I explore what I take to be a plausible way to understand the inte-
gration requirement. It is, or so I will argue, a way that makes rather 
good sense of the role played in the debate, in modality and elsewhere, 
by the notion of ‘integration’ – although of course not everything can 
(or should) be preserved, since some of what has been said about the 
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integration challenge appears to conflict with certain other things that 
have been said.  
2.1. The Vertical Follow-up Question   
I suggest we conceive of the integration challenge as the challenge to 
answer an instance of what we may call the vertical follow-up 
question.17 To see what that means, let’s first consider what might be 
thought of as the original question, namely this: what justifies a modal 
belief? Answering this question is the main activity of modal episte-
mologists. First-order modal epistemologies specify candidate 
answers to this question in terms of suggesting methods – in the 
broad sense stipulated in the previous chapter – for supporting modal 
belief. For instance, a conceivability theorist might say that the fact 
that I find philosophical zombies conceivable justifies my belief that 
philosophical zombies are possible. 
To this, we could pose two distinct follow-up questions. On the 
one hand, we could ask: what justifies my claim to finding zombies 
conceivable? This would be to ask a horizontal follow-up question, 
and an answer takes us further back in a justificatory chain. We would 
still be on the level of first-order modal epistemology, concerned with 
how it is that certain sorts of beliefs are justified.18. On the other hand, 
we could ask why my finding zombies conceivable confers justifica-
tion on my belief that zombies are possible. This is what I call a 
vertical follow-up question. A vertical follow-up question of this sort 
can be posed to any candidate modal epistemology, just switch “my 
finding zombies conceivable” for whatever method suggested by the 
modal epistemology in question. Generally formulated, a vertical 
follow-up question to candidate modal epistemologies asks: why does 
suggested method M confer justification on modal beliefs? We may 
think of the integration requirement on a modal epistemology as the 
                                    
17 The picture I am trying to paint here is inspired by Bradford Skow (2016, chapter 
4). But it should be noted that his use of the notion of a vertical follow-up question 
occurs in a quite different context. 
18 This is the sort of follow-up with which for instance Hale (2002) presses 




requirement that this question can be answered for the method 
specified by the epistemology in question.  
It is an interesting question why we should think that meeting the 
integration requirement, in the sense of answering the vertical follow-
up question, is important for modal epistemologies. Ultimately, I wish 
to distinguish between two ways of answering that question, repre-
senting what we may call different framings of the integration 
requirement. To see clearly the difference between the alternative and 
the framing I prefer, we will need to know a little bit more about how 
I think we should understand the integration requirement. I will thus 
only present the framing under which I will conduct the investigation 
in this book here, and then return to the alternative and how it differs 
from my framing in section 2.4. 
I call this the meta-theoretical framing and the reader will notice that 
this framing goes well with the idea of the integration requirement as 
the demand for an answer to the vertical follow-up question. On the 
meta-theoretical framing, meeting the integration requirement is im-
portant for the meta-justification of a theory. To repeat some of what 
I said in the previous chapter, it is very important to be aware that the 
integration requirement, and hence the idea that modal metaphysics 
and modal epistemology should harmonise with each other, is best 
understood as being motivated by truth monism, at least with respect 
to modality (i.e. by the idea that true modal belief is the aim of modal 
enquiry, and that justification should be understood in relation to 
this). On such a view, something can be a justificatory method with 
respect to modal matters only insofar as it furthers this aim of true 
belief and error avoidance. To put forward a particular method as 
justificatory is thus to claim for that method that it relates modal belief 
to modal truth. The vertical follow-up question is a question about 
how the method is supposed to be doing that work. It is a question 
about what M has to do with modal truth, about what makes M a 
modal epistemology rather than just a method for forming beliefs. And 
if the integration requirement is not fulfilled given a particular modal 
epistemology, this reflects badly on that theory, since it comes across as 
unsupported. It leaves unaddressed something which we – rightfully, 
or that is the idea – expect an account of, given the central claim of 
the theory.  
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This will do as a preliminary introduction of how we should 
understand the integration requirement insofar as we are interested in 
it as a means for evaluating and comparing modal epistemologies. In 
the sections that follow, I delve deeper into the question of what it is 
that the integration requirement demands, i.e. what sort of answer we 
reasonably can and do expect in response to the vertical follow-up 
question. The constraints on what would count as an answer to the 
vertical follow-up question are all supposed to flow from this meta-
theoretical framing of the integration requirement for modal episte-
mologies, and for ease of exposition I will give each such constraint 
a label. The first one is also the one I take to be the most central: 
METAPHYSICS MATTERS.  
2.2. A Central Assumption: METAPHYSICS 
MATTERS 
Why is it that in some domains, fulfilling the integration requirement 
poses a challenge? I submit that whether or not a particular domain is 
going to be problematic in this sense or not cannot be determined 
until we have formed some idea or other about what the right episte-
mology and the right metaphysics will look like. Certain domains may 
seem in some sense mysterious to us already at the outset. Blackburn, 
for instance, write as follows about modality:  
By making judgements of necessity [or possibility], we say things, and 
these things are true or false. Perplexity arises because we think there 
must therefore be something which makes them so, but we cannot 
quite imagine what this is. Nor do we understand how we know about 
whatever this is: we do not understand our own [modality]-detecting 
faculty (1993, 52).  
Philosophers, of course, theorise in response to this initial puzzle-
ment. They form ideas about what makes modal propositions true or 
false, and about how we justify modal beliefs – that is, they start 
sketching a metaphysics and/or an epistemology (not necessarily 
alongside each other). It is only once we have some idea of what makes 
modal claims true, and of how we might be justified in believing them, 
that a challenge may emerge when we consider the issue of integration. 
When integration poses a challenge, this is typically due to a tension 
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of some kind between two hypothetical theses: one metaphysical, and 
one epistemological, specifying the nature of modal facts on the one 
hand, and modal justification on the other. It is only under some 
particular interpretation(s) that the two phenomena seem difficult to 
reconcile. Hence, when we say that a domain, like modality, faces an 
integration challenge, that is because the most popular or dominant 
views in a field seem to be in tension with each other.  
To see this, we may consider the textbook example in matters 
concerning the integration challenge, namely Paul Benacerraf’s 
dilemma in the philosophy of mathematics (1973). Benacerraf 
pointed out that there is a serious tension between the (at least back 
then, supposedly) best metaphysical theory of mathematical facts, 
namely platonism, and the best epistemological theory, namely a 
causal theory of knowledge.19 According to platonism, mathematical 
truths are about mind-independent, causally inert, abstract objects. 
According to a causal theory of knowledge, knowledge requires that 
epistemic subjects stand in some appropriate causal relation (direct or 
indirect) to the referents of the truths that they know. But if both 
theories are assumed to be true, mathematical knowledge is 
impossible. That is of course an unwanted result – as David Lewis 
has pointed out, it would be preposterous of philosophers to deny 
mathematical knowledge since “[o]ur knowledge of mathematics is 
ever so much more secure than our knowledge of the epistemology 
that seeks to cast doubt on mathematics” (1986, 109).  
Similar dilemmas can and have been constructed in modality. 
Holding fixed something like the causal theory of knowledge that 
Benacerraf held fixed, a common argument against Lewisian modal 
realism about possible worlds is this: since we cannot interact causally 
with possible worlds, it is unclear how we can know about them. A 
similar problem faces Ersatzism20 about possible worlds, according to 
which possible worlds are abstract objects, albeit part of the actual 
world: if the objects of modal knowledge are abstract, we can interact 
with them causally just as little as we can interact with Lewisian worlds 
                                    
19 Along the lines of Goldman (1967). 
20 See e.g. Adams (1974) and Plantinga (1978) for theories of this sort. “Ersatzism” 
is, however, David Lewis’ term.  
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(or platonic numbers), so how can we know about them?21 The al-
leged problems have the same structure: if this is the correct 
metaphysics of modality, it seems we cannot have modal knowledge, 
construed according to a particular epistemology that requires causal 
interaction between epistemic subject and object of knowledge.22  
One way to get out of these dilemmas and rid oneself of the 
tension is of course to change tack and go for another metaphysical 
theory. One could, for example, revise our view of modal (or 
mathematical) truth as being about objective, mind-independent 
entities of the above specified kinds. We might not want to do that 
for various reasons, but as far as integration is concerned, it would 
plausibly improve matters. For instance, while the integration require-
ment applies to everyone, there might be an integration challenge for 
conceivability theory when considered together with e.g. Lewisian 
possible worlds realism (1986), but perhaps not so much when con-
sidered together with e.g. Blackburn’s view of modal facts as consti-
tutively dependent on our abilities to imagine (1993). 
 From the perspective of the epistemology of modality, what we 
should take away from this is that while the integration requirement, 
in an egalitarian spirit, poses the same sort of task to all modal 
epistemologies, the task will look different depending on what 
theories one seeks to integrate. What sort of answer to the vertical 
follow-up question one can expect, and how difficult it is to provide 
one at all, may look very different depending on the one hand on what 
                                    
21 Shalkowski (2017) is a recent example of someone pointing out that Ersatzers are 
just as bad off in this respect. There is a potentially important difference, however. 
Genuine modal realism is sometimes thought to be even worse off, because of the 
concrete nature of the possible worlds. The problem is supposed to be this: even for 
those who are inclined to accept that we can have non-causal knowledge of abstract 
entities, it is a stretch to think we should be able to have it of concrete entities (cf. 
Skyrms 1976, 326). Lewis reply to this objection is in (1986, section 2.4), see also my 
discussion in 5.4.2. below.  
22 Although Leon (2017) suggests that we know at least some modal claims with 
Moorean certainty, which would place them on at least an as secure level as our 
mathematical knowledge, some may perhaps feel that conceding scepticism is less 
serious here than in the case of mathematics. Either way, as I have stated in the 
previous chapter, I ignore full-blown modal scepticism, so we will assume that it is 
not an option.  
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sort of modal epistemology it concerns and on the other on what sort 
of modal metaphysics it is to be integrated with. We may call each 
such prospective pair of theories a specification of the integration 
challenge.  
Whether integration is challenging for a theory then, depends on 
the specification in which it is considered. Whether integration is 
challenging in a domain depends on what specifications we restrict 
ourselves to considering at all. Most domains traditionally said to be 
facing an integration challenge are such that the facts are usually con-
strued as mind-independent – and this is certainly true for modality. 
It is fine to restrict one’s attention to specifications with a particular 
sort of theory on the metaphysics side, but in my view this restriction 
does not obviously have anything to do with the integration requirement. 
We may have lots of perfectly legitimate reasons to prefer a mind-
independent metaphysics of modality, but the idea that integration is 
a desideratum is not one of them – unless, of course, the epistemology 
one is meaning to integrate with it meshes really well with the meta-
physics in question.  
I stress this because not everyone interested in the integration 
challenge will agree, or at least it is not clear that they will. In the quote 
from Peacocke above, for instance, he stresses that the challenge is to 
reconcile “plausible” accounts of the metaphysics and epistemology 
respectively. It is not obvious how to interpret “plausible”, but 
presumably the idea is that the theories are to be considered good 
theories in other respects, in the sense of being e.g. parsimonious, 
having great explanatory power, preserving important intuitions, or 
whatever. That is, we want two good theories of these two sides of a 
domain, and we want to integrate them. That is all very well, but I 
think we should keep the issue of integration itself separate from what 
sort of theories we take to be “plausible” or “good” more generally – 
not least because the latter is an issue on which philosophers tend to 
disagree. It should be possible to agree that a particular specification, 
consisting of, say, conceivability theory and Blackburn’s theory of 
modality, does very well with respect to the integration requirement, 
but that we have other reasons to reject one or both sides of it. In 
short, integrative potential might be one out of several reasons to pre-
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fer a pair of theories, but a pair of theories may have good integrative 
potential while being unattractive for other reasons.  
The upshot of this, as far as the meta-epistemology of modality is 
concerned, is that in order to assess a particular modal epistemology 
with respect to integration, we must have some idea of what modal 
metaphysics it is supposed to be integrated with.23, 24 The integration 
challenge cannot be met in a metaphysically neutral way, and we also 
must not hold it against a modal epistemology as far as integration is 
concerned that it only integrates with a particular sort of modal meta-
physics. This is not always appreciated. Some philosophers seem to 
assume that the standard according to which we should judge a modal 
epistemology’s success in the integration-department is meta-
physically neutral. Ross Cameron (2007) for instance, appears to make 
use of such an idea of neutrality in his criticism of David Lewis’ theory 
of modality. Lewis’ (1986) genuine possible worlds realism, according 
to which modal truths are about spatiotemporally located but causally 
inaccessible possible worlds, famously faces an epistemological 
objection, as we saw above: if modal truths are about concrete worlds, 
just like our own, that are causally isolated from us, how can we have 
knowledge about them? Assuming that we do have modal knowledge, 
this is considered a problem for Lewisian modal metaphysics. But 
Lewis presented a sketch of a modal epistemology to go with his 
theory (1986, 108-115). Cameron’s aim is to criticise Lewis’ modal 
epistemology by insisting that it does not meet the integration 
challenge. The exact details of Lewis’ response need not concern us 
here, as the point of Cameron’s objection is that what Lewis says only 
makes sense if one accepts genuine possible worlds realism. That is, 
the epistemological picture that Lewis sketches presupposes that 
genuine possible worlds realism is right. Cameron thinks this is 
insufficient – Lewis must present a modal epistemology which is in-
dependently plausible, in order to repel the charge that the integration 
challenge cannot be met on his picture of modality (2007, 148). 
                                    
23 This is not supposed to mean that there is always a “designated” metaphysics to go 
with a given modal epistemology – we may evaluate a given theory as part of a number 
of different specifications and compare how they fare. 
24 For someone else who has recently stressed this, see Mallozzi (2018).  
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Now, it is true that Lewis’ (sketch of a) modal epistemology is 
bought in a package with his genuine modal realism when it comes 
integration. But the same goes for any other candidate modal episte-
mology to be evaluated – it must be evaluated together with some 
metaphysics or other, if we are interested in the integration challenge, 
and so as a point against Lewis modal epistemology, the criticism is 
void. Of course, there may be all sorts of reasons to reject Lewisian 
possible worlds realism, and then to think that Lewisian modal 
epistemology should also be rejected since they come in a package. 
But as far as the integration requirement goes, achieving integration 
only given a particular modal metaphysics is not a problem.  
The same point can also be highlighted by considering a fairly 
common kind of criticism in the epistemology of modality literature 
which we may call the special faculty objection. The complaint is 
basically that some candidate modal epistemology (explicitly, or more 
often implicitly) appeals to a “special” or “mysterious” faculty in 
explaining modal knowledge. For instance, consider what Lowe says 
about such a strategy:  
Of course, we could just maintain, dogmatically, that we possess, as one 
of our cognitive capacities, a brute or basic capacity to recognize at least 
some metaphysically possible truths as such. But that would be, or 
should be, a thesis of the last resort. It would be much more satisfying 
if we could explain our capacity to know metaphysically possible truths 
– that is, more precisely, our capacity to know that something that is 
not actually the case could be the case – without just positing a special 
capacity to do precisely this (2012, 921). 
How should one understand ‘special’ here, in a way such that it is a 
bad thing? One quite natural interpretation is that the faculty 
postulated would be ad hoc in the sense that it is just postulated as a 
mechanism whose only job is to track modal truth. But whether the 
postulation of something is ad hoc must be decided relative to some 
background, and the problem here would seem to be that the faculty 
one appeals to in explaining our capacity for modal knowledge is 
‘special’ (or ad hoc) in relation to the modal metaphysics that the 
epistemological story in question is supposed to go with. Some alleged 
method for forming modal beliefs may well appear ‘special’ in the 
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sense of being very strange given some metaphysical story, while 
making good sense given some other modal metaphysics.25  
So, in sum, it matters to whether the issue of integration is 
supposed to present a challenge, and it matters to what a solution might 
look like. In short, METAPHYSICS MATTERS. I take this to be a very 
central tenet of the integration requirement as it is standardly con-
ceived.  
2.3. POSITIVE: A Strong Sense of ‘Integration’ 
In this section I turn to the issue of how much is required in order 
for the integration requirement to be considered fulfilled, given some 
specification of the integration challenge. There is no clear consensus 
on this, although as I will argue, there is quite some support in the 
literature for the fairly strong interpretation of what counts as 
‘integration’ that I defend. I call this requirement on the answer to the 
vertical follow-up question POSITIVE, which should be taken to indi-
cate that one must tell a positive, substantial story in response to it. 
It will be useful to approach this issue by way of Benacerraf’s 
dilemma. It is, as we saw, a particular specification of the integration 
challenge in the philosophy of mathematics, one involving mathemat-
ical platonism and a causal theory of knowledge. We also saw that one 
could construct similar dilemmas for the philosophy of modality. 
Common to them is the causal theory of knowledge. But nowadays, 
the causal theory of knowledge is no longer in vogue and so one easily 
feels that these particular dilemmas have lost most of their dialectical 
force.26 However, Benacerraf’s problem is still used as the typical 
entry point into issues concerning integration. It is often said that the 
integration challenge is a generalisation of Benacerraf’s problem. 
Peacocke puts it like so: 
The Integration Challenge is the generalization, to an arbitrary subject 
matter, of the challenge which Paul Benacerraf so sharply identified and 
                                    
25 I wish to thank a helpful anonymous reviewer for elsewhere pressing me to clarify 
this.  
26 As Clarke-Doane (2017, 19) notes, not even Alvin Goldman (1967), the creator of 
the causal theory of knowledge to which Benacerraf appeals in his paper, intended 
the theory to apply to mathematics. 
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discussed for mathematical truth (…). Benacerraf wrote that ‘the 
concept of mathematical truth, as explicated, must fit into an over-all 
account of knowledge in a way that makes it intelligible how we have 
the mathematical knowledge that we have’. (1999, 1) 
The reader may also look at e.g. Casullo (2000), Fischer (2017a), 
Miščević (2003), Roca-Royes (2010), Shalkowski (2017), Vahid (2006) 
and Vaidya (2010, 2017) for cases where the integration challenge, in 
the context of the epistemology of modality specifically, is introduced 
in terms of Benacerraf’s dilemma.  
What is it, then, that generalises? It is not, I venture to say, the 
dilemma character – the incompatibility of two theories – that is the 
key here. One might think that the tension which characterises 
domains where integration seems difficult to achieve is this sort of 
flat-out incompatibility (provided that we want to resist scepticism) 
between a metaphysical thesis and an epistemological thesis. But in 
order to get out of a dilemma, one need only reject either the meta-
physical or the epistemological thesis when the two are incompatible 
with each other. So, given how things stand today, one could just 
reject the causal theory of knowledge, and be done with the problem.  
What this manoeuvre accomplishes is the rejection of one partic-
ular specification of the integration challenge. But presumably, if one 
wants to hold on to the claim that we do have modal knowledge, then 
one must offer a replacement epistemology to take the place of the 
rejected causal theory of knowledge. The problem will not go away 
merely by rejection of the causal view of knowledge. As W.D. Hart 
(1977) memorably puts it when reviewing a book by Mark Steiner, 
who attacks the causal theory of knowledge in reply to Benacerraf’s 
problem in mathematics:  
[I]t is a crime against the intellect to try to mask the problem of 
naturalizing the epistemology of mathematics with philosophical 
razzle-dazzle. Superficial worries about the intellectual hygiene of 
causal theories of knowledge are irrelevant to and misleading from this 
problem, for the problem is not so much about causality as about the 
very possibility of natural knowledge of abstract objects (125-126).  
So, one needs to present some, presumably non-causal (in the sense 
of not taking a causal connection to be a necessary condition on 
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knowledge or justification), epistemology. But what will happen when 
the new alternative is on the table – to be evaluated for its integrative 
potential – is that there will be another specification of the integration 
challenge. Hopefully, this new specification will not generate a 
dilemma, and so things should look rosier. One may, for instance, 
introduce an epistemology that specifies a priori proofs from certain 
axioms as the method for supporting mathematical beliefs. No causal 
connection needed for justification if that is the way we are supposed 
to achieve justified beliefs. Or, to take an example in the domain of 
modality, we may consider a specification with conceivability theory 
as the epistemology one chooses to replace the causal theory of 
knowledge on the one hand, and Lewisian possible worlds realism on 
the metaphysics-side of things. What should we say about the 
integration requirement in this case? 
One might want to say that conceivability theory is fine, because 
the integration requirement is satisfied since the two theories are not 
incompatible: modal knowledge is not rendered impossible when they 
are taken to be true together. If this is all that is required, one certainly 
has a weak reading of ‘integration’. Or, one might instead think that 
it is not enough that the two theses be compatible with each other in 
the sense of not precluding modal knowledge when taken to be true 
together, and insist that the integration requirement demand that 
there is some connection, that the specification should enable us to 
tell some sort of positive story about how things go. To demand this is 
to have a stronger reading of what is required for ‘integration’. On the 
latter view, it is hard to see that the specification conceivability theory 
+ Lewisian possible worlds realism is done just yet. In order to meet 
the integration requirement, its defenders would need to elaborate a 
bit, and actually give a positive answer to the vertical follow-up 
question rather than just saying: because they can both be true 
without precluding the existence of justified modal belief. 
The difference between the weak and the strong reading may also 
be illustrated with the following case. Let’s hold fixed a toy view of 
modal facts as causally efficacious on the metaphysics side, and 
consider it as part of two different specifications: one with a 
conceivability theory and one with a modal epistemology based on 
causal interaction between epistemic subject and fact. Neither 
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specification precludes modal knowledge, and so they both achieve 
integration in the weak sense. But there is surely a sense in which the 
latter epistemology is at least prima facie more adequate for the 
metaphysics, and so that specification apparently does better with 
respect to integration. It is not entirely easy to say exactly in what 
sense they integrate well, especially not with the acute lack of detail 
here, but we can fairly easily – more so than with the conceivability 
theory, at any rate – see how a story would go on which the causal 
epistemology and the metaphysics reinforce and support one another. 
I think the standard conception of the integration requirement lies 
closer to the strong reading of ‘integration’, and thus I consider 
POSITIVE a requirement on what the answer to the vertical follow-up 
question should look like. I will provide further support for this in the 
following subsection, but it is also worth noting that POSITIVE makes 
a lot of sense once one has decided to think of the integration require-
ment in terms of the vertical follow-up question. That was, of course, 
the question of why we should think that some particular method 
constitutes a modal epistemology, in the sense of why it should be 
thought to justify modal beliefs given that the aim of belief is truth. It 
is hard to see that a reply to the effect that the method in question is 
not incompatible with modal knowledge given such-and-such a 
modal metaphysics could be satisfying. 
2.3.1. POSITIVE: An Explanatory Demand 
One hint that POSITIVE is in line with the integration requirement in 
the literature is something known as Field’s challenge. As I noted, the 
relevance of the particular sort of specification that gave rise to 
Benacerraf’s dilemma is significantly lessened due to the demise of 
the causal theory of knowledge. Although, as I pointed out above, 
philosophers often introduce the integration challenge by way of 
Benacerraf’s problem, they also typically acknowledge that there is a 
more forceful formulation of what is really at issue (see e.g. Casullo 
(2000, 21-22), Fischer (2017a, 270) and Lam (2017)). This formula-
tion, also originally put forward in the context of philosophy of 
mathematics, is due to Hartry Field (1989, 230-233) and is accordingly 
known as Field’s challenge. 
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Field’s challenge is a premise of what we may call Field’s argument. 
The aim of Field’s argument is to lower the credence that 
philosophers’ assign to a particular metaphysical thesis, namely plato-
nism about mathematics. The argument can be structured as follows:  
P1: Generally, our mathematical beliefs are reliably true 
P2: If our mathematical beliefs are generally reliably true, 
then this is a fact that must be explained.  
P3: Assuming platonism to be correct, this reliability can-
not be explained.  
C: Platonism fails to discharge an explanatory burden. 
Field’s challenge is the explanatory challenge posed in P2, and it is a 
challenge that faces anyone who accepts that there is a prevalent 
correlation between mathematical belief (at least those held by 
mathematicians) and mathematical truth, i.e. that we are reliable with 
respect to mathematical matters. This is, in Field’s words, a correla-
tion “so striking as to demand an explanation” (1989, 26). Field’s 
challenge then is the challenge to provide an explanation of this 
reliability-fact, and any theory on which no such explanation is forth-
coming is in trouble. 
Considered as an argument against platonism, Field’s challenge is 
considered superior to and more compelling than Benacerraf’s 
dilemma. One reason for this is that it does not make any assumptions 
about what is required in order to have mathematical knowledge or 
justified mathematical belief, unlike Benacerraf’s dilemma which 
assumed a causal theory of knowledge which platonists have little rea-
son to accept. Instead, it rests on the idea that if platonists agree that 
our mathematical beliefs are mostly true – which they presumably will 
– then this reliability is something they owe us an explanation of. That 
seems rather reasonable. There is no obvious reason for platonists to 
reject this explanatory demand, while they may well have reasons to 
reject particular theories of knowledge or justification as begging the 
question against them. This is the beauty of Field’s argument, and 
these aspects have also been stressed by David Liggins in a number 
of papers (2006, 2010, 2018).  
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Now, although Field’s challenge, and the argument Field makes 
on the basis of it, assumes nothing about what it takes to be justified, 
we are currently working with the idea that justification is to be under-
stood in terms of a reliable connection with truth. We may thus read 
P2 as an integration requirement, i.e. as stating that it is important that 
the integration challenge for the domain in question can be met. P3 
then, can be read as the claim that the integration challenge for math-
ematics cannot be met on any specification involving platonism on 
the metaphysics-side.  
For Field’s argument, formulated in these terms, to have any 
chance of going through, the weak reading of ‘integration’ will not do. 
Consider the epistemological thesis that the method we use to 
support mathematical beliefs are proofs. This thesis is not incompat-
ible with the reliable correlation of mathematical belief with 
mathematical truth given platonism, just as conceivability theory is 
not incompatible with modal knowledge given Lewisian possible 
worlds realism. But Field clearly thinks platonism is supposed to be 
facing a further task here, and many agree with this – as I think we 
should.  
In sum, Field is after something more than an absence of incom-
patibility when he says there must be an explanation. We still wonder 
what makes proofs a good method when the aim is true mathematical 
belief, given that mathematical truths are about platonic numbers. We 
still want a positive answer to the vertical follow-up question, that is. 
And since Field’s challenge is one of the most renowned formulations 
of the integration challenge after Benacerraf, I take that to support 
POSITIVE as a requirement on an answer to the vertical follow-up 
question. Field explicitly formulates this positive story in terms of 
explanation, and I will adopt this way of thinking too. In order to meet 
the integration requirement, one must explain why such-and-such a 
method confers justification on modal beliefs, given such-and-such a 
nature of modal facts. 
2.3.2. POSITIVE: The Explanandum Fact 
Now that I have proposed we think of the integration requirement in 
terms of the demand for an explanation, a question that immediately 
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arises is: what, more precisely, is it that must be explained in order for 
the integration challenge to be met? Let’s see whether we can draw 
more on Field’s formulation of the challenge and the literature 
engaging with it, for some guidance. 
As is evident from the reconstruction of the argument above, the 
explanandum Field picks out concerns reliability. What Field takes to be 
the target explanandum is a correlation between belief and truth, as we 
just saw. The assumption is that this correlation is not brute or 
coincidental – it is reliable. It is this reliability that needs to be ex-
plained. But this immediately calls for some refinement. As Schechter 
(2010, 444) points out, if the challenge was to account for the 
reliability of the beliefs, there would be a very straightforward answer 
in any given case: our beliefs are reliable because they are products of 
a reliable method. Schechter says – and I think he is right in this – 
that this is clearly not what we are after. The relevant question rather 
concerns the reliability of the method that allegedly support the beliefs 
in question. This is evident in J. L. Mackie’s epistemological queerness 
argument against moral realism (1977, 38-42), which shares some 
properties with Field’s argument against platonism. In short, Mackie’s 
complaint here is that if we are moral realists who account for moral 
truth in terms of objective values, then in order to account for the 
fact that we have true moral beliefs we would need to introduce some 
special faculty for detecting objective values. Such a faculty would be 
quite unlike any other cognitive faculty that we allegedly possess, and 
the problem with appealing to it is that it does not help explain what 
we wanted to explain, as long as the only thing we know about it is 
that it supposedly allows us to reliably detect objective values.  
This focus on method rather than belief is captured in the vertical 
follow-up question. As the reader will recall, the vertical follow-up 
question asks, of any given allegedly justificatory method, why it 
furthers the aim of true belief about the subject matter in question. 
This could also be phrased in terms of reliability – why is the method 
a reliable guide to true belief? – although I prefer to talk in terms of 
justification in the broad sense stipulated in the previous chapter.  
Another thing to note about the explanatory challenge that Field 
poses is that the platonist is allowed to rely on the justificatory power 
of an alleged method in providing the explanation of that justificatory 
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power. This is true more generally of the integration challenge. When 
we want to know why e.g. visual perception is capable of conferring 
justification on certain sorts of beliefs, we do not expect an explana-
tion that does not rely on the justificatory power of perception. The 
same goes for the explanation we can expect in the case of an alleged 
method for modal justification. A conceivability theorist, for instance, 
need not provide an explanation of the reliability of conceivability in 
terms of something external to the method of conceiving, but is 
allowed to rely on the justificatory power of the method in question.  
It is important to see that the point of the integration requirement 
is not to prove that a certain method is justificatory. The point is to 
explain why it is, under the assumption that it is. Field’s challenge and 
its role in Field’s argument nicely underscores this by never question-
ing the obtaining of the explanandum fact, i.e. by never questioning 
whether our mathematical beliefs are reliable. If platonism obstructs 
explaining this fact, so much the worse for platonism.  
In light of these two points – that what is to be explained is the 
reliability of some method, and that one is allowed to assume the 
reliability of this method and so the truth, generally speaking, of (most 
of) the beliefs supported by the method in question – I also want to 
note a third thing. In the context of Field’s challenge, there is little 
discussion of what method it is that mathematicians rely on in forming 
their reliable beliefs. The method in question is just whatever method 
mathematicians use. But this question of method is clearly key in the 
integration requirement on modal epistemologies, so we need to 
tweak the setup a little bit for current purposes.  
Very simply put, Field’s challenge to the platonist is this: our actual 
mathematical beliefs are reliably true, so the method we actually use 
to support them is reliable, and this is an actual fact in need of expla-
nation (but your platonist metaphysical assumptions make it 
impossible to explain). The explanatory challenge that faces the modal 
epistemologist is rather: you claim that such-and-such a method for 
forming modal beliefs is reliable, i.e. it tends to lead to true modal 
beliefs, and if this is indeed a fact, then it is a fact in need of explana-
tion. When we evaluate a modal epistemology in relation to the 
integration requirement, we assume that it is a fact, and then we have 
something similar to Field’s challenge.  
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Of course, modal epistemologists typically think of themselves as 
providing the story of our actual justified modal beliefs. Therefore, 
supporting the claim that such-and-such a method is the method that 
actually support the many true modal beliefs that we have, is often an 
important part of supporting a modal epistemology. But it is strictly 
speaking an issue separate from the question of integration, and not 
one that is necessarily prior to the question of integration. We can 
evaluate specifications of the integration challenge on the conditional 
basis that if this is the right epistemology and this is the right meta-
physics, then...  
In sum, the relevant explanandum will be unique to each specifi-
cation of an epistemology and a metaphysics, but in its general form 
it is the assumed fact that method M is a good method for supporting 
modal beliefs, given the truth-aim of enquiry. 
2.3.3. POSITIVE: The Right Sort of Explanation 
Another, equally pressing, question concerns what sort of explanation 
one is supposed to provide of the relevant explanandum fact. To 
approach this issue, we may begin by considering a quote by Derek 
Lam. Lam is ultimately critical of the integration requirement in the 
epistemology of modality, but he states what is at the heart of it quite 
clearly when he formulates an assumption he calls Truth Relating. 
Truth Relating: If x is the source of justification for our belief on a 
subject matter, x must be related to the truth on that subject matter in 
a way that does not have to be characterised in terms of justification 
(2017, 2167).  
This is a way to formulate the motivation behind the integration 
requirement that I tried to state in the previous chapter, when I said 
that it assumes that justification, whatever else good it does, is 
supposed to further the final epistemic aim, i.e. true belief. The 
integration requirement then, is the requirement that one should be 
able to explain how, in Lam’s terms, x is supposed to be related to 
the truth. The task is to spell out this relation, in a sense. The 
explanation cannot merely place the modal facts and the allegedly 
justified modal beliefs next to each other – that just is the very corre-
lation to be explained. We want to hear about how, or in virtue of 
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what, the latter can be a path of access to the former. Thomas 
Grundmann nicely captures in what sense it should be spelled out in 
the following passage:  
the reliability of a reason is not a brute fact but, rather, depends on imple-
mentation by a metaphysical link between the facts and the reason. (…) 
Without the metaphysical link, the modal tie between reasons and facts, 
which is necessary for reliability, cannot obtain. The demand for an 
explanation of reliability, in other words, is (…) for a reductive explana-
tion, which would describe the mechanism that realizes this reliability 
(2007, 82-83, emphasis in original).  
Øystein Linnebo seems to be tapping into a similar idea when trying 
to capture what is missing from an unsatisfactory explanation.27 He 
writes that while it  
may ensure that the process is reliable, it does nothing to explain what 
makes it the case that the process is reliable. An explanation that 
addresses the latter question would be much more illuminating. And 
the demand for such an explanation seems completely reasonable 
(2006, 563).  
I suggest we read these locutions, “what makes it the case” and “the 
mechanism that realizes”, as asking for what we may call the meta-
physical underpinnings of the explanandum fact. That is, the sense in 
which the “relation to truth” should be spelled out is in terms of what 
makes it the case that it holds. The integration requirement demands 
that one give the metaphysical underpinnings of the fact that some 
method M confers justification on modal beliefs.  
The crucial point here is that we want to know what is going on 
under the hood, so to speak. We are being told that such-and-such a 
method is related to modal truth in some way, and now we are 
requesting to hear how the connection runs. If the theory cannot spell 
this out, then there is surely a sense in which it fails to discharge its 
explanatory burden. A similar idea has been proposed in a different 
context by Kelly Trogdon (2017). In the context of metaphysical 
grounding claims, he suggests that we can use the ability to show how 
an alleged connection runs, i.e. in virtue of what more specific deter-
                                    
27 Linnebo’s comment is made about Field’s challenge for mathematical platonism, 
but the point generalises.  
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mination relation it holds and between which facts, to assess whether 
a particular theory is plausible or not.28 For instance, we can evaluate 
Jonathan Schaffer’s priority monism thesis (2010), according to which 
the cosmos, which is the fusion of all facts there are, is the most 
fundamental entity and all sub-cosmic facts, concerning proper parts 
of the cosmos, are metaphysically grounded in the cosmos facts.  
What we would want to know then, is how the connection runs 
between the cosmos facts, and the sub-cosmic facts, what it is about 
the cosmos facts that make them able to ground the sub-cosmic facts, 
and so on. We would want to know about the (using Grundmann’s 
term which incidentally Trogdon also uses) mechanism that realises the 
assumed grounding claim. Similarly, if we are left without a specifica-
tion of what goes on under the hood, this is often where we might 
feel there is a so-called explanatory gap and that renders bad marks 
for the theory under evaluation. The most famous explanatory gap is 
allegedly in the metaphysics of mind. It is sometimes said that the 
mental is grounded in, or supervenes on, the physical, but even then, 
we feel that there is something missing – there is an explanatory gap 
(see e.g. Levine 1983). Trogdon suggests that we can understand what 
is missing here in terms of this idea of mechanisms and how the 
connections run: what is missing is an account of the mechanisms 
that realise this alleged link between the mental and the physical.  
It is interesting, in light of this, to consider the following possibil-
ity: couldn’t the integration requirement be met by the claim that the 
relevant explanandum fact is a brute fact? For example, as for the 
integration of conceivability theory with respect to Lewisian possible 
worlds realism say, one could say that it is just a brute fact that e.g. 
conceiving is (under certain circumstances) a guide to what goes on 
in these worlds. There is nothing more to say about it, like it or not. 
Not that I know of anyone who might want to take this route, but it 
could perhaps be argued that such a manoeuvre satisfies POSITIVE 
and the idea that we need an explanation in terms of the metaphysical 
underpinnings of the relevant explanandum fact. For instance, one 
                                    
28 See also Jessica Wilson (2014) for an earlier version of the idea that grounding 
claims are only explanatory insofar as the can be explicated in terms of more fine-
grained “small-g” dependence relations.  
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could appeal to something Lewis has said in a discussion of what 
counts as an explanation in the context of the One over Many 
Problem. Ostrich nominalism is the view that there is nothing further 
in virtue of which e.g. both a and b are turquoise, it just is a brute fact 
that a is turquoise and b is turquoise (cf. Devitt 1980). Against this 
Armstrong has complained that ostrich nominalists fail to deal with 
the explanatory task set before any theory that attempts to deal with 
the One over Many problem, i.e. they fail to explain the fact that there 
is objective similarity between distinct individuals (or something like 
it) when they claim that it is primitive, unanalysable (1978, 1980). In 
defence of ostrich nominalism’s contribution to the discussion as a 
genuine one, Lewis points out that not every account is an analysis. 
ostrich nominalists cannot be accused of failing to make a place for 
the explanandum fact (they don’t deny it), nor can they be accused of 
shirking from answering the question (they answer: it is primitive). 
Lewis insists that ostrich nominalism does give an account (1983, 352). 
Saying that something is primitive is sometimes, when appropriate, 
enough of an explanation. Could one try a similar approach in the 
context of the integration requirement?  
In principle, I would not want to rule it out. In practice, I think it 
will be hard work making a plausible case for the claim that the 
explanandum fact in the context of the integration requirement is a 
brute fact – much more so than the sort of fact at issue with the One 
over Many problem. Moreover, there are interesting discussions to be 
had about when we should allow the move of “going primitive” if we 
want our debates to be progressive and fruitful. I will not delve into 
those discussions here, but just note that this move is not in principle 
ruled out by POSITIVE when elucidated as the request for an explana-
tion in terms of the metaphysical underpinnings.29 
                                    
29 See Baron (2016, pp. 2255-2256) for a discussion of possible restrictions on the 
move of going primitive. One might also want to draw parallels to the way in which 
truthmaker theory is supposed to help us catch metaphysical “cheaters” out. That is, 
thinking in terms of truthmakers helps us see that theories with allegedly sparse 
ontologies need to postulate e.g. certain suspicious properties as fundamental 
existences, in order to provide truthmakers for all the kinds of propositions we take 
to be true (cf. Sider 2001, 40-41). To say that the explanandum fact here is primitive 
would thus be like cheating. Notably though, we should say (in analogy with Bennett 
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2.3.4. POSITIVE: CAUSAL BLUEPRINT and NEUTRALITY 
It is commonly accepted that the metaphysical underpinnings of a 
reliable connection between some method and some facts “normally 
consist in a causal link between reasons and facts” (2007, 83) as 
Grundmann puts it. This is something of a blueprint solution to the 
integration requirement. I do think there is a certain importance to 
the wide-spread agreement on the idea that this is the solution we 
know and love, and the problem is that in this or that domain, it is 
not available, and we are left wondering what the alternative solution 
might be. This is a constraint on what the right conception of the 
integration requirement is rather than on what counts as an answer. 
The point is that if the integration requirement is addressed by way 
of a (sufficiently spelled out) causal link between method and facts 
given a specification of the integration challenge, then this should 
count as having met the requirement, if we have a good conception 
of the requirement in play. I will refer to this as CAUSAL BLUEPRINT.  
But there are two sides to this coin. An equally important, and as 
widely accepted, idea is that we must not assume that a causal expla-
nation in that sense is the only sort of explanation that would do.30 
The integration requirement is “stubbornly neutral about what sort of 
nontrivial explanations are, in principle, available for the reliability of 
epistemic processes”, as Jody Azzouni (2004, 101) puts it. I will refer 
to this constraint as NEUTRALITY, meaning precisely that the 
integration requirement is neutral on what sort of metaphysical un-
derpinnings one could provide here. They can, but need not, involve 
a causal link.  
NEUTRALITY is dialectically important, because if the integration 
requirement was instead a causal requirement – i.e. the requirement 
                                    
(2011)) that the problem is not that they fail to give an answer now that we press 
them, but that we can see that the answer is suspicious in some sense or other.  
30 Sometimes, for instance by Linnebo, it is suggested that Field’s argument against 
platonism, or rather its second premise, rests on the assumption “that a scientific 
explanation of a correlation must involve a causal connection between at least some 
of the correlated items” (2006, 553). It is unclear whether Field in fact intends his 
claim that platonists cannot provide an explanation to rely on this assumption, or 
whether he just notes that we have no idea what the platonists’ non-causal explanation 
would look like and that this is enough to doubt that an explanation is forthcoming.  
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to elucidate a causal link that underwrite the reliability of the method 
– then it would not be a very useful criterion in the meta-epistemology 
of modality. It is unclear why the platonist would want to accept the 
meta-theoretical claim that one must be able to spell out the causal 
link between fact and method which underpins the reliability of the 
method – clearly this is something she won’t be able to do. The 
situation is similar in the epistemology of modality – that requirement 
would rule out both certain metaphysical theories of modality and 
certain modal epistemologies from the get-go. But even from the per-
spective of those who do favour metaphysics and epistemologies 
where one might be able to spell the reliability out in terms of a causal 
link, there is at least a dialectical reason to resist a causality biased 
interpretation of the integration requirement. If their opponents do 
not agree in the first place that the integration requirement is 
reasonable, they lose an important point against those theories which 
fail to live up to it. Conversely, having one’s opponents on board here 
from the beginning makes one’s case for one’s own favoured theory 
more convincing, once one can show that the integration requirement 
is satisfied by way of a causal link. But if the integration challenge is 
considered a question-begging task in the first place, this argument 
loses its dialectical force. It is better then, to start out with a more 
open idea of what integration can be, of what sort of metaphysical 
underpinnings one may put forward here.  
Most philosophers engaged in the debate do, I think, agree with 
the letter of this. However, it is not uncommon that expressed agree-
ment on the neutrality of the integration requirement is immediately 
followed by the claim that we just have no good idea as to what the 
alternative metaphysical underpinning could be like. This requires 
some qualification though. One perfectly good alternative, not 
particularly hard to imagine, is a constitutive link. For instance, 
consider again the specification of a conceivability theory and a 
Blackburnian theory of modality. One might suggest that the reason 
conceivability is a good guide to modal truth, on this picture, is that 
modal facts are constitutively dependent on what we can conceive, 
and so this constitutive relation is what underpins the explanandum 
fact. Of course, philosophers are not generally unaware of this sort of 
alternative. What they mean when they say that we have no idea 
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whatever about what an alternative to a causal link might be, is that 
we have no idea about alternatives when we restrict our attention to specifi-
cations involving mind-independent metaphysics of modality. That is, we cannot 
see what sort of metaphysical underpinnings could involve mind-
independent facts, save a causal link. Of course, this is why there is 
an integration challenge for modality – on the most popular concep-
tions of modal facts, they do not lend themselves to causal interaction. 
But that does not identify the issue of integration itself with the causal 
alternative.  
2.4. Contrasting Two Framings 
Let’s take stock. So far, I have suggested that the integration 
requirement should be understood in terms of a vertical follow-up 
question about any given method for which justificatory power with 
respect to beliefs about modal matters is claimed. With this under-
standing in the background, I have argued first that each instance of 
the vertical follow-up question is posed in relation to some modal 
metaphysics, given which the method in question should be shown 
to be appropriate. This is what I called a specification of the integration 
challenge. Further, I argued that given any such specification, the 
integration requirement demands a positive account of (in particular: 
an explanation of) the assumed fact – that the method in question is 
conducive to true modal belief – in terms of the metaphysical under-
pinnings of that fact. It may, but need not, be a causal link.  
We are now in a position to return to the difference between two 
possible framings of the integration requirement, flagged in section 
2.1 above. By way of a reminder, I call my favoured conception meta-
theoretical. In my view, the integration requirement is important for the 
meta-justification of a given theory in, in this case, the epistemology 
of modality. If the integration requirement cannot be fulfilled given a 
candidate modal epistemology, then this reflects badly on that 
candidate theory, because it fails to elucidate what is going on “under 
the hood” of the claim at the heart of the theory, namely that such-
and-such a method confers justification on modal beliefs. There is an 
explanatory burden that one has failed to discharge. 
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This framing resonates rather well with the way Field uses the 
explanatory requirement, in the sense that the problem, when the 
integration challenge has not been met assuming a certain theory, is a 
problem for the theory in question. There is an explanatory task that 
befalls any theory of modal justification, and if that task is not 
completed then so much the worse for the theory in question. 
This can be contrasted with what we may call the sceptical 
conception of the issue. To see the difference, consider again the up-
shot of Field’s argument: we have a reason to reject platonism because 
it fails to deal with a certain explanatory task, namely accounting for 
the reliability of mathematical beliefs. There is another argument in 
the vicinity, with a sceptical twist. According to it, we have a reason 
to reject platonism because it implies actual mathematical scepticism. 
In particular, it implies that there is an undercutting defeater for the 
prima facie justification of our mathematical beliefs. 
A defeater is a form of evidence which interferes in some way or 
other with one’s original evidence or method for supporting beliefs. 
There are two main categories of defeaters: rebutting defeaters and 
undercutting defeaters. A rebutting defeater is evidence that points in 
the other direction of the original evidence. An undercutting defeater 
is higher-order evidence which gives one reason to doubt that the 
original evidence is evidence for the truth of the relevant belief. To 
illustrate, let’s say that David believes that zombies are possible, and 
that his reason for believing that zombies are possible is that he can 
conceive of a world where there are zombies. The starting assumption 
here is that conceiving is a justificatory method with respect to 
matters of possibility, so David seems to be justified in this belief. A 
rebutting defeater in this case, is a reason to believe that zombies are 
not possible, contrary to what the original evidence told David. The 
original evidence is in favour, the rebutting evidence is against, and 
the latter cancels out the former, we might say. An undercutting 
defeater would instead be a reason to doubt that conceivability is a 
guide to possibility, hence removing David’s reason for believing that 
zombies are possible by breaking the link between the method and 
the fact. For instance, an undercutting defeater in this case might be 
evidence to the effect that conceiving frequently leads to erroneous 
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modal beliefs with respect to a variety of matters, not following a pre-
dictable pattern. 
Now, some see Field’s argument as presenting the platonist with a 
threat from an undercutting defeater in something like the following 
way.  
P1*: If we do not have an explanation of why our mathe-
matical beliefs are reliable, we have reason to think that 
they are not reliable.  
P2*: If we have a reason to think they are not reliable, our 
justification for them is undercut.  
P3*: Assuming platonism to be correct, we have no 
explanation for the reliability of our mathematical beliefs.  
C*: Platonism implies that our mathematical beliefs are 
not justified.  
While clearly similar to the argument I called ‘Field’s argument’ in 
2.3.1, the arguments are importantly different. They have distinct 
conclusions, and so although in both cases the ultimate upshot is 
supposed to be to lower our credence in platonism, the reason we ought 
to lower our credence in platonism differs. In the former case, 
because it does not explain what it is supposed to explain. In this latter 
case, because it implies scepticism. I am therefore going to refer to 
this latter interpretation as ‘the sceptical argument’. Dan Baras (2017), 
Justin Clarke-Doane (2015, 2017) and Joel Pust (2004) all appear to 
read Field as putting forward the sceptical argument against 
platonism, while David Liggins (2018) pushes the other line. Liggins 
writes:  
It is worth noting that there is no mention of justification here [in 
Field’s original discussion]: according to Field, inability to explain [the 
explanandum fact] is an embarrassment for platonism because [it] is the 
sort of phenomenon which demands explanation. 
Whatever interpretation Field originally had in mind, and whether he 
has changed his mind in later writings, it is enough for current 
purposes that the two arguments are different, and that I favour the 
framing that I first presented in 2.3.1 above.  
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In terms of the vertical follow-up question then, we can 
distinguish two reasons for thinking it bad that the question goes un-
answered: because it is part of the explanatory burden that befalls a 
theory, or because it creates an undercutting defeater for beliefs 
formed using the method in question. Again, I favour the former idea 
over the latter. We should not mix the threat from scepticism into the 
motivation. 
One reason to prefer the meta-theoretical conception is that the 
central claim of the sceptical conception is either false or fails to get 
the cases right. The central claim of the sceptical conception is that 
failure to meet the integration requirement on a method creates an 
undercutting defeater for beliefs based on that method. More 
precisely, if the integration requirement on a method cannot be met, 
that is a reason to doubt that the method is reliable. Now, I also take 
it that friends of the sceptical conception will agree that if the 
integration requirement on a method is met, that is some kind of affir-
mation of the claim that it is reliable.  
Let’s begin by noting that this last point seems to commit friends 
of the sceptical framing to POSITIVE, for it is very hard to see how 
integration in the weak sense could provide any support of a reliability 
claim. But if POSITIVE is right it seems failure to meet the integration 
requirement does not create an undercutting defeater after all. That is, 
under the assumption that meeting the integration challenge involves 
giving a positive story, the analogue of P1* above seems false. 
To see this, note that there is plausibly a difference between having 
a reason to distrust a method with respect to a subject matter on the one 
hand (as one would have with e.g. evidence of frequent and 
unpredictable errors) and lacking affirmative support of its reliability with 
respect to a subject matter, on the other. While having evidence in 
the former category, which suggests that a method is not reliable, 
might plausibly amount to an undercutting defeater in the relevant 
sense, it is highly unclear whether lacking evidence that affirms 
reliability does.  
But failure to provide a positive story of why a method is reliable, 
from an epistemic subject’s point of view, seems like lack of a kind of 
affirmative support rather than a reason to doubt the reliability of the 
method. So if it is right that POSITIVE is a constraint on an attempt to 
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meet the integration requirement, failure to meet the integration re-
quirement does not obviously amount to an undercutting defeater for 
beliefs justified on the basis of that method. To illustrate, consider 
again the case against platonism. That the platonist cannot (it is often 
thought) explain why e.g. proof from axioms is reliable with respect 
to facts involving mind-independent platonic entities, exposes that we 
have no idea of how come the method is reliable, which we think it 
is. If we had some idea, that could count as a positive reason to think 
it is. But, the critic argues, we do not and so we do not have such a 
reason to think it is. That, however, is not necessarily a reason to doubt 
that it is. In other words, that platonists cannot give a positive story 
– that they cannot meet the integration requirement constrained by 
POSITIVE – does not amount to an undercutting defeater.  
So the central claim of the sceptical framing seems false, assuming 
POSITIVE. I said above that friends of this framing appear committed 
to POSITIVE, but if we ignore that for a second, we can see that if they 
were to reject POSITIVE, and suggest that the integration requirement 
only demands integration in the weak sense in order to avoid an un-
dercutting defeater, the framing fails to get the cases right. In 
particular, it makes the integration requirement far too easy to meet. 
On such a view, failure to meet the integration requirement amounts 
to having a metaphysics and an epistemology given which the relevant 
sort of knowledge is impossible. That evidence of this should amount 
to an undercutting defeater seems plausible indeed. However, if only 
weak integration is required, then there is no reason to think that a 
platonist should be unable to meet the integration requirement 
assuming a method like e.g. proofs from axioms as supporting math-
ematical belief. Again, there is no incompatibility between 
mathematical knowledge, platonism and e.g. proof from axioms as 
the method for supporting mathematical beliefs. So the platonist does 
not have a problem (and the same goes for a specification involving 
e.g. Lewisian modal realism and, say, conceivability theory). But even 
those who prefer the sceptical framing usually think that what I call 
the sceptical argument against platonism has at least initial traction, 
so this seems like a problematic result.  
In sum, assuming the sceptical conception of the integration re-
quirement seems to lead to unattractive consequences. If POSITIVE is 
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right, then failure to meet the integration requirement is not an 
undercutting defeater, and so the conception undermines itself. If 
POSITIVE is wrong, the integration requirement is far too easy to meet, 
implying for instance that there is not really a challenge for e.g. 
platonism or Lewisian modal realism, which goes counter to all main-
stream understanding of the integration challenge. I consider this to 
be a good reason to go for the meta-theoretical framing, given the 
support I have already provided for the claim that POSITIVE is in line 
with the standard conception of the integration requirement. 
Moreover, I also think it is plausible that ability to meet the integra-
tion requirement can be a way of supporting the claim that a method 
is reliable (if one can also make a good case in other respects for the 
integrated pair of theories), which further supports POSITIVE. 
(Notably though, I find it very important to stress that even if meeting 
the integration requirement is a way of supporting a reliability claim, 
not any way of supporting a reliability claim is a way of meeting the 
integration requirement – more on this later.) 
Is there a way to avoid this result on the sceptical conception? It 
is sometimes suggested by friends of this framing that it is not the 
actual lack of an explanation of the assumed reliability that creates an 
undercutting defeater, but the fact that it seems “in principle impos-
sible”31 to provide an explanation. That is when there is a problem 
with the integration requirement and hence a threatening defeater in 
the relevant sense. And, it is suggested, given platonism it is in 
principle impossible to provide an explanation. Unfortunately, it is 
highly unclear what “in principle impossible” is supposed to mean in 
order to yield this result. The only interpretation that comes to mind 
involves the assumption that the explanation must be in terms of a 
causal dependence of belief on fact (directly or indirectly). You might 
think so if you think that all knowledge is empirical, for instance. But 
to incorporate this view into the idea of integration involves rejecting 
NEUTRALITY, which is a widely accepted principle, so this too is 
problematic.32  
                                    
31 See e.g. Clarke-Doane (2017) and Baras (2017). The rather opaque expression 
goes back to a quote by Field (1989, 26).  
32 Although see 5.4.2 for related discussion. 
MODAL EMPIRICISM MADE DIFFICULT 
56 
It might not seem a very impressive objection to say that on the 
sceptical conception of the integration requirement, the integration 
requirement fails to be the way it is on my preferred, meta-theoretical, 
conception. But that was not my argument. Rather, I take it that there 
are independent reasons, from the existing literature on the 
integration challenge, to think that NEUTRALITY and POSITIVE apply 
and that specifications involving e.g. platonism should be facing a 
challenge at least (even if arguments based on it do not go through in 
the end). Given the meta-theoretical conception these things can be 
preserved, whereas there is considerable difficulty if one instead goes 
for the sceptical framing.  
2.5. The Deferral Strategy and Its Constraints 
As has been noted above, most recently in the section on CAUSAL 
BLUEPRINT and NEUTRALITY, it is traditionally thought that the 
integration requirement presents a problem – there is an integration 
challenge – primarily for specifications involving some realist 
metaphysics of modality. And this is the sort of specification that 
attention has mainly been devoted to in the philosophy of modality, 
likely because alternatives to realism are considered unacceptable in 
themselves by many. The reason modal truth realistically construed is 
problematic from an integration-perspective is that modal 
metaphysics matter: given the way we understand modal facts, it is 
unclear how our beliefs about them can be justified.  
A rather popular strategy for dealing with the integration require-
ment in light of all this, is what we may call the deferral strategy. The 
core of it is to defer the integration challenge to another domain 
where meeting the integration requirement supposedly presents, well, 
less of a challenge. In a nutshell, the idea is this: modal beliefs are 
justified in virtue of being somehow downstream from some other 
kind of justified belief k.33 It might be that modal beliefs are inferred 
                                    
33 Often, all modal knowledge is explained as derivative of the same more 
epistemically basic kind(s) of knowledge, but there could also be accounts where some 
subclass of all modal knowledge depends on some kind of knowledge k and another 
subclass depends on another kind of knowledge k2. I will ignore the more pluralist 
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from k-beliefs, or that they otherwise essentially depend on some k-
beliefs.  
Examples of this strategy involve both rationalist and empiricist 
modal epistemologies: Lowe (2012) argues that our modal knowledge 
is based on knowledge of essence, as does Hale (2013), and Vaidya 
(2010) takes it to be based on understanding of essence.34 Fischer 
(2016b) reduces justification of a given modal belief to the justifica-
tion of the theory that implies the truth of the modal belief in 
question. Roca-Royes (2017) presents a modal epistemology of 
inductive reasoning based on categorical knowledge of actual prop-
erty instantiation. Thus, I count both those who take modal 
knowledge to be in some sense reducible to k, and those who take 
modal knowledge to be essentially dependent on k, as deferralists. 
There may admittedly be more than one reason for deferring, but 
concerns with the integration requirement is a fairly prominent one. 
Peacocke and Vaidya for instance, put forward their respective epis-
temologies very much with integration in mind – explicitly so. Roca-
Royes’ account at least partly stems from concerns about how certain 
methods do not seem to mesh well with the nature of the entities 
concerned (see especially her 2007), which is an integration-related 
worry.  
I take it that part of the idea with the deferral strategy is this: modal 
knowledge can piggy-back on the integration achieved for k – either 
by being reduced to or being based on k. For instance, part of the 
idea with putting forward an empiricist strategy – and as we shall see 
in more detail in chapter 3 – is that integration is easier to achieve for 
certain non-modal facts and beliefs about them acquired in such-and-
such an empirical way. Or, to take a different example, part of the 
point with an essentialist modal epistemology ought to be that 
integration is more easily achieved for essentialist facts and beliefs 
about them acquired in such-and-such a way.  
                                    
option for now, but the reader may note that it relates to the issues of 
uniformism/non-uniformism to be discussed in chapters 4 and 6.  
34 All three of them take essence-facts to be ontologically prior to modal facts.  
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2.5.1. The BULGE IN THE CARPET-constraint 
The idea with deferralist modal epistemologies, again, is to defer the 
integration challenge to a domain where it is less challenging. I am 
now going to argue that there is a particular constraint on deferralist 
attempts to meet the integration requirement for modality. It is really 
fairly simple, and it may appear obvious, but it will turn out to matter 
quite a lot, hence the rather lengthy defence of it below.  
Crucially, for a deferralist modal epistemology to constitute a 
satisfactory answer to the vertical follow-up question, the question 
must indeed be answered for the domain to which the challenge has 
been deferred. Why is it not, from the perspective of the epistemology 
of modality, enough to just defer the problem of achieving integration 
to another domain? In my view, it is because until we have seen the 
explanation in response to the integration requirement for the domain 
to which it has been deferred, one has merely shifted the problem 
rather than solved it. It is like trying to flatten out a bulge in our 
otherwise nice philosophical carpet by applying some theoretical 
manoeuvre or other only to have the bulge appear elsewhere. 
Assuming that the aim is a neat-fitting carpet, that seems a highly un-
satisfactory solution – really it should not count as a solution at all, 
one might think. But still, something has happened. A constraint like 
POSITIVE alone does not tell us what is wrong with this strategy: a 
deferralist modal epistemology does tell us something positive about 
in virtue of what the explanandum fact obtains, namely another corre-
sponding explanandum fact in a different domain. The potential 
problem is thus different from when we have compatibility but no 
substantial story, as (according to Field) with platonism and e.g. 
mathematical proofs from axioms, for instance.  
In order to prevent this sort of scenario from counting as a genuine 
solution to a philosophical problem, albeit in relation to a different 
topic, Paul Noordhof formulates the ‘bulge in the carpet’-constraint: 
No candidate solution to a philosophical problem should raise another 
problem which appears just as intractable and which requires the reso-
lution of an issue similar to that which made the original problem so 
intractable (1998, 223). 
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Now, the general demand that solutions must not cause new prob-
lems (although of course it may count in favour of a solution that it 
does not) is clearly way too strict. But Noordhof’s constraint narrows 
down the kind of scenario we want to avoid in a useful way: the new 
problem which appears as a result of the attempt to solve the old 
problem must not be the same problem in new guise. To see that this is 
motivated, we may take a page from the literature on infinite 
regresses. The carpet-metaphor is familiar there as well. Armstrong, 
for instance, wrote of someone whose theory faces an infinite regress 
that: 
He is like a man who presses down the bulge in the carpet only to have 
it reappear elsewhere (1978, 21). 
But regresses are not always vicious. What distinguishes a vicious 
regress? The most promising strain in the discussion over this issue is 
that when there is nothing else obviously wrong with a regress-prone 
solution to a problem, the viciousness or unacceptability of regress 
has to do with failure of problem solving (see e.g. Bliss 2013; Maurin 2007, 
2013; Wieland 2011). The idea is that a regress is bad for a theory only 
with respect to some specific problem that needs solving, which is 
not solved by the theory due to the regress. The point can be 
generalised beyond the context of regresses, to the assessment of 
philosophical moves more generally. If the point of applying some 
move or other is to deal with a certain problem, it is clearly 
problematic if that very problem appears elsewhere.  
Deferralist modal epistemologies that shift the problem to another 
domain without attending to it (or referring to someone who satisfac-
torily does) violates BULGE IN THE CARPET. The ‘bulge’ currently of 
interest is the apparent lack of an answer to an instance of the vertical-
follow up question which is supposed to enlighten us on how and 
why such-and-such a method is truth-conducive. If one says that the 
method in question depends on or is inferred from non-modal beliefs 
supported by some distinct method, we still want an answer to the 
question of why that distinct method is truth-conducive. Crucially, 
this seems to really just be the old bulge in a new location, unless that 
is spelled out. For instance, if Lowe’s modal epistemology where 
modal knowledge depends on essentialist knowledge were to leave it 
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a mystery how methods for essentialist knowledge are truth-
conducive, then it seems the problem has just been pushed sideways. 
It is especially important to be aware of this constraint in light of 
the fact that some modal epistemologists, while not explicitly defer-
ralist, still rely on an implicit deferralist move. Sònia Roca-Royes has 
argued in a series of papers (2010, 2011a, 2011b) that many of the 
prominent modal epistemologies on the market – including those 
promoted by Chalmers (2002), Peacocke (1999), Williamson (2007)35 
and Yablo (1993) – make modal knowledge dependent on knowledge 
of essence or of constitutive truth. Note that these epistemologies are 
not explicitly deferring the issue, but what Roca-Royes points out is 
that they implicitly rely on the deferralist move. There is nothing 
wrong with this in itself. But Roca-Royes’ complaint is that the 
essentialist/constitutive knowledge remains unelucidated, which 
creates a “revenge of the integration challenge” (2010, 340). 36  
It is especially interesting to see how this criticism plays out against 
Peacocke, given that he is explicitly concerned with meeting the 
integration challenge. Very roughly speaking, according to Peacocke’s 
modal epistemology, Connor is justified in his modal belief that it is 
possible that this table breaks if he arrived at the belief through 
investigating a priori whether the concept ‘POSSIBLE’ applies to the 
proposition <This table breaks>. Peacocke’s preferred modal meta-
physics is a linguistic ersatz-view, according to which a modal 
proposition like <◇This table breaks> is true in virtue of some 
possible world, construed as a set of thoughts, or propositions, and 
which possible worlds there are is determined by the so-called 
“principles of possibility” (see e.g. his 1999, section 4.2). 
The major part in meeting the integration requirement is supposed 
to be played by these principles of possibility. They both dictate what 
is possible and necessary by determining what sets of propositions 
                                    
35 For similar discussion of Williamson, see Tahko (2012).  
36 Of course, philosophers who defend modal epistemologies that make modal 
knowledge depend on essentialist knowledge won’t necessarily agree that we lack 
good accounts of essentialist knowledge that can meet the integration requirement – 
this is a live issue indeed in the literature. Again, there is nothing wrong with the 
deferral strategy itself. It is only problematic if there is a problem with constraints like 
BULGE IN THE CARPET.  
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form possible worlds (we may view them as some sort of 
metaphysical laws that encode constitutive truths), and they form the 
possession-conditions for the concept ‘POSSIBLE’ in the sense that 
unless you have implicit knowledge of the principles you do not 
possess the right concept ‘POSSIBLE’. That is, if you possess the 
concept ‘POSSIBLE’ you have access to the set of possible worlds, 
because possessing the right concept involves grasping the principles 
of possibility, and they also determine what possible worlds there are 
and, hence, what is possible. Simply put, with the principles of 
possibility we have something which operates both on us and on the 
objective facts of the world. The beliefs supported by the method, 
and the modal facts, somehow both depend on the principles of 
possibility (although exactly what the relevant dependence relations 
are in that case is an interesting question). Thus Peacocke’s project is 
a clear example of someone being mindful of what the relevant modal 
metaphysics are, when doing epistemology of modality.  
But despite this being arguably one of the most promising 
rationalist attempts integration-wise, Roca-Royes does not think it is 
a successful one. In particular, she argues that our epistemic access to 
or acquisition of the right concept ‘POSSIBLE’, on which the whole 
modal epistemology rests, remains unelucidated. So the integrative 
prospects for Peacocke’s account depend on the prospects of an 
appropriate epistemology of the constitutive, and in order to see what 
such an epistemology should look like, “we should inquire about the 
nature of constitutive facts so that we know, broadly, the kind of con-
stitutive epistemology we should be aiming at” (Roca-Royes 2010, 
340) 
In my terms, the result is merely a new specification of the integra-
tion challenge, albeit for another domain37, that awaits a solution, and 
the original problem depends for its solution on that new version of 
the challenge being solved. Again, this is what BULGE IN THE CARPET 
is supposed to capture. 
                                    
37 Assuming that constitutive truths belong to another domain than modal truths – as 
with essentialist truths, some may rather suggest that they are a subclass of modal 
truths.  
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2.5.2. METAPHYSICS MATTERS, again 
A deferralist modal epistemology accounts for justified modal beliefs 
in terms of some other justified beliefs. Of course, a deferralist modal 
epistemology must elucidate how epistemic subjects can form 
justified modal beliefs on the basis of these other justified beliefs. 
That is, the allegedly right route from non-modal to modal beliefs 
better be elucidated. And this typically is where most of the work is 
put in – understandably, since this is really where the identity of the 
candidate theory is set. But in order not to violate BULGE IN THE 
CARPET, it better be the case that the beliefs on which modal 
knowledge is based, are justified through some method for which the 
integration requirement can be met. There is one more thing which a 
deferralist modal epistemology needs to do though, in order to be 
able to meet the integration requirement: the modal facts need to be 
hooked up to the picture too.  
The deferralist encourages us to switch our attention to a different 
class of beliefs. But in doing so we also switch to a different subject 
matter, as far as integration is concerned. In order to meet the BULGE 
IN THE CARPET requirement, the k-beliefs must be integrated with the 
k-facts. The justified k-beliefs then form the basis for justified modal 
beliefs, and the deferralist modal epistemology tells us how. But the 
vertical follow-up question is the question of why the relevant method, 
described by the theory in question, works. We are interested in why 
e.g. reasoning on the basis of k-beliefs result in justified modal beliefs. 
In order to have an answer to that question, it seems we would want 
to know what k-facts have to do with modal facts.  
An example will help here. E. J. Lowe (2012) puts forward a modal 
epistemology which tries to account for our knowledge of meta-
physical possibility and necessity in terms of knowledge of essentialist 
truths. Lowe summarises it as follows: 
[I]t is part of our essence as rational, thinking beings that we can at least 
sometimes understand a real definition – which is just a special kind of 
proposition [namely those that express the essence of a thing] – and 
thereby grasp the essences of at least some things. Hence, we can know 
at least sometimes that something is metaphysically necessary or 




In order for this theory to meet the integration requirement, one 
needs to describe how one can draw modal conclusions about what 
is possible and necessary, on the basis of this essentialist knowledge. 
One also needs to make plausible that the integration requirement is 
met for essentialist beliefs had by the method Lowe envisages, given 
the nature Lowe takes essentialist facts to have. And finally, one must 
also say something about the relation between essentialist facts and 
modal facts. This will involve making certain metaphysical claims.  
Now, as far as Lowe’s modal epistemology is concerned, his 
metaphysics of modality in terms of essences is a centrepiece of the 
view, so this last part is duly addressed (although of course there are 
critics of various aspects of the account, some having to do with the 
metaphysical story).38 But it is important to stress more generally that 
this part must be elucidated, because (as we shall see in chapter 3, for 
instance) it sometimes is not as clear as one might have hoped. 
In a sense this in not a separate constraint as much as an instance 
of METAPHYSICS MATTERS. The bottom line of METAPHYSICS 
MATTERS is that in order to be able to tell whether a particular modal 
epistemology is able to meet the integration requirement, we need to 
know something about what modal metaphysics the theory is sup-
posed to be integrated with. This remains true even for deferralist 
modal epistemologies. It is not just that the metaphysics of the k-facts 
matters in order for it to be integrated with the method supporting 
the k-beliefs. Modal metaphysics still matters, in the sense that it 
matters how modal facts are related to the k-facts.  
2.6. Conclusions 
In this chapter I have outlined the conception of the integration re-
quirement which I take to be both the most informative and true to 
large parts of the literature on the topic. I will refer to this as the 
standard conception of the integration requirement in the rest of the 
book, but by doing so I do not mean to say that it is a conception 
everyone would agree on. For one thing, I have sometimes explicitly 
                                    
38 In fact, essence-based epistemologies quite generally tend to address this part of the 
task in a recommendable way, see also e.g. Hale (2013), Jago (2018) and Mallozzi 
(2018).  
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argued for my preferred conception over how others have conceived 
of it. Moreover, while I have drawn a lot on the actual literature on 
the issue of integration for both modality and other domains, I have 
also endeavoured to make explicit things that have previously been 
lurking under the surface. In doing so, I have likely sometimes gone 
beyond what other have meant to say.  
The standard conception of the integration requirement in the 
epistemology of modality is as the demand for an answer to the 
vertical follow-up question. This is a question which can be posed 
about any particular method which, according to some modal episte-
mology, allegedly is able to confer justification on modal claims. In 
order to find out whether a modal epistemology is able to meet the 
integration requirement, one considers it as part of a particular 
specification, involving a theory of the nature of modal facts, i.e. a 
modal metaphysics. It is often due to metaphysical assumptions that 
a domain is thought to face an integration challenge, and so it is natural 
that whether or not a modal epistemology is successful with respect 
to the integration requirement also depends on what assumptions one 
is making about modal metaphysics. This is what the principle META-
PHYSICS MATTERS states.  
In order for the integration requirement to be met by a modal 
epistemology, there must be some substantial story available as an 
answer to the vertical follow-up question (POSITIVE). This answer is 
best understood as an explanation, where the explanandum is the 
assumed fact that the method in question is a good method for 
supporting modal beliefs, given that truth is the aim of modal enquiry. 
The explanation should specify the metaphysical underpinnings of 
the explanandum fact, i.e. it should elucidate in virtue of what the 
explanandum fact obtains. These metaphysical underpinnings can 
(CAUSAL BLUEPRINT) but need not (NEUTRALITY) be a causal link.   
A common strategy in taking on the integration challenge for 
modality is to defer and explain modal justification in terms of some 
other justified beliefs, supposedly more easily integrated with 
whatever facts they are about. In light of this, I also stressed that when 
one evaluates modal epistemologies that avail themselves of this 
strategy, one needs to be mindful of two things. First, that the inte-
gration requirement actually is met for the justified beliefs that 
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support modal beliefs (BULGE IN THE CARPET). Second, that it is 
made clear what the facts in the domain to which the integration 
challenge is being deferred have to do with modal facts. This latter 






3. Modal Empiricism: Promises and 
Problems 
In this chapter, the spotlight is placed on a central player in this book; 
one which also occupies an increasing amount of space in the litera-
ture on the epistemology of modality, namely modal empiricism. 
Modal empiricism is not the name of one particular candidate modal 
epistemology, but the term I, along with others in the debate, use to 
refer to a group of modal epistemologies which take modal justifica-
tion to be explained in terms of experience or experientially justified 
beliefs.  
As I said in 1.4 above, I am taking an interest in modal 
empiricism with the integration challenge in mind. Empiricist modal 
epistemologies may have many other virtues, but here I am only going 
to focus on the claim that they enable us to meet the integration 
challenge while assuming modal realism in some form to be correct, 
and the related claim that modal empiricism is in a better position, 
integration-wise, than non-empiricist alternatives.  
The plan for the chapter is as follows. I begin in 3.1 with substan-
tiating the claim that modal empiricism holds some promise for 
meeting the integration requirement, and that its defenders often 
seem to be assuming that it does, in making arguments in favour of 
it. But, I indicate, there is a surprising lack of actual accounts of how 
the integration requirement is supposed to be met given empiricism. 
Thus, I turn in 3.2 to the task of trying to provide such an account, 
using two examples: an induction-based and an abduction-based 
empiricist modal epistemology. With a fuller picture of how empiri-
cism deals with integration, it becomes evident that there are gaps to 
be filled in and some possibly problematic implications. I raise three 
such issues in 3.3, and end with briefly describing a way for 
empiricism to handle the last of these issues, a way which will be 
examined much more closely in the next chapter.  
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3.1. The Promise of Modal Empiricism 
According to a popular version of the history of the epistemology of 
modality, theories that sort under the label of modal rationalism were 
the only real options on the table for quite a long time. But at the 
same time, and even more so in recent years, rationalism has come 
under intense criticism. Much (although of course not all) of this 
criticism against rationalist theories concern the integration require-
ment, in particular that it is unclear how it could be met given modal 
rationalism plus some version of modal realism.  
I have already mentioned Roca-Royes’ criticism against conceiva-
bility theories (2011a) and Peacocke’s understanding-based account 
(2010) to the point that they have not met the integration require-
ment, in virtue of not heeding what I call BULGE IN THE CARPET. 
Jenkins (2008, section 2.5) criticises Peacocke’s epistemology in a 
similar manner, suggesting that the problem with it (and other 
unsatisfactory a priori epistemologies) is that it lacks a crucial ingredi-
ent characteristic of satisfactory epistemologies of realist subject 
matters, namely a stage of “worldly input” (empirical or otherwise) 
which our mental faculties may then churn away at and finally 
produce a belief. Stephen Biggs starts off the motivation for his 
abduction-based modal epistemology by presenting the integration 
challenge as an insurmountable task for modal rationalism (2011, 287-
289).39 One may read Jessica Leech’s (2011) challenge to a particular 
version of modal rationalism in this way too.40 She suggests that it is 
not enough that the rationalism in question can deal with a number 
of alleged counterexamples:  
[b]eyond dealing with particular examples, what is required is a general 
explanation of why we should expect a prioricity and necessity to match 
up in the first place. Until such a general motivation is provided, the 
rationalist will always have to be on his guard for further kinds of 
counterexamples (111). 
                                    
39 Biggs has in mind a pretty strong version of modal rationalism where intuiting or 
conceiving that p is possible entails that p is possible. 
40 The theory she discusses is laid out by Keith Hossack (2007), and is also a quite 
strong version of modal rationalism. 
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Peter Kung (2010, 634) questions the justificatory power of imagina-
tion with respect to modal matters on the basis of the claim that 
imagination has very few constraints, and the constraints that it does 
have seem unrelated to the utter bounds of modal truth. That is, Kung 
complains that we have no reason to think that this method tracks 
the modal facts, which is just to say that the vertical follow-up 
question has not been satisfactorily answered.  
The list could go on, but in short, integration is a worry for speci-
fications involving a rationalist modal epistemology and a realist 
modal metaphysics. Indeed, in other domains where the integration 
challenge has been assumed to loom large, the specifications consid-
ered most relevant (because they involve the pair of independently 
most plausible theories, presumably) also involve an a priori method 
and a realist metaphysics. Given the strong standing of modal realism, 
this is criticism many will take quite seriously. If the specification in-
volving some modal empiricism plus modal realism does not face the 
same problem, that will put empiricism at a nice advantage.  
But why think that the problem lies with rationalism here? 
Arguably it is considerations of modal metaphysics that turned us to 
rationalism in the first place. If modal facts were more like, say, 
categorical facts of property possession by macro objects, we could 
for instance perceive them and justify our modal beliefs that way. Then 
empiricism would clearly be attractive. But modal realists often take 
modal facts to be not only unobservable but also acausal. Empiricism 
may thus seems like a dead end. Presumably this is a large part of the 
explanation for why it long seemed obvious to turn to rationalist 
methods when constructing a theory of modal justification. Of 
course, new problems awaited there. Again, because modal realists 
also take modal facts to be mind-independent, it appears unclear why 
some a priori method should be a reliable guide to truths about them.  
The hope with the deferralist strategy is, I assume, to break up 
some new ground here. If we cannot see how the integration 
challenge for modality can be met given rationalism plus modal real-
ism, it might be a good idea to consider explaining modal knowledge 
in terms of some other knowledge, of a domain where the integration 
challenge appears less intractable. But as I have mentioned already, 
rationalist attempts to explain modal knowledge in terms of some 
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other a priori justified beliefs about or “grasp” of for instance essences, 
or constitutive truths, are arguably tripped up by their failure to heed 
BULGE IN THE CARPET, since the integration requirement has not 
been met for the method to which they appeal.41   
This is where the promise of modal empiricism comes in. When 
BULGE IN THE CARPET is a worry, it is because the domain to which 
the integration requirement is deferred turns out to be as problematic 
as that of modality, integration-wise. Modal empiricism which defers 
the integration challenge to a domain commonly taken to be unprob-
lematic insofar as integration is concerned. According to modal 
empiricism, justified modal belief is just a matter of empirically 
justified categorical beliefs about certain sorts of actually obtaining 
facts, and we presumably have an explanation of the reliability of e.g. 
perception here, in terms of a causal link. In short, since empiricism 
defers the integration challenge to an apparently very un-mysterious 
domain, there is no BULGE IN THE CARPET worry, and the solution to 
the integration challenge for modality piggy-backs on the way 
ordinary perception of non-modal facts meets the integration require-
ment.  
3.2. Integrating Modal Empiricism 
The above is my rational reconstruction of the situation. Because 
modal empiricists, as it happens, do not say very much about the inte-
gration requirement and how it is met on specifications involving 
their sort of theory. Also, empiricism is rarely criticised for not dealing 
with the integration challenge, in the way rationalist theories are. 
Now, this might be either because empiricists do not bother with the 
integration requirement or because it is totally obvious how the 
integration requirement is met, given empiricist specifications.  
                                    
41 See Roca-Royes (2010) for this criticism of Peacocke and Horvath (2014) for an 
argument that Lowe’s essence-based modal epistemology relies on unelucidated 
modal knowledge. Again, people who defend modal epistemologies that rely on 
essentialist knowledge may not agree that they fail to elucidate essentialist knowledge 
in a way that meets the integration requirement. But here I am granting the empiricist 
that her rival has problems, for the sake of argument.  
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The former option is clearly out, since empiricists often press and 
refer to the objection that rationalists cannot deal with it as part of 
the motivation for their approach, as noted above. Relatedly, other 
alleged virtues of modal empiricism can also be tied to an assumption 
that the integration requirement can be met. For instance, it is claimed 
as a point in favour of modal empiricism that it reduces modal 
justification to “ordinary” cognitive capacities, and this is preferable 
for parsimony-related reasons. An example of this is Williamson’s 
(e.g. 2007, 136) anti-exceptionalist criterion, which he puts forward 
roughly as a case of Occam’s razor for cognitive economy: we should 
postulate as few cognitive capacities as possible in order to account 
for the knowledge that we have. The idea is that if modal justification 
is reducible to good old experience plus some perfectly “everyday” 
form of inference that is considered respectable in non-modal 
contexts, we do not need to introduce some additional – perhaps sus-
picious – notion like conceivability or modal intuition. Sounds good, 
right? But presumably the parsimony card can only be played if 
empiricism can do what more costly theories of modal justification 
are supposed to be accomplishing by postulating these other 
capacities of ours, namely account for justified modal belief.  
Moreover, some explicitly seem to relate anti-exceptionalism, 
which apparently speaks in favour of modal empiricism, to integra-
tion. Barbara Vetter, an empiricist who explicitly embraces the 
Williamsonian anti-exceptionalist credo, notes that modal epistemol-
ogies that do not attempt to reduce modal justification to “everyday” 
capacities have a difficult time “explaining how such isolated [modal] 
thought is to hook on to reality” (2016, 767). The idea of hooking on 
to reality is readily interpretable in terms of integration.  
It better be the case then, that modal empiricists can meet the 
integration requirement, if they are to argue for their theories in the 
ways they often do. So, is it obvious how the challenge is met given 
empiricism? Not entirely. The aim in the remainder of this chapter is 
to spell out how I take it that it is supposed to work, and also make 
some points about why one might doubt that all the work has been 
done. 
Let me first make clear what will not do. In relation to the point 
about anti-exceptionalism, it is supposed to be a good thing that we 
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can rely on our “everyday” cognitive capacities and methods, not just 
for reasons of parsimony but because we already trust them to be 
justification-conferring with respect to various non-modal matters. 
Therefore, the idea is, we can safely trust them with respect to modal 
matters too.42 But this in itself is not obviously helpful with respect to 
the integration requirement, especially not on the meta-theoretical 
framing of it. The concern is not with reassuring ourselves that we 
would be non-culpable, epistemically speaking, in relying on such-
and-such a method in forming modal beliefs. The concern is with 
explaining why it supposedly confers justification, in the sense of 
being truth-conducive with respect to modal claims, by outlining the 
metaphysical underpinnings in virtue of which the reliability 
supposedly obtains.  
But the actual key to integration given modal empiricism is in the 
vicinity. Perhaps the good confidence we have in these “everyday” 
and largely empiricist capacities, is due to the fact that we consider 
them to meet the integration requirement. That is, we have a good 
explanation of why they should be reliable in relation to the facts in 
question. For instance, we have a pretty good idea of how perception, 
i.e. the basis of experience, works; of how the perceptual apparatus 
gets its input from what we wish to justify our beliefs with respect to, 
namely physical reality. Very simplified, perceptual evidence justify 
beliefs about the world because the perceptual evidence is caused by 
the world.  
Now, there are two ways the empiricists could go in piggy-
backing on this integration. Either she can argue that perception is 
the source of modal knowledge in the sense that we perceive modal 
facts, and the explanation of why this is a reliable means parallels the 
one we have for perception of non-modal facts. I will not discuss that 
option here. 43 Or, she can play the deferralist card and be a liberalised 
                                    
42 Biggs (2011) makes that point with respect to abduction: if we can trust it with 
respect to non-modal matters in science, we can also trust it with respect to modal 
matters, unless there is a particular reason not to. More on Biggs’ argument below.  
43 Again, Margot Strohminger’s (2015) account of perceptual nonactual possibility 
knowledge might be an example of this, but it is unclear how the details vis-à-vis the 
modal facts are to be spelled out there, and so how the integration challenge should 
be met for that account is not at all transparent.  
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empiricist. Then she will suggest that we can reason from these 
empirically justified and well-integrated non-modal beliefs to modal 
beliefs, and arrive at derivatively justified modal beliefs. Then, if em-
pirical knowledge through sense perception (and ordinary derivative 
sources of empirical knowledge like testimony and memory) forms 
the basis for modal justification – i.e. this is the domain to which the 
strategy reduces modal justification – there seems to be no BULGE IN 
THE CARPET worry for the empiricist deferral strategy.  
But crucially, liberalised modal empiricists rely not only on these 
empirically justified non-modal beliefs, but also heavily on the ampli-
ative principles, in particular induction and/or abduction, that 
supposedly take us beyond actuality, to modal conclusions. These 
ampliative principles themselves are not necessarily empiricist in the 
sense that one could have a modal epistemology based on induction 
or abduction on non-empirically justified beliefs. What is empiricist 
on the accounts currently under consideration is primarily the “input” 
on which these ampliative principles operate. But the ampliative 
principles pull quite a lot of important weight in getting us modal 
justification.  
It is therefore an interesting question whether there is also an 
integration requirement on these ampliative principles, and whether 
that has been met. The use of ampliative principles is sometimes 
defended on the basis of the claim that methods based on them are 
generally justification-conferring in non-modal contexts, and so can 
be trusted here too. But again, as with the case of “everyday” 
cognitive capacities more generally, the question is not whether 
epistemic subjects are faultless in relying on these methods, but 
whether the assumed reliability of them can be explained given the 
nature of the relevant facts.  
I will revisit this issue in section 3.3. First however, I will spend the 
next two subsections illustrating the role of the non-modal empirically 
justified beliefs and the ampliative principles with a more detailed 
outline of two different liberalised empiricist accounts of modal 
justification. I first consider induction-based, and then abduction-
based, modal empiricism. Once one has a clearer picture of this, it will 
also be easier to assess the claim that the integration requirement can 
indeed be met given modal empiricism plus modal realism.  
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3.2.1. Induction-based Modal Empiricism 
Liberalised modal empiricists need to appeal to something in addition 
to empirically justified beliefs about what is actually the case in order 
to “get beyond” actuality, to justify beliefs about the modal realm, 
since experience itself can only justify beliefs about what is actually 
the case. One familiar and well-entrenched way to get beyond the 
actually observed is induction, i.e. the idea that we can justifiably draw 
general conclusions on the basis of (enough) accumulated knowledge 
of particular instances. Thus, the first sort of modal empiricism I wish 
to examine in more detail is one that makes use of experientially 
justified beliefs plus induction in order to account for modal justifi-
cation. Sònia Roca-Royes (2017) provides a comparatively detailed 
version of such an account, and I will take a closer look at her view 
in this subsection (but see also Elder (2004) and Leon (2017) for other 
examples that partly appeal to induction). 
Roca-Royes captures her own suggested account in slogan form 
like so:  
We know about some entities’ unrealized possibilities by extrapolation 
from knowledge about some other, similar entities’ realized possibilities 
(2017, 233).  
The idea is that my belief that something is a de re nonactual possibility 
for an entity x, is justified by my experiential knowledge about what 
is actually de re the case for entity y, just in case y is relevantly similar 
to x. In order to start unpacking this compact summary, let’s have a 
toy example to work with.  
Let a be the screen of Darla’s phone, and let B<◇Cracked(a)> be 
Darla’s belief that the screen of her phone could possibly crack. 
According to the slogan then, Darla is justified in holding 
B<◇Cracked(a)> on the basis of extrapolation from other justified 
beliefs she has about possibilities realised by other entities relevantly 
similar to a. There are two notions that primarily need to be unpacked 
here, in my view: ‘extrapolation’ and ‘relevant similarity’. They are 
related in the sense that the extrapolation manoeuvre is only justifi-
cation-conferring when the objects of the belief extrapolated from are 
relevantly similar to the target object, so to speak.  
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We might say that B<◇Cracked(a)> is justified by two separate 
beliefs. First, Darla believes that a is a glass phone screen, i.e. she 
believes that <GPS(a)> is true. This is a non-modal, categorical belief 
about actual property instantiation. Second, she believes (perhaps tac-
itly) a principle of the form ∀x(Qx → ◇Px), where Q and P are 
distinct properties. In this case, Darla believes that ∀x(GPS(x) → 
◇Cracked(x)), i.e. that if something is a glass phone screen it is 
possible that it cracks. This is what Roca-Royes calls a “nomic belief”. 
From these two together, it clearly follows that it is possible that a 
cracks (since a is a phone screen and if something is a phone screen 
it can possibly crack). 
Now, the nomic belief is obviously a modal belief, so someone 
might interject that insofar as this is supposed to be a deferralist 
account of modal justification it is not a very successful one. But that 
is a bit too quick. Because the idea here, I take it, is that the nomic 
belief is justified, in turn, by categorical, non-modal beliefs. This is 
where induction enters the picture. The idea being mined is of belief 
in general principles of the form ∀x(Q(x) → ◇P(x)) as supported by 
experience of their instances, and this is just ordinary inductive infer-
ence, a tried, tested and deeply intuitive practice on which we rely 
incessantly in ordinary life as well as in science. Darla’s belief in the 
principle ∀x(GPS(x) → ◇Cracked(x)) then, is supported by categor-
ical beliefs of actual property instantiation. For one, she holds beliefs 
B<GPS(b)> and B<GPS(c)>, where b is the screen of her previous 
phone, and c is the screen of her brother’s phone. For another, she 
holds the beliefs that both b and c actually instantiate the property of 
being cracked, i.e. she holds B<Cracked(b)> and B<Cracked(c)>. She 
then extrapolates from these beliefs, and perhaps others like them, to 
the general principle ∀x (GPS(x) → ◇Cracked(x)), by relying on in-
duction.  
But one small thing is missing. Instances of entities actually having 
both the property of being a glass phone screen and the property of 
being cracked only appear to support a principle of the form ∀x (Qx 
→ Px), and that is not what we are after. Darla concludes that if 
something is a (non-broken) glass phone screen it is possible that it 
breaks, and this is different from two more ordinary forms of 
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inductive inference: it is different from concluding that if something 
is a raven, it is also black (going from one current property 
instantiation to another current property instantiation); and it is 
different from concluding that if something is a larva at time t it will 
at some later time t2 be a dragonfly (going from one current property 
instantiation to a conclusion about a future property instantiation). 
The principle here says that if something is a glass phone screen it can 
possibly crack (whether or not it ever will), and so it would presumably 
need to be supported by instances of entities that are glass phone 
screens and can possibly crack. However, that – it being possible that 
something cracks – seems to be the kind of thing we were wondering 
how one could come to justifiably believe.  
Therefore, a central thought on this account that every actual prop-
erty instantiation is a “realized possibility”, as it says in the slogan. So, 
in order for the extrapolation to the right principle to be completed, 
the categorical beliefs from which Darla extrapolated must be supple-
mented with belief in another principle: if something is actual it is also 
possible. That is, Darla’s nomic belief is also supported by her belief 
– which may be tacit – that e.g. <Cracked(b) → ◇Cracked(b)> is true. 
Thus, the nomic belief in question is supported by categorical beliefs 
and inductive inference on the basis of those beliefs, plus the principle 
that whatever is actual is also possible (which Roca-Royes takes to be 
a conceptual truth). Returning to the notions of ‘extrapolation’ and 
‘relevant similarity’ in the slogan, we can conclude the following: 
‘extrapolation’ refers to the transcendence to the nomic belief from 
the particular instances, and ‘relevant similarity’ to the categorical 
property which allows a given object to be subsumed under the 
general principle.  
In sum, the idea is that modal beliefs are justified by non-modal, 
categorical beliefs about actual property instantiation. These non-
modal beliefs are in turn empirically justified. For instance, Darla 
believes that <GPS(a)> is true because she can see it, feel it, hear it if 
she taps it with her nail, and she has read the product specifications 
on the back of the box the phone came in. She believes <GPS(b)> 
and <GPS(c)> for similar reasons, and she believes that b is cracked 
because she saw it break and that c is cracked because her brother told 
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her that it is.44 This empirical knowledge is then aided by an ampliative 
principle of reasoning, in this case induction, which supports the 
nomic principle which takes Darla beyond the actually observed.  
This is an interesting and neat-looking account, with many aspects 
that bear discussing at length. In particular, the notion of relevant 
similarity and the work it does in determining which nomic principles 
confer justification on modal beliefs would be interesting to find out 
more about.45 But currently, I am only considering how this should 
all be understood from the perspective of the integration require-
ment.  
A deferralist strategy in the epistemology of modality defers the 
integration challenge to another domain, where the integration re-
quirement on the relevant method is more easily satisfied. Induction-
based modal empiricism defers the integration challenge for modality 
to the domain of actual, categorical property instantiation by concrete 
objects. The reliability of the empirical methods (e.g. perception) we 
use to find out about these non-modal facts can presumably be 
causally explained, and so it arguably meets the integration require-
ment. We are also told that an epistemic subject proceeds from these 
justified non-modal beliefs to modal beliefs by relying on inductive 
inference. Presumably, if there is an integration requirement on 
epistemic methods there is one on this inductive inference too. Is it 
met?  
This issue is not sufficiently addressed by Roca-Royes. She notes 
that we can even test whether her suggested method delivers the right 
results in the case of de re possibility beliefs (2017, 232). In the 
example of Darla’s belief, we can for instance attempt to break the 
phone screen after she has formed the belief that it can possibly break, 
using the method outlined above. We could do this over and over 
again with different phone screens, and more generally with different 
sorts of entities that are similar in different respects, if we wanted to. 
                                    
44 Although in this example the categorical believes are justified in a very straight-
forward ways, these beliefs could be justified in much more complex ways, involving 
abduction, induction from more basic directly perceptual, or derivative but still 
empirical, sources. 
45 Clearly connected to the issues about induction famously raised by Nelson 
Goodman (1955, see especially chapter 2).  
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Given enough data, if the success rate – the ratio of true modal beliefs 
arrived at through the given method – is high enough we could say 
that it is a reliable method for forming that kind of modal beliefs. This 
might be terribly cumbersome an experiment, but the claimed 
reliability is at least in principle testable. 
Moreover, the method is familiar, highly intuitive – even in the 
modal case, it seems. Isn’t it very natural to think that after observing 
instances of similar entities actually instantiating some property, that 
this entity here could also possibly instantiate that property? In short, 
since inductive inferences are generally assumed to be justification-
conferring in many contexts, provided the appropriate empirical 
input, why not think they are justification-conferring here too? It is a 
tried and tested method which we use and trust all the time.  
Sure, it is intuitive. But neither testability nor intuitiveness 
obviously speak to the question of integration. Because, again, when 
it comes to the integration requirement on a method, the question is 
why it is a reliable method, not whether it is. All we are being told are 
slightly different versions of the claim that we have reason to think 
induction and abduction works (or at least, no reason to think it does 
not work) – but we have not been told why. 
3.2.2. Abduction-based Modal Empiricism 
The second sort of modal empiricism I wish to consider is one that 
makes modal justification a matter of experientially justified beliefs 
about what is actually the case, plus another principle for ampliative 
reasoning, namely abduction. Abduction, or inference to the best 
explanation, is the idea that if some (set of) claim(s) is the best expla-
nation of a phenomenon in need of an explanation, that is a reason 
to accept  that (set of) claim(s).46 Theories consist of various claims, 
and these claims aim to explain phenomena by showing why they are 
what they are, e.g. by showing why an event occurred or why certain 
properties often occur together. Often, there are several incompatible 
theories that give different explanations of one and the same 
phenomenon. In order to decide which theory provides the best 
                                    
46 For a seminal work outlining and discussing inference to the best explanation, in 
particular in science, see Lipton (2004).  
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explanation of the phenomenon, and in turn decide which of the 
competing claims one can justifiably take to be true, one makes use 
of a plurality of abductive principles, using what may be viewed as a 
two-step process. First, one determines how well each competing 
candidate explanation does with respect to each individual abductive 
principle. Second, one weighs the results together and determine 
which candidate has the overall best result (Biggs 2011, 294-295). The 
candidate explanation that does, is the one we can justifiably accept.47 
As in the case of induction, what turns an abduction-based account 
into an empiricist modal epistemology is primarily that the “input” is 
empirically justified. But what is the “input” in an abductive process, 
and what exactly is the role of experience here? I will now spend some 
time laying that out. 
In the case of abduction, the most central “input” is the phenom-
enon in need of an explanation. A toy example of abduction in a non-
modal context will illustrate this. Abby is a physicist in the 1990s who 
believes that Higgs’ boson exists. Let B<Higgs’ boson exists> be this 
belief of Abby’s. This belief, and Abby’s other beliefs about the nature 
of this unobserved entity, is justified by abduction. In particular, Abby 
has no sensory evidence for the existence of Higgs’ boson, certainly 
not in the sense of direct perception but also not on a computer 
screen hooked up to very advanced lab equipment (nor has any other 
scientist who could have told her about it). No, instead <Higgs’ 
boson exists> is taken to be true because it is (part of) the best expla-
nation of a phenomenon, namely the fact that some particles have 
mass. Now, while Abby and her colleagues have not been able to 
observe Higgs’ boson, they have observed (broadly speaking) that 
some particles have mass. Thus, her belief about some particles’ 
having mass, which we may call B<Particles have mass>, is justified 
experientially (by her own experiences, or indirectly through testi-
mony from other scientists). Without specifying what exactly the 
relationship between B<Higgs’ boson exists> and B<Particles have 
                                    
47 Provided that it is good enough, that is. If the best explanation is still a bad 
explanation, its being the best out of a pool of terrible alternatives is not a reason to 
accept it.  
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mass> is, it seems quite clear that B<Higgs’ boson exists> depends48 
in some way on B<Particles have mass>. That is, Abby believes that 
Higgs’ boson exists (partly at least) because she believes that particles 
have mass. And while she has availed herself of abductive principles 
in order to support (and perhaps form) B<Higgs’ boson exists>, 
B<Particles have mass> also plays a crucial role, and the latter is 
experientially justified in a perfectly ordinary – well, ordinary for 
physics – way. Without B<Particles have mass> and the experiential 
support it enjoys, it seemingly does not matter at all – as far as the 
justification for the belief that Higgs’ boson exists – that <Higgs’ 
boson exists> is the best explanation of <Particles have mass>. The 
support that B<Higgs’ boson exists> enjoys is thus in a very im-
portant sense parasitic on the (experiential) justification that 
B<Particles have mass> enjoys.  
More generally, the explanandum phenomenon and the belief that it 
obtains plays a central role in the way abduction is used to justify 
beliefs. And it matters how this belief is justified. It might be justified 
a priori: say I have a very clear and distinct rational insight that 
something is the case, and then I can abduct to justified belief in some 
distinct claim which best explains that something. Or it might be 
justified empirically. But presumably there must be a difference be-
tween our epistemic position with respect to the explanandum belief 
and the claim to which we abduct. If we cannot determine directly 
whether some s is the case, but by making it plausible that there is 
some explanatory connection between s and some phenomenon p, we 
can conclude that plausibly s is the case, on the grounds that p is the 
case. This practice seems quite odd if our epistemic situation with 
respect to s and p were equally bad (or good) at the outset. So, it seems 
we need to have if not an epistemically better handle on the explanan-
dum belief then at least the handle we have must be, well, different. 
When it comes to the epistemology of modality, and the issue of 
integration, it seems promising that the explanandum beliefs should be 
empirically justified. If this is what one holds, one has an empiricist 
abduction-based account.  
                                    
48 This is not supposed to rule out that there is a form of interdependence, in the sense 
of mutual support, going on.  
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A couple of philosophers have in recent years expressed optimism 
about the use of abduction as a method for justifying modal beliefs, 
including Biggs (2011), Fischer (2017a, 2017b) and Leon (2017). Here 
I focus on the view laid out by Stephen Biggs, as it focuses “purely” 
on abduction directly for individual modal claims (whereas e.g. Leon 
has a candidate view which is less detailed and more pluralistic, and 
Fischer’s account makes modal justification more clearly derivative of 
abduction to theories on a grander scale). 
In a nutshell, Biggs’ suggestion is that I am justified in believing 
that something is possible or necessary if this is the best explanation 
of a phenomenon that needs to be explained. For this to be a worka-
ble account, at least the following is required: that modal claims can 
(be used to) explain phenomena; that abductive principles have 
something to say about modal claims, i.e. that at least some of the 
abductive principles will favour some modal claim(s) over some other 
competing modal claim(s); that the principles can be weighed together 
and balanced against each other in order to promote one modal claim 
over another to yield an overall best candidate. 
Let’s have an example here to illustrate how Biggs takes this to 
work. Let B<H2O metaphysically necessitates water> be Benjie’s 
belief that H2O metaphysically necessitates water, i.e. that it is meta-
physically necessary that if some particular stuff is H2O then this stuff 
is water.49 Let’s assume that this belief is true and justified. How is it 
justified, given an abduction-based modal epistemology of Biggs’ 
variety? First of all, we need to have an idea of what the explanandum 
belief here is, parallel to Abby’s belief about the mass of particles in 
the non-modal example above. Following Biggs, let’s assume that the 
phenomenon to be explained is the repeated co-occurrence of water 
and H2O. Let B<Co-occurrence> be short for Benjie’s true belief that 
water and H2O repeatedly co-occur.  
Then we need to have some idea of how a modal proposition like 
<H2O metaphysically necessitates water> explains <Co-occurrence>. 
Biggs works with what he takes to be an intuitive notion of 
                                    
49 I borrow the outline of this example from Biggs, and the “metaphysically 
necessitates” terminology is his own. Later in the paper he cashes this out in terms of 
constitution, a relation distinct from identity.  
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explanation, and suggests that the claim about metaphysical modality 
here explains the co-occurrence claim in the sense that if you wonder 
why it is the case that water and H2O repeatedly co-occur, and you are 
told that it is because H2O metaphysically necessitates water, then if 
you understand the claims involved you will not need to ask again 
(2011, 294-295). That is, it seems absurd to say, in response to this 
that “I understand that H2O metaphysically necessitates water, but 
why do these two properties repeatedly co-occur?”.  
Other, competing modal claims can also explain the same 
explanandum phenomenon, however. For instance, the claim that H2O 
merely nomologically necessitates water is a contender. Let <H2O 
nomologically necessitates water> be this claim. It explains in the 
same intuitive way as the claim of metaphysical necessitation, i.e. it 
would be absurd to respond “I understand that H2O nomologically 
necessitates water, but why do the two properties repeatedly co-
occur?” (the intuition might be more vivid if one thinks of the nomo-
logical necessitation claim as equivalent to a claim about a law of 
nature: “I understand that it is a law of nature that all H2O is water, 
but why do the two properties repeatedly co-occur?”). To be clear on 
how the claim of metaphysical necessitation and the claim of mere 
nomological necessitation are incompatible: while it is the case that 
anything metaphysically necessary is also nomologically necessary, it 
is not the case that anything nomologically necessary will be 
metaphysically necessary. I take it that something’s being merely nomo-
logically necessary should be read as entailing that it is metaphysically 
possible that there be some x which is H2O but not water. In contrast, 
this possibility is precluded by the claim that H2O metaphysically 
necessitates water.50 
So far so good then. Now, in order for Benjie’s belief in the claim 
of metaphysical necessitation to be justified abductively, it needs to 
be the case that it explains the explanandum phenomenon better than 
the claim of mere nomological necessity. In order to see how that 
might happen, we need to know what the abductive principles are. 
                                    
50 The claim of metaphysical necessitation, however, allows that it is metaphysically 
possible that there be some water which is not H2O, i.e. it allows for multiple 
realisability of the property of being water.  
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Biggs focuses on two: (ontological, qualitative) parsimony and com-
prehensiveness. They are among the usual suspects, along with e.g. 
conservativeness, elegance, fruitfulness, simplicity, predictive power, 
etc. (cf. Lipton 2004, 122; Quine and Ullian 1978; Thagard 1978). It 
is important to stress here that the value of compliance with the 
abductive principles is supposed to be epistemic, in the sense of truth-
conducive, rather than e.g. pragmatic. That is to say, the assumption 
behind abduction as a method here is explicitly that compliance with 
abductive principles is a sign of truth rather than usefulness in some 
other sense (2011, 301; 309)51 – this is important for integration, since 
the integration requirement is motivated by the idea that truth is the 
aim of enquiry and justification should be understood in relation to 
this.  
Biggs goes on to argue that <H2O metaphysically necessitates wa-
ter> is both more parsimonious and more comprehensive than 
<H2O nomologically necessitates water>. By doing so he aims to 
show that abductive principles do have something to say about modal 
claims and do (sometimes) favour one modal claim over another 
competing modal claim. I will not go into the details of that here, 
though, but merely note that in order to gain abductive justification 
for a modal claim, one proceeds by deciding how well each candidate 
explanation does with respect to the various abductive principles. 
Once that is done, it is time to weigh them together, balance virtues 
and vices off against each other, and then determine which candidate 
provides the best explanation. 
One thing that is worth quickly noting, however, is how Biggs 
understands the virtue of comprehensiveness, which is a notion badly 
in need of unpacking. The way Biggs seems to understand it will 
further emphasise the role of empirically justified beliefs on this 
account. Biggs takes comprehensiveness to be the ability to explain 
                                    
51 The assumption that explanatory virtues are truth-conducive has of course been 
questioned. Here is what Lipton calls “Voltaire’s objection”, memorably voiced by 
Fumerton (1980, 596): “[The best theory according to explanatory virtues] is certainly 
more desirable than its competitors in the sense that it would be nice if it turned out 
to be true. But this is not the best of all possible worlds and (some theologians aside) 
what would be nice is not always so”. See also Van Fraassen (1980) for a classical 
argument to the effect that theoretical virtues are not truth-conducive in the sciences.  
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other relevant phenomena besides the “primary” explanandum phenom-
enon (in this case the repeated co-occurrence of water and H2O). 
When a detective seeks to primarily explain the dead body in the 
parlour, he will prefer a candidate explanation that also has the ability 
to explain the suicide note on the table over one which leaves the 
latter a mystery while only explaining the dead body. An explanation 
that can account for both is more comprehensive, on this understand-
ing. A highly interesting question, of course, is what counts as a 
secondary explanandum in a given case. Biggs, a bit unhelpfully, says 
that generally, common sense will decide this issue. In the current case 
of water and H2O’s repeated co-occurrence, Biggs lists water’s ability 
to nourish life and erode land, its propensity to boil at a certain 
temperature and expand when frozen as plausible candidates of 
secondary explananda, and then argues that overall, the metaphysical 
necessitation claim does a better job of explaining relevant secondary 
explananda, and hence it is more comprehensive (2011, 308-311). 
There is a lot – of the critical variety – to be said about Biggs’ 
argument for that particular claim and whether it is successful, but I 
will not go into that either. The important thing I wanted to 
emphasise was the role of experiential evidence at this level of 
abduction too.  
Let’s conclude this sketch of the view by going back to Benjie’s 
justified modal belief B<H2O metaphysically necessitates water>. It 
is supported by a battery of other beliefs that we may unfold like so: 
First, Benjie believes <Co-occurrence> (his primary explanandum belief). 
He also believes << H2O metaphysically necessitates water> is the 
best explanation of <Co-occurrence>>. Let’s call this the abduction-
belief. We thus have an explanandum belief and an abduction belief 
that allegedly justify Benjie’s modal belief and these beliefs in turn also 
need to be justified, of course, in order to confer any justification. The 
explanandum belief, presumably, is empirically justified. The abduction 
belief will, I take it, be justified by beliefs about the steps in the 
abductive process: the belief that <H2O metaphysically necessitates 
water> is more parsimonious than competing candidates, the belief 
that <H2O metaphysically necessitates water> is more comprehen-
sive than competing candidates, and so on. These beliefs will be 
justified in different ways, but notably the comprehensiveness-belief 
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will be justified by a number of secondary explanandum beliefs: the 
belief that water nourishes life, that water erodes land, that water boils 
at 100°C, etc., that will plausibly be empirically justified in a similar 
way to the primary explanandum belief.  
Again, there is much that could be said about this theory. In 
particular, a seriously pressing worry is that very few modal claims 
really will be able to play the abductive role envisioned for them here. 
But again, I will only concern myself with integration-related matters. 
Biggs makes a big number of the fact that his account is promising 
with respect to the integration requirement. But unfortunately, what 
he says is not very helpful insofar as we are to understand how the 
requirement is actually met.  
Let me try to fill in the blanks in a way similar to how things went 
with induction-based empiricism. First, the integration challenge for 
modality is deferred to the domain of the explanandum facts and the 
corresponding beliefs – this is the “input” into the abductive machin-
ery. Assuming that these beliefs are empirically justified and that the 
facts are categorical non-modal facts of some appropriate sort, the 
integration challenge seems to be met by way of an explanation in 
terms of a good old causal link. But as in the case of induction, we are 
completely missing an explanation of the alleged reliability of 
abduction. And abduction is clearly central since it is what takes an 
epistemic subject from the non-modal, empirically justified “input” 
beliefs to modal beliefs.  
What little Biggs does say is similar to what Roca-Royes says: he 
appeals to the fact that we trust abduction in many cases, and so 
absent any reason to refrain from trusting it here, we can go on 
trusting it. But again, this does not obviously speak to the question of 
integration.  
3.3. Three Worries 
Above I described two versions of liberalised modal empiricism, 
apparently a good bet with respect to meeting the integration require-
ment. I also offered what has so far been missing in the literature, 
namely an explicit outline of how liberalised empiricist accounts like 
these are supposed to accomplish the feat of meeting the integration 
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requirement. Now that such an outline is on the table, there are a few 
worries to be raised about whether the integration requirement has 
indeed been met. One of them, to be further developed in 3.3.1 
below, has already been indicated above. It concerns the integration 
requirement on the ampliative principles. The second worry, 
intimately related to the first and discussed in 3.3.2, concerns the way 
METAPHYSICS MATTERS applies to deferral strategies. In the third 
subsection below, I raise a different kind of worry. The point of this 
last worry does not concern the claim that the integration requirement 
is met given modal empiricism. Rather its point is to emphasise that 
even assuming that it is met, this comes at a serious cost. In particular, 
the modal empiricist needs to choose between endorsing quite far-
reaching partial modal scepticism and defending a position known as 
non-uniformism. While the latter may not be unattractive in itself, the 
most natural way to understand it creates a tension for modal 
empiricists who wish to embrace it as a way to avoid partial modal 
scepticism. 
3.3.1. First Worry: Black-Boxing 
I noted above that reliance on induction and abduction, respectively, 
is crucial in getting epistemic subjects from justified non-modal 
beliefs to justified modal beliefs, according to liberalised modal epis-
temologies. But even if the non-modal “input” beliefs are integrated, 
it is not clear that the methods of inductive and abductive reasoning 
are. Given how central they are to getting any modal knowledge at all, 
we might say that the ampliative principles perform some kind of 
black-boxing manoeuvre. The real machinery – everything we are 
curious about – is all inside the black box of induction/abduction, 
and as far as the question of explaining reliability is concerned, we 
have been told nothing about the black box. So it seems we can press 
the vertical follow-up question for the ampliative principles that 
actually do the work of converting non-modal knowledge into modal. 
Will liberalised modal empiricism hold up? 
Again, points about intuitiveness, testability, and being entitled to 
extend trust in a method as long as we have no reason not to, seem 
orthogonal to the question of integration. But most of what Roca-
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Royes and Biggs say are along these lines. For instance, Biggs 
emphasises, as a central starting point, that abduction is widely used 
in non-modal contexts, including in science, for justifying claims 
about unobservable entities (2011, 284). However, there is an argu-
ment in the vicinity here that might be more helpful. Roca-Royes 
notes that while there is certainly an interesting and difficult question 
concerning what she calls the “epistemic adequacy”52 of ampliative 
methods like induction, there is no special problem for an episte-
mology of modality that also uses induction (2017, 230-232). 53 Perhaps 
we should read remarks like these as saying that the integration 
requirement is met for induction/abduction in non-modal contexts, 
and we should extend not only our trust in them but the explanation 
that provides integration, to the modal context.  
But this attempt to free-ride on a solution in the non-modal case 
can only succeed insofar as we have a good enough idea about how 
to explain the reliability of inductive/abductive reasoning (note 
though that this task is not the same as the task of independently 
justifying induction or abduction – that would be a tall order indeed 
– since the framing of the integration challenge allows one to assume 
the reliability of the method in explaining it). I think it is far from clear 
that we do.  
Even granting that we do have a good enough idea of how those 
explanations would go, on which the modal empiricist can attempt to 
free-ride, there is a further problem. It is not at all clear that there is 
no additional explanatory task that befalls the modal epistemologist – 
at the very least, that is an open question. Again, Biggs suggests that 
we can take abduction to confer justification on modal beliefs too 
unless there is some reason not to think so. Well, whether there is such a 
reason or not, insofar as integration is concerned, plausibly depends 
on how one understands the nature of modal facts. The story of 
                                    
52 This way of phrasing it is unfortunately ambiguous between issues of reliability and 
other possible aspects of epistemic justification, but I will consider this as pertaining 
to the integration challenge as understood here. 
53 Leon (2017, 257) makes a similar remark on using analogy-based reasoning to 
support modal claims: whatever problems there might be about the reliability of 
analogical reasoning are general and have nothing to do with using such reasoning in 
modal cases.  
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modal justification needs to make sense in light of the story of modal 
facts, and as I have already indicated, it seems many have had precisely 
the idea that modal facts are not like non-modal facts in various epis-
temically relevant aspects. Perhaps that idea is misguided, but then 
one needs to subscribe to a metaphysical picture on which liberalised 
modal empiricism does make this kind of sense. In short, even 
assuming that the integration requirement on induction/abduction is 
met given non-modal reality, it is reasonable to demand that 
liberalised modal empiricists say something more, something to make 
it plausible that this will extend to modal reality. If not, it seems we 
might have something of a BULGE IN THE CARPET worry for these 
accounts after all.  
3.3.2. Second Worry: METAPHYSICS Still MATTERS 
The second worry I wish to raise concerns the way in which 
METAPHYSICS MATTERS applies to deferral strategies in the epistemol-
ogy of modality. In short, the modal empiricist accounts currently 
under consideration have neglected to hook the modal facts up to the 
picture they have been painting. It is related to the previous worry in 
the sense that whether or not the underpinnings of the reliability of 
abduction/induction, whatever they are, can also underpin an 
assumed reliability of these methods with respect to modal matters 
depends on the nature of modal facts. So in a sense, dealing with one 
of these worries may be a way to deal with the other, conveniently 
enough. 
In 2.5.2, I made the task facing a deferralist modal epistemology 
up as being tripartite. One: elucidate the justificatory path from beliefs 
in this other domain to modal beliefs. Two: make sure the integration 
requirement is met for the domain to which the challenge has been 
deferred. And three (also crucially, as far as integration is concerned): 
outline the relation between facts in the other domain and modal 
facts. Again, the vertical follow-up question about a deferralist empir-
icist modal epistemology involves asking why reasoning in such-and-
such a way on the basis of some particular non-modal beliefs can 
result in justified modal beliefs. And the answer seems to require 
making metaphysical claims about the relation between modal and 
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relevant non-modal facts. Which amounts to making claims about 
modal metaphysics.  
In the previous chapter, when I first introduced how the 
METPHYSICS MATTERS condition plays out for deferralist modal epis-
temologies, I noted that this third task might seem more obvious in 
some cases than in others. For instance, when the reduction is to the 
domain of essentialist truths, the need for elucidating the relationship 
between essentialist facts and modal facts may appear more pressing, 
because the domain deferred to is less familiar to us. We will naturally 
wonder how this could help with modal knowledge. But when it 
comes to a mundane, familiar-feeling domain like categorical prop-
erty-instantiation of hum-drum, concrete macro objects, and our 
beliefs about these facts, perhaps we intuitively feel as if we under-
stand what is going on. So we might fail to press the corresponding 
question here. But surely the same task arises for all deferralist modal 
epistemologies if we take the integration requirement seriously. And 
the point is that liberalised modal empiricists have not completed the 
third task. They do not say anything about modal facts and their 
metaphysical relations to the non-modal facts that are supposed to 
inform us about modal matters. Typically, they just say that they 
assume some unspecified kind of modal realism.  
Now, I am certainly not suggesting that it is a problem for 
liberalised modal empiricists that they need to be more specific in 
their metaphysical commitments. Since METAPHYSICS MATTERS 
characterises the integration requirement, this goes for everyone. I am 
also not suggesting that liberalised empiricists would be forced to 
make unlikely or strange claims about the nature of modality, or that 
it would be troublesome spelling the assumptions out. Perhaps they 
will, but perhaps not. The problem is that so far, they have not said 
anything about it, so we do not know. Given METAPHYSICS MATTERS, 
we therefore cannot really evaluate whether the integration 
requirement has been met for liberalised modal empiricists.  
In sum then, it is too early to say whether liberalised modal 
empiricism can meet the integration requirement assuming modal 
realism. Its proponents have said too little about the integration of 
the ampliative principles, and they have said too little about the 
metaphysics of modality, and in particular about how modal facts 
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relate to the relevant non-modal facts. Plausibly, doing the former will 
include doing the latter. But whether or not it can be neatly accom-
plished, we have yet to find out. 
 Insofar as it is considered a major advantage of modal empiricism 
that it can easily meet the integration challenge, it is in empiricists’ 
interest to give these two points some thought. First, recall that a 
strength of modal empiricism is supposed to be that unlike competing 
deferral strategies, they face no BULGE IN THE CARPET worry because 
the reliability of the “input” beliefs in the domain to which the 
integration challenge has been deferred can be readily explained. 
Rationalist modal epistemologies, on the other hand, often have 
trouble accounting for the reliability of the more basic beliefs that in 
turn are supposed to support modal beliefs.54 I have suggested that 
empiricists have not done enough to suggest that there is no BULGE 
IN THE CARPET worry for their accounts.  
Second, on many of the modal rationalist accounts that are geared 
towards meeting the integration requirement – such as Peacocke’s 
and Lowe’s modal epistemologies – there is no particular problem 
with explaining how the modal facts are related to the facts in the 
domain to which the challenge has been deferred. They supply 
metaphysical accounts that cover this issue, and so they heed META-
PHYSICS MATTERS as it appears for deferralists. I argued that modal 
empiricists are weaker in this respect. Now, at best the two strategies 
have one weakness each, but if I am right in my previous point about 
BULGE IN THE CARPET, then it turns out empiricism may actually be 
worse off than some forms of rationalism. In short, it is imperative that 
empiricists attend to these issues if they want to appeal to the 
integration requirement as an aspect in which their theories are 
superior. 
3.3.3. Third Worry: The Limitation Problem 
This worry is different from the two previously discussed, in the sense 
that I do not intend it to put pressure on the claim that the integration 
                                    
54 This does not have much to do with modal epistemology in particular, but with the 
fact that the reliability of a priori methods is considered more difficult to explain quite 
generally, compared to experientially justified beliefs. 
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requirement is easily met given modal empiricism. Rather, this worry 
actually arises assuming that the integration requirement can be met 
and that it is met in roughly the way I have suggested above. Because 
the fact that the key to meeting the integration requirement is reliance 
on empirically justified non-modal beliefs is what creates the problem. 
The problem is that modal empiricist theories will have a built-in 
limitation in the sense that some putative cases of modal justification 
cannot be accounted for if their sort of view is the correct one. Before 
I begin outlining this problem, should say that it is not a surprising 
problem. Roca-Royes explicitly notes these limitations of her theory. 
However, as I will go on to argue in the next subsection, a natural 
move to make in the face of these limitations is problematic.  
There are limitations with respect to (at least) two subcategories of 
modal belief. To begin with, it seems modal empiricism cannot 
account for justified modal beliefs about abstract entities. As we shall 
see in more detail in the next chapter, the abstract/concrete distinc-
tion is a tricky one, but for current purposes a fast and loose 
characterisation will do. Paradigmatic examples of concrete objects 
are cups, phone screens, horses, human beings, stars, electrons, and 
bacteria. Paradigmatic examples of abstract objects will always be 
more controversial, but it is fair to include numbers, propositions, 
concepts, and meanings on a provisional list. Thus, modal claims 
about horses and electrons are modal claims about concrete objects 
and modal claims about propositions and functions are modal claims 
about abstract objects. Whatever way the abstract/concrete 
distinction is ultimately drawn, it is commonly understood to be 
exclusive in the sense that nothing is both abstract and concrete. In 
addition, it seems fairly uncontroversial to say that the distinction is 
supposed to divide entities into what Lewis calls “two fundamentally 
different kinds” (1986, 81). Finally, on a common understanding of 
‘abstractness’ (which also seems to fit with the above examples), all 
abstract objects are causally inert. 
The last two aspects are key in the current context. Induction-
based modal empiricism rests centrally on the availability of 
empirically justified beliefs about actual cases of property 
instantiation. It is in virtue of the fact that the reliability of the 
methods that support these beliefs can be explained in terms of some 
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causal dependence relation that the integration requirement is 
supposed to be met (bracketing the worries raised in 3.3.1 and 3.3.2). 
First, since abstract objects are causally inert, there cannot be any such 
empirically justified input-beliefs about abstract objects, from which 
we can generate justified possibility beliefs about abstract objects. 
Second, since abstract and concrete entities belong to two fundamen-
tally different kinds, as Lewis puts it, it seems very unlikely that an 
abstract object is ever “relevantly similar” to a concrete object. Hence, 
it is highly implausible that we should be able to use empirically 
justified beliefs about concrete objects as basis for an inductive 
inference to a modal conclusion about some abstract object.  
It is worth noting here that this is not a problem that has to do 
with modal epistemology in particular. Nor does it have to do with 
induction. One could certainly have an analogous, induction-based 
account of modal knowledge of abstract entities, if there were some 
empirically justified beliefs about abstracta to begin with. It is rather 
that if one subscribes to empiricist epistemology quite generally, one 
will find it difficult to account for alleged knowledge about abstract 
entities.  
In the case of abduction-based modal empiricism, the range of 
input-beliefs will be limited in the same way, of course. But while the 
inductive reasoning involved relies on relevant similarity, which pre-
vents us from basing modal knowledge of abstract entities on 
knowledge of concrete entities, it is less clear how things stand when 
the reasoning is abductive. It is not obvious, I guess, that a modal fact 
involving an abstract entity could not be the best explanation of a 
non-modal fact involving a concrete entity. It is hard to say very much 
about the reach and limits of abduction, since it is unclear what 
underwrites reliable abduction. However, there are at least two 
reasons to think that abduction-based modal empiricism will be 
limited to modal beliefs about concrete entities in a way similar to 
induction-based modal empiricism.  
First, while Biggs (unlike Roca-Royes) does not explicitly concede 
that his theory does not extend to modal knowledge of abstract 
entities, he does claim to target only “what is necessary/possible for 
broadly scientific entities” (2011, 284). From the examples he lists of 
what this includes and excludes, one can guess that it limns the 
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abstract/concrete distinction when understood to track the distinc-
tion between acausal and causal. The idea, in short, is to focus on how 
modal facts involving concrete entities can be the best explanations 
of some explanandum facts. I can only speculate on the reasons for this 
explicit restriction, but here is one idea: people who rely on abduction 
in philosophy like to emphasise that abduction is used a lot in science, 
e.g. to justify claims about unobservable entities. But while actually 
unobservable, these entities are assumed to be related – typically 
causally related – to other things in the world that are observable. So, 
an unobservable entity might be stipulated to fill a gap in the causal 
network, very crudely speaking. That is the most obvious way in which 
they might explain things, from the scientist’s perspective. Abstract 
entities are, by stipulation here, not causally related to other things in 
the world, and so one cannot rely on or proceed from assumptions 
about such a causal network in which they might be needed to play 
an explanatory role. Admittedly, some philosophers like to appeal to 
abduction in justifying existence claims about allegedly acausal 
entities, see e.g. various versions of indispensability arguments for the 
existence of numbers.55 The exact workings and viability of such 
arguments, and whether they really do justify meatier existence claims 
such as “platonic, acausal numbers exist” (rather than just “numbers 
exist”), are hotly debated issues, and the relevant sense of ‘explana-
tion’ involved in them is rather murky. Given all that, it is unclear at 
best what the explanatory role of specific modal facts about abstract 
entities could be, in relation to non-modal facts about concrete 
entities. 
Second, if we consider the only example which Biggs gives, the 
explanandum belief and the modal belief justified through the process 
of abduction involve the same substance (water). There are two things 
this might indicate. To begin with, it indicates that what is 
“unobservable” but which we might still find out about through 
abduction, is not something about a distinct (sort of) entity, but 
something unobservable about (e.g. the modal profile of) the very 
                                    
55 For classical indispensability arguments, see Quine (1961) and Putnam (1971). For 
the new “enhanced” indispensability argument, see e.g. Baker (2005, 2009) and Lyon 
(2012). For criticism, see e.g. Finn (2017), Leng (2002), Maddy (1992), Melia (2000). 
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entity in question. Thus, it matters what sort of entities we can get 
empirically justified “input”, i.e. explanandum-beliefs, about, and that 
is limited to concrete entities, it would seem.  
The other subcategory of modal belief whose justification modal 
empiricism seems to have trouble accounting for, is what we may call 
extraordinary modal beliefs. The ordinary/extraordinary distinction 
pops up quite frequently in the epistemology of modality, but it is 
unclear what it is supposed to capture. Even more so than in the case 
of the abstract/concrete distinction, in fact: it seems pretty clear, at 
least, that the abstract/concrete distinction is a metaphysical distinction, 
but it is not at all obvious on what level the ordinary/extraordinary 
distinction is supposed to cut. Even the terminology tends to vary a 
bit: Bueno and Shalkowski (2014), Vaidya (2015) and Fischer (2016b) 
talk about “ordinary” and “extraordinary” modal judgements; but 
(Fischer 2017b) 56 instead contrasts “interesting” and “uninteresting” 
modal claims; and Roca-Royes (2018, footnote 29) 57 notes a differ-
ence between “ordinary” and “remote” modal claims. The distinction 
as relevant to the epistemology of modality goes back to a seminal 
paper by Peter van Inwagen (1998), and he uses instead the terms 
“basic” and “remote”.  
The distinction is often introduced by way of example. Extraordi-
nary modal claims are claims like 
Naturally purple cows are possible.  
Personal fission could not possibly occur.  
A world with gunky mereological structure is possible.  
The laws of nature could have been different.  
                                    
56 A note on Fischer’s terminology in (2017b): assuming the theory-based modal 
epistemology he defends, we can be justified in believing some interesting (which lie 
beyond “ordinary”, cf. 2017b, 8) modal claims, if we justifiably believe a theory which 
says they are true. However, he also uses the term “extraordinary”, which on his 
construal just means modal matters we cannot be justified in believing anything about 
because we don’t justifiably believe any theories which say anything about those 
modal matters (2017b, chapter 5). That is, some interesting modal matters are, on that 
usage, extraordinary while others are not.  
57 See also her (2017, 225-226).  
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There could be such a thing as a utility monster. 
These are to be contrasted with ordinary modal claims like 
It is possible for this wooden desk to break.  
It is possible that this healthy cat could have another litter 
of kittens.  
I could have been born one day earlier than I actually was.  
Bikes don’t have their colours with necessity.  
David Lewis could have been a psychiatrist rather than a 
philosopher. 
There is a sense in which this distinction, when we have these 
examples in hand, is pretty intuitive. Lots of philosophers claim to get 
it. But as soon as we try to pin it down, say more precisely what the 
difference is, things become tricky. Some philosophers like to use 
what we may call social epistemological or perhaps even sociological 
observations to characterise what goes on what side of the distinction. 
They use claims about things like confidence, interest, controversy 
and (dis)agreement (Fischer 2017b, 7-8; Leon 2017, 252; Roca-Royes 
2017, 234-235). For instance, ordinary modal knowledge is character-
ised by being uncontroversial while claims to know extraordinary 
modal claims are controversial. Ordinary modal claims are 
characterised by widespread agreement on their truth-value while 
extraordinary modal claims are characterised by widespread 
disagreement on their truth-value. We are generally confident in our 
beliefs about ordinary modal matters but not at all as confident in our 
beliefs about extraordinary modal matters. And so on. We may 
capture these ideas in the claim that ordinary modal claims are 
generally uncontested while extraordinary modal claims are generally 
contested. I use “generally” here, because I recognise that in the right 
(or wrong, perhaps) sort of context, even the most mundane claim 
can be contested.  
It is thus characteristic of an extraordinary modal claim that it is 
generally contested and of an ordinary modal claim that it is generally 
uncontested. What else can we say? It is tempting to suggest the 
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sociological properties characteristic of claims about ordinary and 
extraordinary modal matters respectively are explained by some 
deeper, perhaps metaphysical, difference in subject matter. For 
instance, it might be suggested that extraordinary modal claims 
concern metaphysical modality, whereas ordinary modal claims are 
claims about nomological modality. Or one might suggest that 
extraordinary modal claims concern situations or states of affairs that 
are wildly different from what things are actually like, while ordinary 
modal beliefs are about scenarios fairly “close to home” in a sense. 
In chapter 6 where I discuss what the modal empiricist might say 
in response to this aspect of the Limitation Problem, I will return to 
the ordinary/extraordinary distinction in more detail. There I point 
out problems with grounding the ordinary/extraordinary distinction 
in these kinds of metaphysical difference and defend an understand-
ing of it that stays on the sociological level. But I will not take a stand 
on that yet. In order to see that modal empiricism is going to be 
limited with respect to extraordinary modal claims, this will be 
enough: modal claims can be grouped into two broad, intuitive 
categories we may call ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’. Many of the 
claims in a group will share properties, some of which will be 
sociological and some of which will be of a more objective character. 
In the group we may call ‘extraordinary’, the claims will be generally 
contested in the sense above. Many of them will be about “remote” 
possible worlds; many will be about scenarios wildly different from 
scenarios we are familiar with from actual reality: many will be outside 
the sphere of nomological necessity. Surely there are contested modal 
claims that are not exotic in this sense, and exotic modal claims that 
are not contested. But these two circles will likely overlap to a 
significant extent, giving us a fair amount of contested and exotic 
modal claims – and many of them will be exactly the sort of claims 
many philosophers are interested in making. Let these be what we call 
extraordinary modal claims for now. It will be enough to suggest that 
modal empiricism will not be able to account for the justification of 
extraordinary modal beliefs. Note also that the ordinary/extra- 
ordinary distinction clearly cuts across the abstract/concrete 
distinction: the latter concerns the nature of an individual object while 
the former applies to something of a structured scenario, involving 
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e.g. a combination of object(s) and properties. For pretty much any 
individual entity one can come up with, it appears that there are both 
ordinary and extraordinary modal truths about it.58  
Now, it seems that modal empiricism of the sort examined in this 
chapter will have trouble accounting for the justification of many ex-
traordinary modal beliefs. First, the only non-modal, empirically 
justified input-beliefs we have are squarely in the ordinary category. It 
is an interesting question whether extraordinary modal matters are 
ever “relevantly similar” to ordinary non-modal matters, but I am 
going to go with the answer that they probably are not (and if they 
are, it will be very rare). Because reliable induction here is not just a 
question of what objects we can and do actually have experiential 
knowledge of, it is also about the sort of properties we can observe 
these objects to have, and the combinations of objects and properties 
that we are familiar with. Moreover, induction rests on some assump-
tion about the “uniformity of nature”. If this is, as it is sometimes 
taken to be, a claim about the actual laws of nature, well, then it seems 
this method of modal justification cannot justify any metaphysical 
possibility claims that go beyond what is physically possible, and that 
is arguably true for many of the extraordinary scenarios.  
As for abduction-based modal epistemology, things are again 
much less clear, since it is much less clear what sort of assumptions 
there are about what underwrites reliable abduction on the basis of 
empirically justified beliefs. On the other hand, I think there are 
concerns to be raised about the power of the Biggsian abduction-
based modal epistemology outlined here. My suspicion is that it might 
be seriously limited in the sense that very few modal claims will be 
able to actually come out as the best explanation of various 
empirically justified explanandum-beliefs. But it will take me too long 
to delve into that here. I do hope to have indicated though, that there 
are reasons to think that abduction-based empiricism suffers from 
limitations similar to those which induction-based empiricism wears 
proudly on its sleeve, in particular with respect to abstracta. More 
                                    
58 Perhaps excluding certain entities that are themselves extraordinary in the sense of 
being exotic relative to the actual world.  
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reasons might emerge if one were to spend more time investigating 
the assumptions on which abduction relies. 
These limitations – with respect to modal claims about abstract 
objects and extraordinary modal claims – show that if liberalised 
modal empiricism of the sort outlined here is the correct account of 
modal justification, we cannot be justified in holding any extraordi-
nary modal beliefs or any modal beliefs about abstracta. That is, the 
modal empiricist appears to be committed to scepticism with respect 
to modal matters involving abstract entities and extraordinary modal 
matters. It is reasonable to view this as a rather far-reaching partial 
modal scepticism, in the sense that it renders us unable to be justified 
in beliefs we prima facie thought we were, or could be, justified in 
holding. I will refer to this as the Limitation Problem for modal 
empiricism.  
It is certainly not mandatory for the modal empiricist to see this 
partial modal scepticism as a problem. One might, for instance, 
instead take this implication as a useful lesson in epistemic humility 
and conclude that we are not justified in anything like all the cases we 
like to think we are justified: a lot of the time, we are completely in 
the dark. Leon (2017) is an example of someone who is happy to 
accept scepticism about the modal matters beyond that which 
experiential knowledge can justify, and even takes the implied partial 
scepticism as a virtue of his account.59 And if one is independently 
committed to some naturalist or empiricist programme more gener-
ally, this will be the natural attitude to adopt.  
That said, many are likely to find at least one dimension of the 
Limitation Problem genuinely worrying. Much of philosophy 
involves a great deal of talk, implicit or explicit, about abstract entities, 
including talk about their modal profile. Of course, some philoso-
phers think there are no abstract objects, but among those who do 
accept their existence it is typically also thought that we can have 
knowledge (or at least justified beliefs) about them, including modal 
                                    
59 However, Leon is rather optimistic (exaggeratedly so, I think – he has a very liberal 
idea of where analogy and similarity-based reasoning can justifiably take us) of the 
prospects for basing philosophically interesting modal knowledge on experientially 
justified beliefs, so the scepticism he thinks his account commits us to is less far-
reaching than what I suspect it might be.  
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knowledge. Likewise, philosophy is riddled with scenarios clearly in 
the extraordinary category (with and without abstracta), used and relied 
upon in important arguments. If we cannot at least be justified in 
believing that these scenarios are indeed possible, they will typically 
be useless.60 In chapters 4 through 6, I am going explore two broad 
strategies the modal empiricist might avail herself of in dealing with 
the Limitation Problem. I acknowledge that some modal empiricists 
will not see the need for any “strategy” here, because they do not see 
the outcome as problematic, but these modal empiricists will not be 
my concern in what follows.  
In closing this section, I just want to make a clarificatory point 
regarding the way in which the Limitation Problem implies 
scepticism. I said in chapter 2 that on the meta-theoretical concep-
tion, the point with meeting the integration requirement is not to 
avoid scepticism. For that reason, it may seem confusing that I am 
now saying that modal empiricism’s inability to account for (in a way 
which meets the integration requirement) justified beliefs about some 
modal matters, implies scepticism about those modal matters.  
The point I am pressing here is this: say that I hold on to a 
particular modal epistemology, which is supposed to meet the 
integration requirement in a particular way, as the correct one. If it 
turns out that this modal epistemology cannot account for the 
justification of a subclass of modal beliefs in a way which meets the 
integration requirement, it seems I am committed to my favoured 
modal epistemology not being correct for that subclass of modal 
beliefs. That is, we cannot be justified in holding those beliefs, using 
the route outlined by my preferred modal epistemology. Then I, as an 
advocate of this modal epistemology, seems to be committed to scepticism 
about these modal beliefs. In order to avoid this, I could give up on 
the modal epistemology that put me in this position, and no longer 
be committed to partial modal scepticism. But if I want to stand my 
ground as a friend of imperial modal empiricism, partial modal 
scepticism is my share. That is the Limitation Problem.  
                                    
60 See the opening section of Fischer and Leon (2016) for a useful discussion of the 
wide-spread resistance to modal scepticism.  
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3.4. The Tension Problem 
The third worry is that modal empiricists appear to face a rather far-
reaching partial modal scepticism due to the Limitation Problem. But 
as already flagged, modal empiricists are not unaware of this built-in 
limitedness of their theories. For instance, Roca-Royes explicitly says 
from the start that she only intends her account to target ordinary (as 
opposed to extraordinary) de re possibility knowledge of concrete, as 
in spatiotemporally located, objects.61 Biggs too restricts the scope of 
his theory. Rather than with “what is necessary/possible in general” 
he is concerned with “what is necessary/possible for broadly 
scientific entities. Broadly scientific entities include inter alia electrons, 
trees, and pains. Broadly scientific entities exclude inter alia numbers 
and logical axioms” (2011, 284). We may for current purposes 
understand this as a restriction to concrete entities.  
Other empiricists are also clear about the limited scope of their 
accounts. Strohminger comments in relation to her perception-based 
modal epistemology:  
[T]here are many instances of knowledge of non-actual possibilities that 
cannot be based on sense perception (…) As a result, the 
epistemologist of modality will need to invoke something else to avoid 
scepticism about some cases of modal knowledge (2015, 369).  
The last sentence of this quote is especially interesting. It appears to 
indicate that one could offer a different sort of account for the 
justified modal beliefs outside the explanatory scope of one’s own 
theory. Roca-Royes similarly remarks that modal knowledge about 
abstract objects will have to be accounted for in a very different way, 
and extraordinary modal beliefs about concrete objects will also need 
a separate epistemology. Indeed, she elsewhere (2018) discusses the 
modal epistemology of abstracta separately.  
Are we looking at a possible way for modal empiricists to avoid 
far-reaching partial modal scepticism, by opening the door for some 
                                    
61 Even more specifically, spatiotemporally unified concrete entities i.e. excluding 
scattered objects that exists according to universalists about mereological 
composition.   
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different route(s) which can justify (some of) the modal beliefs outside 
of empiricism’s scope? 
This prospective solution has a name: non-uniformism. As we shall 
see in the next chapter, exactly what non-uniformism amounts to is a 
matter of some controversy, but on a provisional understanding on 
which most can agree, non-uniformism should be understood in 
contrast to uniformism, and while a uniformist takes there to be just 
one route to justified modal belief, a non-uniformist takes there to be 
more than one. The distinction between uniformism and non-
uniformism is a relatively recent addition to the modal episte-
mologist’s toolbox, and the terminology is only as old as the idea that 
non-uniformism is a live option to be discussed – which is not very 
old. Interestingly, non-uniformism becoming a live option has 
somewhat coincided with modal empiricism becoming a live option, 
no doubt partly because of the obvious limits of empiricism. 
For the empiricist to turn to non-uniformism in order to avoid far-
reaching partial modal scepticism is to concede that a non-empiricist 
modal epistemology will be correct for some instances of justified 
modal belief, while some empiricist modal epistemology is correct for 
certain instances of justified modal belief. However, with the 
integration requirement in mind, this appears to create a serious 
tension for the modal empiricist gone non-uniformist. For one reason 
to prefer modal empiricism to various rationalist competitors was, 
allegedly, that empiricism can meet the integration requirement 
(suppressing the worries I raised above about whether this has been 
accomplished). In order to argue this way, it must first and foremost 
be accepted that the integration requirement is an important 
desideratum in the epistemology of modality. But if the empiricist now 
concedes that rationalism should be considered correct too – does 
that not seem to require the empiricist to accept that rationalism can, 
after all, somehow meet the integration requirement? 
This is an odd position for the modal empiricist to find herself in. 
First of all, it seems we have made very little progress with respect to 
the integration challenge for modality by embracing empiricism, since 
we also need to meet it given a non-empiricist modal epistemology. 
And of course, the assumption that modal realism must be integrated 
with modal rationalism is the reason why integration is such a looming 
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worry in the philosophy of modality. Second, empiricists are in a 
weird dialectical situation when they turn to non-uniformism in this 
way. Given that they must now concede that the integration challenge 
can be met given modal rationalism, it seems to undermine arguments 
for modal empiricism over modal rationalism which proceed from 
the integration requirement: if rationalist modal epistemologies are 
also up to the integration requirement, why should we prefer modal 
empiricism? In particular in light of the sparse explanatory scope of 
modal empiricism, which flows from its way of meeting the integra-
tion requirement. If it turns out that rationalist modal epistemologies 
are not limited in that sense, and can meet the integration 
requirement, then why bother with empiricism?  
It seems as if the modal empiricist who turns to non-uniformism 
in order to avoid the otherwise implied far-reaching partial modal 
scepticism owes an account of what it means to say that both a 
rationalist and an empiricist modal epistemology are correct – prefer-
ably one which relieves the tension I just noted.62  In the next chapter 
I examine a way to defend non-uniformism which might be able to 
do the trick.  
3.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter I have examined the claim that modal empiricism can 
live up to the integration requirement, assuming modal realism, and 
that we therefore have good reason to prefer empiricist modal 
epistemologies over rationalist modal epistemologies. Since this claim 
typically lacks explicit defence, I tried to sketch the general idea of 
how the integration requirement is supposed to be met given 
empiricism. This exposed some further blanks that would plausibly 
need to be filled in if empiricism should indeed be considered able to 
                                    
62 A terminological note from chapter 1.4 that bears repeating: perhaps it strikes some 
readers as odd to call someone who claims that there is non-empiricist (modal) 
knowledge or justification (in addition to empirical justification/knowledge) a (modal) 
empiricist. A non-uniformist in this sense is not at all an empiricist, one might think. 
That is one way to use the term, but it is not how I use it here. What I call a ‘modal 
empiricist’ is someone who takes some empiricist modal epistemology to be correct. 
In case this is in conjunction with taking some other, non-empiricist, modal 
epistemology to also be correct, one is a ‘non-uniformist modal empiricist’.  
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discharge the explanatory burden here. In particular, what I stressed 
was the task connected to METAPHYSICS MATTERS as it appears for 
deferralist modal epistemologies, and to meeting the integration 
requirement on the relevant ampliative principles. The answer, in 
short, to the question of whether modal empiricism really is able to 
meet the integration requirement given modal realism is: maybe – if 
these details can be filled out, and only assuming certain more 
particular claims about modal metaphysics than unspecified “modal 
realism”. But even if modal empiricism can meet the integration 
requirement it appears to come at the cost of either accepting rather 
far-reaching partial modal scepticism or turning to non-uniformism 
about the epistemology of modality, which places the empiricist in a 
distinctively odd position both dialectically and with respect to the 
integration challenge for modality. With the latter it seems much less 
progress has been made than what we initially hoped for. However, 
the next chapter examines a potential way for the empiricist gone 
non-uniformist to show that the position she finds herself in when 




4. Easing the Tension: Metaphysical 
Non-uniformism 
In the previous chapter it became clear that even if modal empiricism 
can be said to meet the integration requirement this comes at a cost. 
Either it comes at the cost of a rather far-reaching partial modal 
scepticism, or it comes at the cost of having to embrace non-
uniformism about the epistemology of modality. While the latter 
option is not in itself necessarily an unpalatable one, it initially places 
the modal empiricist in an odd position, both dialectically and with 
respect to making progress with the integration challenge for modal-
ity. I call this the Tension Problem. The purpose of this chapter is to 
investigate whether there is a way of making the non-uniformist move 
look less bad for the modal empiricist. But many things discussed 
along the way will be of a more general interest for the uniform-
ism/non-uniformism issue in the epistemology of modality.  
The plan for the chapter is as follows. First, I provide a preliminary 
understanding of the uniformism/non-uniformism distinction, 
including some terminological decisions that I hope will increase the 
clarity of the discussion. Second, I suggest that there are (at least) two 
different ways (both compatible with the preliminary understanding 
of the issue) to construe the conflict line between uniformists and 
non-uniformists, resulting in quite different non-uniformist (and 
corresponding uniformist) claims. Third, I go on to argue that only 
one of them is helpful to the modal empiricist with respect to the 
Tension Problem. Moreover, there are reasons to prefer this construal 
of the issue more generally. Fourth and finally, I examine what an 
argument for non-uniformism in the relevant sense would have to 
look like in order to help the modal empiricist avoid scepticism about 
modal truths involving abstract entities.  
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4.1. Uniformism and Non-Uniformism at a 
Glance 
As I have already noted, the uniformism/non-uniformism distinction 
is a relatively recent addition to the modal epistemologist’s toolbox, 
and the literature explicitly dealing with this issue to date is rather 
scant. The only worked-out and explicit case for non-uniformism in 
the literature to date, as far as I am aware, is due to Sonia Roca-Royes 
in a series of papers (2007, 2017, 2018).63 Fischer (2017b, 9) explicitly 
endorses non-uniformism and makes certain remarks in favour of it. 
A few others indicate that they either assume (Leon 2017; van 
Inwagen 1998) or would be prepared to accept something like it 
(Bueno and Shalkowski 2014, 679; Strohminger 2015, 369-370), 
without actually using the terminology. Finally, some overviews 
mention the distinction (Tahko 2015; Vaidya 2015), but all in all the 
written material on the choice between uniformism and non-
uniformism is sparse.  
Indeed, I do not think there is anything like a univocal, standard 
way of understanding the issue. What has been written about it leaves 
room for more than one interpretation, and it is not entirely clear 
which of the various alternative understandings the authors who 
express sympathies for non-uniformism have in mind. But, again, I 
think most parties would agree on something like the following 
distinction: a uniformist takes there to be just one route to justified 
modal belief; a non-uniformist takes there to be more than one.  
In this section, I will add some complementary claims to this pre-
liminary characterisation, in order to further clarify how I understand 
the issue. In doing so, I will make use of some of the rare passages 
from the literature that explicitly mention the distinction, and thus 
indicate how my understanding and terminology relate to what others 
have said.  
First, a relatively simple but still important thing to note. When the 
uniformist claims that there is just one route to modal knowledge, she 
means that there is just one basic, or non-derivative route. I take it to be 
uncontroversial to uniformists and non-uniformists alike that I could 
                                    
63 Her arguments in (2010, 2011a, 2011b) are also indirectly relevant.  
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be derivatively justified in believing that some p is possible on the 
basis of testimony, and you could be derivatively justified in believing 
that some p is possible on the basis of memory, but neither of these 
are basic sources of modal justification. Whatever justification 
testimony and memory confer on our modal beliefs is derivative of 
some more basic source of modal justification, and it is the latter that 
is of interest in the epistemology of modality. This is how I suggest 
we understand “the most fundamental level of explanation” in the 
following passage from Anand Vaidya’s (2015) Stanford 
Encyclopedia entry on the epistemology of modality:  
The uniformity view holds that there is only one single route to modal 
knowledge at the most fundamental level of explanation. The non-
uniformity view maintains either that different people can come to know 
the same modal truth through different routes or that at the fundamen-
tal level of investigation there must be more than one route to modal 
knowledge. 
Second, the issue of uniformism and non-uniformism is connected 
to the proper explanatory scope of a theory of modal justification. This is 
nicely indicated by non-uniformist modal epistemologist Bob Fischer 
(2017b, 9) in the following passage:  
Uniform modal epistemologies posit a single source of our justification 
concerning modal matters. As you’d guess, non-uniform accounts posit 
multiple sources. TEM is a non-uniform account: I don’t claim that it 
can explain all modal justification. 
TEM is the acronym for the theory-based modal epistemology 
proposed and defended by Fischer, but its exact nature is immaterial 
to the current point. The point is that the non-uniformist holds that 
we need more than one account of modal justification in order to 
explain all cases of modal justification – I take this to be implied by 
Fischer’s upfront statement about the limitations of the theory he 
then goes on to defend. The uniformist, in contrast, thinks we need 
only one. This moves us to conceive of non-uniformism as a form of 
pluralism and uniformism as a form of monism about theorising in the 
epistemology of modality, which in my view is exactly the right way 
to think about it. 
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This raises three issues. Firstly – and as indicated in the Vaidya 
quote above – the label ‘non-uniformism’ is applied both to the view 
that different sorts of modal knowledge are had through different 
basic routes, and the view that (some of) the same pieces of modal 
knowledge can be had through different basic routes. The former is 
the kind of non-uniformist claim that will be the centre of attention 
in this chapter. The reason for this is that it appears most relevant to 
the modal empiricist who wishes to avoid partial modal scepticism.  
Secondly, one is alerted to the question of how a ‘theory’ or a 
‘candidate modal epistemology’ is to be individuated. I suggest we 
think of it in the same way as has been the practice of this book from 
the start, namely in the pretty intuitive manner of one specified route 
to justified modal belief = one theory. Modal epistemologies should 
be individuated, roughly, with reference to the means (e.g. epistemic 
methods, cognitive resources) they claim that an epistemic subject 
make use of in order to be justified in holding a modal belief. 
Examples of such means include: conceiving, rational intuition, 
perception, inductive reasoning, imaginative evaluation of counter-
factuals. Note that one theory may describe one single route to modal 
justification, properly so-called in my view, that involves more than 
one cognitive resource, as long as they are both/all basic to all modal 
justification targeted by the theory. The induction-based modal 
empiricism discussed in the previous chapter, for instance, is one 
theory specifying one method for supporting modal beliefs, but the 
method involves both e.g. perception and inductive reasoning. 
In light of this, and in the interest of increased clarity, I want to 
propose a slight change in terminology. Fischer, amongst others, 
speaks of individual modal epistemologies, such as his own TEM, as 
non-uniform (or uniform). But what is properly uniform or non-
uniform is one’s overall approach to the epistemology of modality as 
a whole. We should therefore not refer to an individual candidate 
modal epistemology as non-uniform the way Fischer does in the 
quoted passage, but rather say that it is either modest or ambitious. A 
modest modal epistemology, like Fischer’s TEM or Roca-Royes’ 
induction-based modal empiricism from the previous chapter, 
purports to explain only a subclass of all modal justification. An 
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ambitious modal epistemology purports to explain all modal 
justification.64, 65 
Third and relatedly, the distinction between uniformism and non-
uniformism is supposed to be orthogonal to the distinction between 
a priori and a posteriori justification. One might, like e.g. Williamson 
(2007, 2013) question the usefulness or even tenability of the a priori/a 
posteriori distinction in epistemology (of modality), and still be a 
uniformist. Or, one may be convinced that all modal justification is a 
priori but still be a non-uniformist, for instance by holding that 
intuition and conceiving are both distinct routes to modal knowledge, 
not reducible to one another (or to a common third source), i.e. both 
some conceivability theory and some intuitionist theory is correct. To 
illustrate, we may consider someone who is arguably a prime example 
of a uniformist about the epistemology of modality, namely E.J. 
Lowe. Lowe (2012) suggests that all modal knowledge is based on 
grasping of essences by understanding real definitions.66 While 
sometimes characterised as a modal rationalist (see e.g. Bueno and 
Shalkowski 2014; Vaidya 2015, 2017), it can be argued that the 
process Lowe has in mind is neither purely a priori nor purely a 
posteriori but “cyclical” in alternating between a priori and a posteriori 
stages (cf. Lowe 2014, 257).67 That would make the candidate modal 
epistemology in question a hybrid theory as far as the a priori/a 
posteriori distinction is concerned, but it clearly has an ambitious 
explanatory scope, and Lowe remains an example of a uniformist. 
I raise this issue not because I think many people would insist that 
the uniformism/non-uniformism issue is intimately tied up with the 
a priori/a posteriori distinction, but because I think there is a risk that 
                                    
64 Here I gloss over potential differences in the explanatory scope one claims for a 
theory, and what explanatory scope a theory in fact has. While I recognise that the two 
need not coincide, and that this may have dialectical import in a given case, I will for 
the most part continue to talk as if they do, for ease of exposition.  
65 It should be noted that having an ambitious modal epistemology in the relevant 
sense is compatible with thinking that the total amount of modal knowledge is small 
– the ambitiousness, so to speak, is just relative to the full class of justified modal 
beliefs, however large or small it is considered to be.  
66 Although see Horvath (2014) who questions whether the account lives up to this 
ambition.  
67 See Tahko (2018, section 2.2.3) for discussion. 
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the two issues – that of whether we should be uniformists or non-
uniformists about the epistemology of modality and that of whether 
modal knowledge is a priori or a posteriori – are sometimes a bit 
muddled. The reason for that is plausibly the fact that many non-
uniformists are interested in defending the kind of non-uniformist 
picture according to which the epistemology of modality, in total, is 
neither “uniformly” rationalist nor empiricist, but we need both sorts 
of theory. That is, they are after the sort of picture that also seems 
helpful to the modal empiricist of the previous chapter. While that is 
probably the most common approach, it is important to keep in mind 
that in principle, the uniformism/non-uniformism issue is separate 
from issues like that of whether (all) modal justification is purely a 
priori or not.68  
4.2. Two Ways to Construe the Conflict 
It is often – and I personally think rightly – said that standard practice 
in the epistemology of modality, up until recently at least, has been to 
proceed from a uniformist assumption, i.e. the assumption that there 
is only one route to justified modal belief. This is betrayed in for 
instance the following passage, where Tahko (2015, 168) is describing 
the field: 
Initially, we hope to explain a given phenomenon such as our apparent 
ability to grasp modal truths, by resorting to a single explanation – we 
attempt to develop a uniform account. (…) The driving idea is that, 
other things being equal, a uniform account of modal epistemology is 
preferable to a fragmented account.  
                                    
68 Even if most will probably agree once the issue has been clarified, some 
philosophers do sometimes express themselves in ways that indicate a much closer 
tie between the two distinctions. For instance, Tahko writes that “if we were to defend 
a uniform account of modal epistemology then all our modal knowledge would have 
to be explained by resorting to just one of these areas [i.e. a priori or a posteriori] of 
knowledge” (2015, 168). That is not strictly speaking true if what I have suggested 
above is right. Also, in relation to this (e.g. 2015, 172), he sometimes seems to suggest 
that the question of how the a priori/a posteriori distinction should be drawn is more 
closely related to the question of uniformism versus non-uniformism about the 
epistemology of modality than what I have suggested it is (see also his (2018) for some 
similar remarks). So improved clarity on this matter is nice.  
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In support of this claim, one may for instance consider a real classic 
in contemporary epistemology of modality, namely Yablo’s conceiv-
ability theory. In setting it up, Yablo seems to work with the 
assumption that conceiving is the only basic route to beliefs about 
nonactual possibilities. Motivating this approach, he writes, 
rhetorically, that “if there is a seriously alternative basis for possibility 
theses, philosophers have not discovered it” (1993, 2). A more recent 
example is Lam (2017) who also seems to consider conceiving our 
only real option in arriving at justified modal beliefs and that 
undermining this idea is a road that leads to radical modal scepticism. 
In general, it has also been common to engage in uniformist-
behaviour in the sense of presenting candidate modal epistemologies 
that seem intended to be accounts of all modal knowledge, with no 
explicit restrictions and no suggestions to the effect that whatever 
falls outside of one’s theory’s explanatory scope should be accounted 
for by a distinct theory. 69 
In light of this, it may seem as if the current dialectical situation 
places the burden of proof, at least tentatively, somewhat more on 
the non-uniformists’ side. The onus, one might be inclined to think, 
is on her to say why we should abandon the uniformist assumption 
all of a sudden. But on the other hand, non-uniformists may object 
that things are not so clear anymore as to whether uniformism can be 
called the default position.70 More and more modal epistemologists 
appear to open up towards non-uniformism, now that the option is 
on the table. Perhaps people were never very uniformist, after all! 
Perhaps it is primarily uniformism that needs to be defended, and non-
uniformism is a perfectly acceptable default starting point. 
In addition to this, I know of no explicit defences of uniformism 
at all in the literature, so it is a bit rich to demand that only the non-
uniformist need to build one. In the interest of a fair and fruitful 
debate then, it would be good if we had some construal of the issue 
where it is clear how both sides could present arguments for their 
respective positions. In the subsections to follow, I am going to tease 
                                    
69 Examples arguably include prominent views like those of Williamson (2007) Lowe 
(2012) and Hale (2013), although Williamson has later made what could be interpreted 
as concessions to non-uniformism, see my footnote 82, p. 125 below.  
70 This has been suggested to me in conversation at several occasions.  
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apart two ways to view the conflict line between uniformism and non-
uniformism. They are both compatible with the preliminary 
characterisation I have given here, including the idea that the conflict 
is akin to one between pluralism and monism. Moreover, both have 
some support in the sparse literature on the issue, and allow for 
explaining why it seems to many that uniformism is the default 
position. However, as will become evident they make for two very 
different versions of the non-uniformist claim. In particular, one 
makes for strong non-uniformism which is a normative claim, the 
other one for weak non-uniformism which is a descriptive claim. As 
we shall see, only the strong form appears helpful to the modal 
empiricist in handling the Tension Problem.  
4.2.1. A Conflict over Proper Domain Restriction 
Philosophers often take the universal applicability of their theories 
very seriously. Counterexamples, or cases that a given theory cannot 
handle using (some version of) its basic strategy, are seen as serious 
problems for that theory. They are typically dealt with either by 
explaining why the case is not one that the theory can be expected to 
deal with after all (because it is artificial, incoherent, or not a genuine 
example of the type of case the theory targets), or by showing that 
despite appearances the theory can deal with the problematic case 
using the basic strategy that characterises the theory. What does not 
happen very often is that those who champion the theory in question 
concede that they cannot deal with a certain sort of case, but that this 
is not a problem because some other, seemingly competing account, 
can deal with those cases, and so both theories are correct simultane-
ously.  
But on the other hand, while philosophers aim at theories with 
universal applicability, ‘universal’ is practically always relative to some 
demarcated domain. That is, a philosophical theory is of course not 
expected to explain absolutely everything. Rather, it is supposed to 
explain the full range of cases antecedently approximated to be 
included in the relevant domain. Modern epistemologists, for 
instance, might not think that all knowledge is had in the same way. 
Hence epistemology is subdivided into smaller portions. We study 
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separately e.g. mathematical knowledge, moral knowledge, knowledge 
of other minds, and, of course, modal knowledge. These subcatego-
ries within epistemology are typically drawn up with reference to the 
subject matter of the knowledge in question. The assumption, I take 
it, is that different knowledge might need to be accounted for in 
different ways depending on the subject matter.  But typically, when 
it comes to one particular subject matter, we can expect a unified 
account.  
Whether one approves of this strong general tendency in 
philosophy to seek universally (relative to a domain) applicable 
theories or not, the idea that uniformism looks like the default 
position makes sense against the background of it.71 However, both 
the uniformist and the non-uniformist can actually agree in affirming 
this assumption. The crucial question is just whether or not “modal 
knowledge” is rightfully regarded as a domain suitable for the sort of 
completely general theorising philosophers like to engage in when 
they can. Certainly, it might have been historically regarded as such, 
but that is just a sociological observation. Perhaps that attitude is 
justified, but then again perhaps it is not. One way of viewing the 
uniformism/non-uniformism conflict is thus as a conflict over exactly 
this. Defending uniformism involves supporting this assumption, 
while defending non-uniformism involves challenging it. That is, it is 
a conflict over how the relevant domain(s) worthy of a unified 
approach to epistemological theorising are to be restricted.  
When the issue is construed in this way, uniformists and non-
uniformists will differ on whether we should aim to produce theories 
with a fully general explanatory scope relative to all of modal 
knowledge.72 From the non-uniformist point of view, the action is 
                                    
71 This is not to say that there aren’t non-uniform approaches to some areas of 
philosophy, or domains philosophers theorise about where we have strong reasons to 
take a non-uniform approach from the start, see e.g. Brännmark (2016) who argues 
for a non-uniformist (“disunitarian”) approach to morality. The default mode though, 
it seems, is a uniform approach.  
72 There is a sense, of course, in which both the non-uniformist and the uniformist 
here are “uniformists” in the more “local” sense that they think we should produce 
unified theories that cover all cases of the relevant kind – they just disagree on what 
the relevant kinds are. There is also a sense in which both the uniformist and the non-
uniformist are “non-uniformists” in the more “global” sense that they will (probably) 
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with defending a claim about the subject matter, in particular that it 
itself is not unified enough to warrant an effort of unified theorising. 
The obvious way to support this is by way of modal metaphysics. One 
would then argue that the domain of modal facts is not uniform 
enough for us to suspect that the epistemology of modality will be 
uniform. This points to an argumentative strategy in favour of non-
uniformism which I will call the argument from metaphysical heterogeneity. 
An argument from metaphysical heterogeneity has two steps. First, 
identify some kind of natural and/or independently plausible 
fragmentation in the subject matter of modal knowledge, i.e. in the 
modal facts. Second, argue that we have some independent73 reason 
to think that this distinction is epistemically relevant.  
The argument from metaphysical heterogeneity rests on what we 
may call an isomorphism assumption.74 That is, an assumption that (some) 
differences on the level of subject matter – i.e. in the modal meta-
physics – will be mirrored at the level of knowledge/justification – i.e. 
in the epistemology of modality. It is useful to understand the second 
step of the argument from metaphysical heterogeneity as a fleshing 
out of this assumption by suggesting how this particular metaphysical 
difference can be expected to be of epistemological import. Note that 
given the current construal of the conflict, a uniformist would also 
rely on an isomorphism assumption in defending uniformism, using 
an argument from metaphysical homogeneity, as it were.  
I will refer to the version of non-uniformism suggested by this 
construal of the issue as a conflict over proper domain restriction, and 
supported by an argument from metaphysical heterogeneity as Strong 
Non-Uniformism, or SNU for short. The following two things are 
important to note about SNU. First, that SNU is a claim one can, in 
principle, make prior to the evaluation or construction of any 
                                    
agree that not all knowledge needs to be accounted for in the same way. What the 
terms are used to designate here are positions with respect to the epistemology of 
modality specifically. Someone could perhaps complain that this is biased against the 
non-uniformist, but it is a mere terminological issue and I do not see any harm in this 
way of talking.   
73 The relevant sense of “independent”, in both steps, is: independent of particular 
first-order modal epistemologies.  
74 Thanks to Sònia Roca-Royes for elsewhere pressing me to clarify this.  
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particular first-order theory in the epistemology of modality. The 
reasons for non-uniformism here are independent of findings in 
epistemology of modality, in the sense that they come from the 
metaphysics of modality.75 Second, and the first point is a prerequisite 
for this, SNU is a claim with normative force, i.e. it tells us something 
about how we ought to theorise. Importantly though, not just any 
modest modal epistemology will do, and which ones will do depends 
on how one runs the argument from metaphysical heterogeneity, i.e. 
on what heterogeneity is appealed to. The task of finding a distinction 
to ground non-uniformism is not just a question of slicing the cake 
of modal knowledge up one way or another, but of finding one which 
is plausibly epistemically relevant, and the non-uniformism supported 
by an argument from heterogeneity will only be as fine-grained as the 
distinction(s) that are arguably epistemically relevant. This places 
important constraints on modest accounts in the sense that their 
scope, while modest, must match the subcategories drawn up by the 
distinctions appealed to in supporting SNU. 
4.2.2. A Conflict over Abductive Inference 
Here is a different way to construe the disagreement between 
uniformists and non-uniformists. It starts out from the plausible 
assumption that theory-selection in the epistemology of modality is a 
largely abductive process. That is, we are to decide which theory is 
the best by appeal to a plurality of theoretical or explanatory virtues.76 
On a typical list of theoretical virtues, we will find something like 
explanatory scope. For instance, it is quite widely accepted that the more 
an explanation can explain the better, i.e. wide explanatory scope is 
                                    
75 In practice, and as a matter of the discovery, of course we go back and forth 
between these all the time. What I intend here is as a matter of justification, i.e. the 
argumentative strategy does not rely on the goodness or badness, or particular 
character of, some specified modal epistemology, whether ambitious of modest.  
76 See Fischer (2015) for a defence and discussion of that assumption. Note that 
construing the issue in terms of domain restriction as above does not involve denying 
this assumption. Rather the disagreement between uniformists and non-uniformists 
there can be seen as the disagreement over whether the epistemology of modality 
involves one or several explananda which we need to infer the best explanation or 
explanations of. 
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better than narrow. We might also find something like unification. Keas 
(2017) defines it as the ability of a theory to explain more kinds of facts 
than rivals with the same amount of theoretical content. Although it 
is not obvious just what “kinds of facts” is supposed to mean, it may 
be interpreted as the idea that a candidate explanation which is able 
to explain many seemingly disparate phenomena in the same way is 
preferable, all else equal. Such explanations, it has been argued, land 
us with a more interconnected and, in a sense, simple picture of (the 
relevant part of) reality (cf. Friedman 1974; Kitcher 1981). 
Against this background, we can also make sense of the idea that 
uniformism seems to be the default position, since uniformism is 
fairly easy to relate to either or both of these virtues. Most obviously 
perhaps, the uniformist idea of one correct theory to cover all modal 
justification can be construed as a way of promoting the importance 
of explanatory scope. Alternatively, one could see uniformism as a 
plea for unification in something like the following sense: the class of 
all justified modal beliefs appear disparate and diverse, but a good 
explanation of them is one which subsumes them all under the same 
principle. In what follows, I will focus on a connection to explanatory 
scope – SCOPE, for short – although that is not the only possible way 
to proceed.77 
Despite how this setup might seem to tip the scales in favour of 
uniformism, we need to remember the following two, also very 
plausible, points pertaining to how inference to the best explanation 
works. First of all, theoretical virtues can typically be satisfied to 
different degrees, plausibly including SCOPE. In other words, SCOPE 
is not an all-or-nothing affair. While a theory that accounts for all 
modal justification has top scores, a modest theory that accounts for, 
say, all ordinary modal knowledge scores higher than one that 
accounts for only ordinary modal knowledge of abstracta, and so on. 
For instance, when we consider the overall performance of a 
seemingly modest theory like e.g. Roca-Royes’ induction-based modal 
empiricism, it might not get top scores given SCOPE, but it certainly 
does not score a zero. Second, theoretical virtues appealed to in 
                                    
77 Tahko (2018, section 1) mentions in passing that uniformism is motivated by 
another classic theoretical virtue, namely parsimony. 
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abduction must have a ceteris paribus clause. That is, while we care 
about SCOPE, we also care about other theoretical virtues. Some of 
these may conflict with having a wide explanatory scope, and then we 
have to prioritise. For example, an induction-based modal empiricism 
may make up for its poorer performance relative to SCOPE by scoring 
well with respect to other desiderata.  
These lines of thought suggest that the conflict between uniform-
ists and non-uniformists is a conflict over whether or not our best 
modal epistemologies are ambitious or modest, all things considered 
in an inference to the best explanation. Defending non-uniformism 
thus involves arguing that some modest modal epistemologies are 
sufficiently better explanations than ambitious competitors, despite 
their relatively disappointing performance with respect to SCOPE. 
Defending uniformism instead involves arguing that some ambitious 
modal epistemology is the overall best explanation, partly of course 
as a result of its excellent performance with respect to SCOPE. On this 
picture, non-uniformism is really just the consequence of applying 
inference to the best explanation in evaluating actual theories in the 
epistemology of modality.  
From the non-uniformist perspective then, the action is with 
“filling out” the abduction supporting the relevant claim about the 
relative goodness of some modest modal epistemologies. I will refer 
to this as the argument from abduction. It can be done in slightly different 
ways. One can argue – straight on, as it were – by demonstrating the 
goodness of modest modal epistemologies with respect to several 
theoretical virtues, although it only covers some subclass of all modal 
knowledge. Or one can argue that available ambitious modal episte-
mologies fail to live up to some minimum requirement(s) with respect 
to some virtue(s), and hence we hardly need to consider that they do 
better with respect to SCOPE since they do not perform well enough 
in other respects to count as candidate explanations at all.78 Either 
way, one’s case for non-uniformism will only be as strong and solid 
as one’s case for the abductive claim. 
                                    
78 Something like this strategy is arguably an important part of Roca-Royes’ overall 
case for non-uniformism: she argues that prominent ambitious alternatives just push 
the integration challenge sideways rather than addressing it (because they fail to heed 
BULGE IN THE CARPET) (2010, 2011a, 2011b). 
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Filling out the abduction will be both messy and demanding, and 
open to challenge at many stages. There may be disagreement over 
what the other relevant desiderata are; over their relative importance; 
over what it means to meet these desiderata; over to what extent 
various theories do meet them. But that is hardly surprising. 
Substantially filling out inferences to the best explanation is always a 
messy and precarious affair with ample room for disagreement. That 
is no reason to think it cannot be done, of course. 
I will refer to the form of non-uniformism suggested by this 
construal of the issue, and supported by an argument from abduction, 
as Weak Non-Uniformism, or WNU, for short. The following two 
things should be noted about WNU. First, it is a conclusion drawn 
on the basis of evaluating actual first-order, candidate modal episte-
mologies. This is in sharp contrast to SNU, which can in principle be 
established independently of and prior to such considerations. 
Second, WNU is a descriptive claim, to the effect that in fact, our best 
theorising about modal justification generates a non-uniform picture 
of modal justification as a whole. This is also in contrast with SNU, 
which was a claim with normative force. With WNU (some) modest 
modal epistemologies might win the day despite being modest, with 
SNU (some) modest modal epistemologies win the day because they 
are modest.  
4.3. Strong or Weak Non-Uniformism? 
So far, I have suggested that there are two different ways of viewing 
the uniformism/non-uniformism conflict, each yielding a potential 
argument for a potential non-uniformist claim. On the one hand, 
there is the picture on which a uniformist and non-uniformist 
disagree over whether the modal realm is sufficiently homogeneous 
to warrant unified theorising about our justified beliefs with respect 
to it or not. The non-uniformist here can argue that it is not, using a 
two-step argument from heterogeneity, and arrive at a rather 
principled non-uniformist claim with normative force as regards our 
theorising about modal justification: SNU. On the other hand, there 
is the picture on which a uniformist and a non-uniformist disagree 
over whether it is actually the case that ambitious modal epistemolo-
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gies are better explanations than modest modal epistemologies – i.e. 
whether SCOPE is actually trumped by other desiderata or not. The non-
uniformist here needs to argue that it is, that some modest modal 
epistemology is the best explanation – by filling out an argument from 
abduction – and arrive at a defeasible, less substantial non-uniformist 
thesis which is more of a descriptive claim about the current state of 
the epistemology of modality debate: WNU.  
Both of these construals fit with the initial characterisation of the 
issue; both allow us to make sense of the intuition that uniformism is 
the default position; and both of them provide a “neutral” starting 
point from which it is clear how either position could be defended or 
challenged, using substantial arguments. But despite their equality in 
this sense, they are clearly very different, both in what sort of claim 
non-uniformism turns out to be and in how it needs to be defended.  
As I have indicated already, the literature on non-uniformism 
contains traces, sometimes in the very same paper, of both ways of 
viewing the issue. There are both passages that suggest abductive 
arguments in favour of non-uniformism, and passages that appeal to 
heterogeneity in the subject matter of our modal knowledge. There 
are parts that suggest non-uniformism is supposed to be something 
more principled, with more normative force, and parts that indicate a 
slightly weaker claim. But in this section, I am going to argue in favour 
of SNU over WNU, and hence in favour of one understanding of the 
issue rather than the other. First, I think there are more general 
reasons to prefer the SNU-package, and I outline some of those in 
4.3.1. Second, I submit that only SNU and the corresponding 
argument from heterogeneity will be of help to the modal empiricist 
in order to address the Tension Problem, and I detail my reasons for 
thinking so in in 4.3.2.  
4.3.1. In Favour of Strong Non-Uniformism 
First of all, the argument from metaphysical heterogeneity captures 
very nicely a guiding idea in the epistemology of modality, namely that 
modal metaphysics matters to modal epistemology. Of course, this is 
a central tenet of the integration requirement which is of central 
interest in this book, and so this feature will be especially important 
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in motivating why SNU is a good choice for the modal empiricist in 
response to the Limitation Problem. More generally, accepting that 
the integration challenge is of importance in the epistemology of 
modality should incline one to be sympathetic to the isomorphism 
assumption and thus to the domain restriction framing of the conflict.  
Second, the argument from metaphysical heterogeneity sits very 
well with certain observations about the epistemology of modality 
known to spark non-uniformist ideas. For instance, today’s literature 
on the epistemology of modality contains many distinctions along 
various dimensions: there is knowledge of essence, counterfactuals, 
possibility and necessity; there are ordinary and extraordinary modal 
matters; there is de re and de dicto modal knowledge; there are modal 
claims about concreta and abstracta, about complex as well as simple 
objects; about things familiar as well as exotic; controversial and 
uncontroversial, interesting and uninteresting modal claims. And so 
on. If one wishes to take at least some of this perceived heterogeneity 
seriously, non-uniformism conceived of in this way appears to be an 
attractive option. Roca-Royes and Tahko (2015, 168; 172; 2018, 
section 3) both express thoughts along these lines, for instance, in 
connection with discussing non-uniformism. Here is Roca-Royes on 
the matter: 
[P]recisely because I think that this heterogeneity [in subject matter 
within modality] has significant epistemological consequences, I am 
suspicious about any uniform attempt to meet the epistemic challenge in 
modality; that is, about any attempt to meet it that is not sensitive to 
this heterogeneity (2007, 126). 
Motivating non-uniformism in this way naturally connects with the 
idea, part of the SNU package, that the modest modal epistemologies 
we need will have a restricted explanatory scope which tracks the 
distinction one is proposing that we take seriously.  
This leads us to the third, and very important, reason to think SNU 
will do better justice to some important ideas about non-uniformism 
present in the literature. We see that explicitly modest modal 
epistemologies tend to target only a particular subclass of modal 
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belief: Biggs (2011)79 focuses on “broadly scientific entities” which, 
again, we may interpret as “concrete”; Roca-Royes (2017) also focuses 
on concrete objects, and only ordinary modal knowledge of them; and 
Fischer (2017b) targets only “interesting” (roughly, extraordinary) 
modal claims. Imposing this sort of prior restriction on the 
explanatory scope of a theory makes good sense if we understand the 
uniformism/non-uniformism conflict as one over proper domain 
restriction. If one, for instance, argues that we ought to be non-
uniformists because the modal realm is metaphysically heterogeneous 
in the sense of involving both abstract and concrete entities, then it is 
natural to think that the right sort of modest modal epistemology will 
target either only modal beliefs about abstract entities or only modal 
beliefs about concrete entities. And presumably we should be able to 
hold the theories to the promise of that (restricted) scope: we cannot 
expect them to account for the justification of all modal beliefs, but 
we can expect them to account for the justification of all modal beliefs 
in the relevant subcategory. This all sits well with SNU.  
But it is much harder to motivate this prior restriction business 
given WNU. Now, I take it that weak non-uniformists think it a virtue 
of their approach that they can concede the two plausible points that 
SCOPE is an important theoretical virtue and that fully general 
explanatory scope is ideally desirable. What is going on when we 
abduct to non-uniformism, on such a picture, is that we (currently at 
least) must make do with modal epistemologies that are less than 
completely general in scope, because they are the overall best 
explanations. We want our epistemologies to explain as many cases 
as possible, and we had to make do with something less than all cases. 
But from this perspective, restricting a modal epistemology at the 
outset to cover only a particular subcategory seems odd. If we accept 
that SCOPE is a virtue we want a given modal epistemology to have as 
large an explanatory scope as possible80, so why rule out a case with a 
gerrymandered but relatively large scope in this way?  
                                    
79 Biggs is silent on whether he intends his modal epistemology as modest or 
ambitious, i.e. whether he also thinks there is modal knowledge to be had about 
entities not in this category of “broadly scientific” entities. 
80 ‘Possible’ given that we also have other theoretical virtues we care about.  
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Fourthly, we must remember that WNU is a descriptive thesis 
without normative force, but actual non-uniformists seem to want to 
make a normative claim. No matter how well the actual abduction is 
filled out, the abduction can only take into account the theories we 
actually have available at the time of evaluation, and so by itself it ell 
us nothing about what future theories ought to look like, and in 
particular it does not tell us that they ought to be modest rather than 
ambitious in scope. One may compare WNU to the claim that to date, 
physicists have not been able to successfully formulate a complete 
theory of physics – the current best theories are incomplete. While 
true, this does not obviously carry any normative force in the sense 
of e.g. implying that physicists should stop trying for a complete 
theory. The same goes for WNU. In light of this, my personal view is 
that WNU is an unexciting claim indeed, especially when compared 
to SNU. Moreover, Roca-Royes (2017, 2018) and Fischer (2017b) 
both suggest that the considerations they put forward in favour of 
non-uniformism support a methodological recommendation or recipe, 
not a mere claim about the current theoretical landscape.  
But an argument from abduction alone cannot establish a 
normative claim. It must be supplemented by something which can 
lend it a normative edge. What could that be? One may attempt to 
supplement it with some sort of historical inductive argument, e.g. an 
appeal to the alleged failure throughout history to produce attractive 
ambitious accounts despite efforts to do so, which then suggests we 
ought to give that strategy up. But the history of contemporary 
epistemology of modality is quite short, especially compared to that 
of other areas of philosophical interest, and so I have a hard time 
feeling the force of such an argument here. Or, one could suggest a 
more principled ordering of the explanatory virtues, to the effect that 
a virtue like SCOPE always has lower priority than certain other virtues. 
One could, for instance, suggest that certain other virtues (typically 
problematic for ambitious theories) are more important than SCOPE, 
and hence we have reason to prefer modest modal epistemologies 
quite generally. But first of all, it is supposed to be a point in favour 
of WNU and the associated argumentative strategy that it allows one 
to concede to the uniformist that SCOPE is an important theoretical 
virtue, and that complete generality of scope is ideally desirable. Not 
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only because it may seem plausible, but also because it is dialectically 
good if you can grant your opponent as much as possible and still run 
your argument. If the strategy is amended in this way, that virtue is 
lost. Instead the uniformist will think that the non-uniformist is 
begging the question against her. Moreover, if non-uniformists are 
allowed to assume a prior ordering of the virtues, the uniformist 
should be allowed to assume that SCOPE always takes priority, or has 
a special status – we can easily see how this is headed towards an 
unattractive deadlock.81  
Fifth and finally, even supposing that WNU could be given a 
normative edge, it carries with it a threat of contagion or collateral 
damage: if non-uniformism is the right conclusion to draw from the 
current lay of the theoretical land in the epistemology of modality, 
shouldn’t it also be the right conclusion to draw for other areas of 
philosophical interest where the situation is similar? Because surely, 
that we would like a good, unified theory able to deal with all cases 
but currently have been able to produce only something lesser than 
that, is true for a number of areas in philosophy. Now, philosophers’ 
standard response is not to conclude they ought to give up. Instead, 
we press on, holding out for a better (version of our currently best) 
theory, with ability to handle all cases judged to be relevant. But if one 
suggests that we should draw conclusions beyond a mere description 
of the current state of the debate on the basis of an argument from 
abduction, then it seems we should also be non-uniformists about all 
other areas where the situation is similar. Of course, it is not obvious 
that this would be wrong. But I do think it would strike at least some 
as an unpalatable consequence.  
The remedy for this worry would of course be something about 
the epistemology of modality in particular which makes non-
uniformism the proper attitude to adopt. Again, one could try to give 
an inductive argument on history, appealing to e.g. extraordinarily 
persistent and intractable disagreement and difficulty haunting any 
                                    
81 Perhaps a more promising alternative would be to somehow connect ambitiousness 
of modal epistemologies with problems in respect to other important virtues, as a 
more principled phenomenon. One could perhaps read Roca-Royes’ case against 
necessity-based modal epistemologies as an example of this strategy (2017, 221-225) 
of connection ambitiousness to being necessity-based. See also my footnote 83 below.  
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and all attempts at providing ambitious accounts. For sure, the 
epistemology of modality does face certain seemingly hard and 
persistent problems – such as the integration challenge – but I do not 
see how they are extraordinarily persistent and intractable, by the stand-
ards of philosophical debate. And again, contemporary epistemology 
of modality has a comparatively short history. I cannot see that 
epistemologists of modality in particular would have a reason to give 
up already. A better strategy is to look to the subject matter itself. This 
would prevent contagion to other areas as long as they do not share 
those salient features of modal knowledge and justification which 
makes pluralism a suitable attitude towards theorising about it. But 
the argument from abduction does not provide any such reason. The 
argument from heterogeneity, on the other hand, delivers precisely 
that. 
In sum, there are reasons to prefer SNU over WNU quite gener-
ally. But more importantly given the outlook for the modal empiricist 
to avoid the Limitation Problem with a non-uniformist move, only 
SNU and the argument from heterogeneity will be of help if she 
wishes to avoid the Tension Problem. That is the topic of the next 
subsection.  
4.3.2. Strong Non-Uniformism and the Tension 
Problem  
In order to see that only SNU has the potential to help the modal 
empiricist improve her situation with respect to the Tension Problem, 
let’s start by considering how things would play out if she were to 
instead go for WNU and the associated argument from abduction.  
Then she needs to fill out the abduction. This will involve bringing 
in other desiderata of modal epistemologies, that ambitious modal 
epistemologies fail to satisfy or satisfy to a significantly lesser extent 
than modest competitors. Now, an obvious candidate is the 
desideratum which has been at the centre of attention in this book: the 
integration requirement. Of course, I have suggested that a 
supposedly important advantage for modal empiricism is its ability to 
deal with the integration requirement, and that some other alleged 
virtues of empiricism in turn arguably flow from this virtue. And 
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indeed, the integration requirement arguably plays the main role in, 
for example, Roca-Royes’ way of supporting non-uniformism. She 
calls upon some of her previous work (e.g. 2010, 2011a, 2011b), 
intending to conclude that salient ambitious modal epistemologies – 
including those presented by Peacocke, Williamson82, Yablo and 
Chalmers – fail to present any real competition to modest alternatives. 
Again, this is because they all fail to meet the integration requirement 
(due to not heeding BULGE IN THE CARPET).83  
But note that when the empiricist in question wants to go non-
uniformist, in the sense of really saying that there must be more than 
one correct theory of modal justification, she will in effect be claiming 
that in addition to empiricism, some non-empiricist modal epistemology 
will also be correct. This is because the limitations in explanatory 
scope of empiricism flows from the reliance on experientially justified 
beliefs. But experientially justified beliefs are also the key to meeting 
the integration requirement. So how can our modal empiricist be 
serious both in her abductive claim that empiricism is our best chance 
to meet the integration challenge, and in her non-uniformist claim that 
some non-empiricist epistemology is also a good (indeed, one of the 
best!) explanation of some kinds of justified modal beliefs? Of course, 
this just is the Tension Problem, and it should now be clear that the 
argument from abduction brings it even more to the front rather than 
help relieve the tension for the modal empiricist gone non-uniformist.  
                                    
82 Although whether Williamson is a uniformist or a non-uniformist, or differently 
put, whether he intends his preferred counterfactual-based account to be ambitious 
or not, is up for discussion. In his (2007) he does appear to express the view that all 
modal knowledge is grounded in counterfactual knowledge. But in a comment on a 
paper by Barbara Vetter, he seems to open up to a non-uniformist approach. He 
writes that his own and Vetter’s account, according to which modal knowledge is 
grounded in our knowing the truth of mundane ‘can’-statements (and indeed other 
accounts too) need not be mutual exclusives (2016, 800). The interesting thing, of 
course is how we acquire knowledge of counterfactuals and ‘can’-statements 
respectively, and whether it is the same basic source or not.  
83 If one were to try and put a normative edge on WNU in the way indicated in my 
footnote 81 above, this could be cast as a way of connecting ambitiousness to the vice 
of failing to meet the integration requirement. But I prefer this framing due to the 
other problems that beset WNU.  
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An argument from heterogeneity, in contrast, can help – if carried 
out successfully. This is how. The thing that is strikingly odd about 
going non-uniformist, from the modal empiricist’s point of view, is 
that it opens up a new specification of the integration challenge that 
must be dealt with, after having argued that the specification 
involving an empiricist account on the epistemology-side is the one 
with the best prospects of being met, in the case of modality. Now 
we have a new specification where we cannot appeal to the empiri-
cist’s explanation, because the integrative “hub” empiricism made use 
of – the empirically justified categorical beliefs – is not available for 
some modal matters. How can the empiricist really mean to make a 
claim with that implication? 
Now, the bottom line of an argument from heterogeneity is that 
the modal realm is metaphysically fragmented in an epistemically 
relevant way. One way to interpret what this means is that there is 
more than one integration challenge for modality in the sense that it 
(given certain metaphysical assumptions, as always) comes apart into 
two (or more, depending on what distinction(s) one appeals to) on 
the metaphysics-side. The second step of the argument – reasons to 
think the distinction is epistemically relevant – is plausibly interpreted 
as supporting the claim that in order to be able to deal with both 
integration challenges, we need the epistemology-side to come apart 
into two (or more, depending, again, on the distinction(s)) as well. In 
light of that, empiricism’s being limited to beliefs about modal facts 
involving concrete objects is a virtue rather than a vice. It can, it 
would be argued, deal with the integration challenge, but only on one 
of the specifications relevant for modality. And the claim that some 
other – non-empiricist – theory is needed to account for other modal 
beliefs is just the claim that there is another specification of the 
integration challenge to be dealt with, for another subclass of modal 
facts. They cannot be integrated with an empiricist epistemology, but 
we should not expect them to. They are metaphysically very different 
from another subclass of modal facts, and so we should also expect a 
successful epistemology to look very different. 
Thus, the argument from metaphysical heterogeneity holds some 
promise for the friend of modal empiricism wishing to go non-
uniformist. Admittedly, she would have to pitch her argument for 
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empiricism with appeal to the integration requirement slightly 
differently than what was laid out in the previous chapter – less in 
opposition to other alternatives, more by stressing the metaphysical 
heterogeneity of the modal realm as relevant to the integration 
challenge, but I think that is as it should be. Non-uniformism is, in its 
most interesting form, an issue prior – in the justificatory sense – to 
individual modal epistemologies. On this way of viewing things, the 
move to non-uniformism does not conflict with the idea that the 
integration requirement is important, but rather the two reinforce one 
another: the road to non-uniformism, given an argument from 
metaphysical heterogeneity, is paved with concerns about the 
integration requirement.  
But this highlights another important issue. Reasonably, insofar as 
one is intending to make a serious non-uniformist claim in order to 
fend off partial modal scepticism, one needs to have in mind some 
positive idea of how the integration challenge is supposed to be met 
on this new, distinct specification that has been actualised by the non-
uniformist move. If one does not have some such idea in mind, it 
seems one is not genuinely avoiding the implied partial modal 
scepticism as much as voicing some sort of agnosticism about what 
lies beyond the scope of one’s own favoured theory. That is a 
legitimate view to express of course, but I do not see that it is non-
uniformism in any interesting sense, nor that it makes the limitedness 
of modal empiricism any more palatable.  
In sum then, SNU and an argument from metaphysical heteroge-
neity can help make sense of the empiricist’s position when she faces 
the Tension Problem. But in order to actually get rid of the problem 
and reject the threatening partial modal scepticism, there must be 
some sort of idea in place of how to meet the integration challenge 
given this other specification that is now being introduced. That is to 
say, we still seem to face the integration challenge on the specification 
involving some modal realism plus a non-empiricist modal epistemol-
ogy. In particular, the friend of modal empiricism seems to face this 
problem. It may seem harsh that the empiricist should turn out having 
to do the rationalist’s job, in a sense. But if one is serious in one’s 
non-uniformist claim as a way of avoiding far-reaching partial modal 
scepticism, then we need something to back it up as distinct from 
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scepticism and agnosticism about that which lies beyond empiricism’s 
explanatory scope. The hope is, of course, that things will look up in 
this respect now that the assumption of a heterogeneous modal realm 
has prompted a “split” of the integration challenge into two. In the 
next section, I turn to the issue of whether the outlook for a solution 
really has been improved.  
4.4. Looking for Metaphysical Heterogeneity in 
the Modal Realm: The Abstract/Concrete 
Distinction 
The Limitation Problem, as I presented it in the previous chapter, has 
two dimensions. Modal empiricism is limited with respect to justified 
modal belief about abstract objects and with respect to justified 
extraordinary modal belief. In this chapter I have outlined an 
understanding of non-uniformism which (in addition to being overall 
preferable to the weaker alternative) can help the modal empiricist 
avoid scepticism with respect to modal beliefs outside of empiricism’s 
explanatory scope. Given the metaphysical character of the 
abstract/concrete distinction, the argument from metaphysical heter-
ogeneity seems particularly well suited to motivate non-uniformism 
along the abstract/concrete dimension, which is good news for the 
modal empiricist who finds it a problematic implication that we 
cannot have any modal knowledge about abstracta. I will now take a 
closer look at what sort of case could be made for non-uniformism 
along this distinction. That is, I will investigate the claim that there 
are two separate integration challenges for modality, pertaining to 
abstract and concrete objects respectively, and how it could be of 
service to the modal empiricist. 
Let’s start by considering the distinction itself and what we need 
from it. Recall that an argument from heterogeneity has two steps: 
first, identify an independently plausible distinction; second, give 
some independent reason to think that this distinction is epistemically 
relevant. The first step may appear to be completed already as soon 
as we settle on the abstract/concrete distinction – it is commonly 
invoked in metaphysics, quite independently of anything to do with 
the epistemology of modality, and so is perfectly respectable, no? 
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Unfortunately, things are not so simple. Despite its popularity, the 
distinction between abstract and concrete is notoriously elusive, so 
one first needs to settle on some substantive way of drawing it.  
I will follow David Lewis’ (1986, 81-86) terminology and refer to 
candidate conceptions of the abstract/concrete distinction as ‘Ways’. 
As Lewis critically demonstrates, different Ways to classify objects as 
abstract or concrete. Part of the goal, of course, is to settle on a 
distinction which classifies the objects one considers to be abstract as 
abstract, and objects one takes to be concrete as concrete. But it is 
likely that any Way will classify some sort of entity sometimes taken to 
be abstract as concrete, or vice versa. That does not have to be a 
serious problem for the Way in question – in principle, there is always 
a way of handling the alleged counterexamples. Perhaps the 
problematic entities are not properly abstract after all (or would not 
be, if they existed), perhaps they are not even metaphysically possible 
and so should not worry us. Whether one has reason to reject a Way 
on the basis of a particular counterexample will likely depend on what 
other metaphysical commitments one has.  
For the purposes of arguing for non-uniformism in general, the 
important thing is that according to one’s favoured metaphysics of 
modality, some entities from both sides are part of the modal realm 
of which we can have knowledge. For the alleged fact that the modal 
domain is thus heterogeneous is what motivates the claim that we 
need two different strategies for handling the integration challenges 
of modality, so that clearly needs to be plausible for this argument to 
get off the ground at all. This is interesting, because from the perspec-
tive of the modal empiricist, that very thing – the modal facts we can 
have knowledge about contain both abstracta and concreta. How can 
this be both the problem and a prerequisite for the proposed solution 
to work? The answer is that the point of the solution is to 
accommodate, or actually make use of the seemingly problematic fact, 
by showing that it underpins a non-uniformist picture.  
In light of that, let’s rethink the relevant claim again: we have 
modal knowledge about both abstracta and concreta. Is it true? If it is 
not, then this argument for non-uniformism will not work. At first 
blush, it might seem obviously true – surely there is modal knowledge 
about sets and numbers as well as about spoons and nebulas. I know 
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that the number two is necessarily the immediate successor of the 
number one, I know that my horse could possibly have grown to be 
an inch taller in height at the withers than he actually did. And since 
my horse is concrete, while the number two is abstract, I have modal 
knowledge about both concrete and abstract objects. 
But then again, think about what modal beliefs are true in virtue 
of, given various influential modal metaphysics. If one thinks modal 
claims are true in virtue of what goes on in possible worlds, aren’t 
modal claims about whatever make up these worlds (e.g. sets of 
propositions, or the same sort of stuff that makes up our own world 
if you are a Lewisian)? Or take someone not enamoured with the 
analysis of modality in terms of possible worlds, who instead thinks 
that modal claims are true in virtue of some properties or other. Then 
what sort of things modal claims are about seems to depend on what 
sorts of things one takes these properties to be. To rehearse 
something quite familiar at this point, the difficulty with modal 
knowledge – in particular as far as the integration requirement is 
concerned – is thought to have to do with the modal metaphysics. 
Modal truths are about facts that are thought to be epistemically 
problematic in various ways – because they are abstract, causally 
closed off, or otherwise “hidden” from us. This, I assume, has been 
thought to be true for all modal facts, whether they are about a given 
concrete or a given abstract actual individual. 
In short, whether the modal realm really is fragmented in the sense 
suggested by this way of running the argument depends on one’s 
metaphysics of modality. This is just another opportunity to reiterate 
the lesson of METAPHYSICS MATTERS. So, whether an argument for 
non-uniformism on the basis of the abstract/concrete distinction will 
be at all viable depends on the modal metaphysics that forms the 
backdrop.  
Now, from the empiricists’ point of view, if the modal realm is not 
heterogeneous in this sense, the problem itself might seem to go away. 
But actually, that need not be the case. Again, we are confronted with 
a sense in which modal metaphysics really matters to the 
epistemology of modality. To see this, note that on the liberalised 
empiricist accounts, empirically justified non-modal beliefs about 
actual individual objects play a very central part in the integration of 
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the account. So for the problem to appear there, it is enough that one 
accepts the existence of both abstract and concrete objects. In short, 
the idea was that integration is achieved at the level of the non-modal 
beliefs which act as input in an ampliative reasoning process that 
generates modal beliefs. The reliability of our methods for supporting 
modal beliefs is explained in terms of the reliability of our methods 
for forming and sustaining non-modal beliefs about what is actually 
the case with such-and-such an object. And the reliability of these 
methods for supporting non-modal beliefs can be explained causally 
as long as the objects of knowledge are not causally impotent – or 
that is the idea. So, the way in which the actual individuals’ concrete-
ness or abstractness matter is on the level of non-modal beliefs. One 
alleged problem with modal knowledge about abstracta as it appears to 
the empiricist, then, is that there are no corresponding non-modal 
beliefs about abstracta, the reliability of which can be explained 
causally. If we had such justified non-modal beliefs about abstracta, we 
would be able to free-ride on their integration too. But we do not – 
given the current fast-and-loose conception of the abstract/concrete 
distinction – so we cannot.  
Is it not enough in arguing for non-uniformism, then, that the non-
modal realm is heterogeneous in this sense? Again, this just comes 
down to modal metaphysics. As I complained in my second worry in 
chapter 3, it is highly unclear what sort of modal realism the empiricist 
has in mind, and so it is as of yet impossible to tell whether the modal 
facts can be appropriately hooked up to the integrative picture. A 
possible way of remedying that worry is to subscribe to some modal 
metaphysics according to which modal facts are somehow grounded 
in the objects themselves and their actual properties, i.e. in the 
numbers two and my horse and their respective properties, for the 
examples given above. That would be a step towards making sense of 
why non-modal facts of actual property-instantiation by objects of 
one and the same kind or similarity-class are relevant to claims about 
modal facts. In short, on the kind of view where non-modal 
knowledge of actual individuals carries a lot of the weight, the modal 
facts will likely have to be connected to these facts somehow. 
What can we learn from these points? First of all, that appealing to 
the distinction between abstract and concrete individuals in arguing 
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for non-uniformism will be a relevant alternative for a limited number 
of philosophers, subscribing to a particular sort of modal 
metaphysics. That is not in itself a problem, but a natural feature of 
modal metaphysics’ importance for modal epistemology quite 
generally. Moreover, modal empiricism of the sort that is presently 
our main concern appears to be in that group given the way they 
supposedly deal with the integration requirement. Second, it is 
highlighted that anyone who attempts to run the argument from 
metaphysical heterogeneity is by doing so affirming the idea that 
modal metaphysics matters for the epistemology of modality, and 
then one cannot shy away from actually engaging with the 
metaphysics. Third, and providing us with direction in what follows, 
it becomes clear that a key feature of abstract objects, insofar as the 
modal empiricist is concerned, is their causal inefficaciousness, and a 
key feature of concrete objects is their causal efficaciousness. The 
empiricist’s integrative explanation of the non-modal beliefs on which 
modal justification rests, is causal.  
David Lewis famously surveys a number of ways in which philos-
ophers have attempted to draw the abstract/concrete distinction, and 
one of the Ways he mentions is the Way of Causality. The idea, in 
short, is that abstract objects are causally impotent whereas concrete 
objects are not. It is a common idea (but not without its problems)84, 
and it is the one I played fast and loose with at the end of the previous 
chapter, in stating the Limitation Problem for modal empiricism.  
Now, Lewis is ultimately pessimistic about whether the ab-
stract/concrete distinction as it is used really tracks an interesting 
difference, and others have pointed to problems with various Ways 
of drawing it, including the Way of Causality.85 But perhaps these 
general problems need not worry us here, once we get clear on what 
we need for our current purposes. Because on the one hand, the non-
uniformist need not provide a reductive analysis of what e.g. 
abstractness consists in, by characterising it in terms that do not 
appeal to the notion of abstractness. But on the other hand, it is not 
                                    
84 Some of them derive from exactly how one is supposed to understand what it means 
to be (or not be) causally efficacious, or causally active, or part of the world’s causal 
order, or however the characteristic is ultimately phrased.  
85 See also Rosen (2014) and Cowling (2017, chapter 2) for discussion. 
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enough to draw the distinction using what Lewis calls the Way of 
Example, i.e. by listing a number of entities from each category. 
What is needed is some characteristic of abstract objects (and some 
corresponding characteristic of concrete objects) that is somehow 
linked to their abstractness (and concreteness, respectively). And the 
Way of Causality seems to do okay here. One simply suggests that all 
abstract objects lack causal efficaciousness but no concrete objects 
lack causal efficacy. Now, lacking causal efficaciousness need not be 
all there is to being abstract – there might be other important charac-
teristics too. It also need not be enough for abstractness – other 
conditions might need to be fulfilled. That is, one need not find a 
sufficient condition. What is needed for current purposes is 
compatible with the idea that ultimately, abstractness is to be 
reductively explained in terms of lack of causal efficaciousness. But it 
is also compatible with what Cowling (2017) calls “primitivism” about 
the abstract/concrete distinction, where being abstract and being 
concrete are taken as primitive notions that in turn can be used to 
explain why objects have certain characteristics, such as having or 
lacking causal efficaciousness. One could, for instance, say that the 
number seven lacks causal efficaciousness because it is abstract. What 
is important is just that one finds a characteristic that helps us draw 
the line and, with the second step of the argument in view, makes this 
line epistemically relevant. Whether the notions of abstractness and 
concreteness are to be analysed in terms of that characteristic or not 
is not something one needs to take a stand on here. 
 It is easy to see how one might argue that abstractness is 
epistemically relevant given the Way of Causality. Indeed, we have 
seen it above already: since concrete but not abstract entities are 
causally potent, it seems concrete but not abstract objects could figure 
in a causal reliability explanation of a given method for arriving at 
modal beliefs. Thus, we should expect there to be two different 
reliability explanations of our modal knowledge, plausibly associated 
with different methods for arriving at modal beliefs. So, we should be 
non-uniformists in the sense of having separate epistemologies for 
modal beliefs about abstract objects on the one hand, and modal 
beliefs about concrete objects on the other. Isn’t this exactly what the 
modal empiricist needs?  
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Well, yes, but it is not enough. Insofar as one intends this to be a 
serious non-uniformist claim rather than just stating what we already 
know – a causal reliability explanation in the style given by the modal 
empiricists of chapter 3 is not available for all modal beliefs – something 
more needs to be said about what sort of reliability explanation we 
can expect, featuring the abstract objects in some non-causal role. As 
Lewis (1986, 111) puts it, it cannot be that “abstract” just means 
“don’t worry”. We have already seen that the question of what it 
would mean to meet the reliability explanation without causality is a 
vexed issue, to say the least. One could hope that appealing to 
heterogeneity on the metaphysical level, using for instance the 
distinction between abstracta and concreta, could help with this issue in 
the sense that the nature of, in particular, abstract objects might 
enlighten us on in what sense they can figure in an explanation. But 
the problem is that if one draws the distinction in what Lewis calls 
the “Negative Way”, i.e. by saying that being abstract is to not be e.g. 
causally potent (or not-something-else, for that matter), we have not 
learned a whole lot about the nature of abstract objects that could 
enlighten us here. All we get to know, really, is that they cannot figure 
in a reliability explanation in a causal capacity – but that, it seems, 
does not get us a substantial case for non-uniformism over partial 
modal scepticism, as discussed earlier. So, it appears we need a positive 
Way of drawing the distinction.  
Or perhaps it is better to say, a Way which is positive enough in 
the sense of what it tells us about abstractness. Some candidate Ways 
may look negative in the sense of being worded in terms of what 
cannot be the case for abstract objects, while still providing more, 
from the current perspective, useful information.86 The important 
thing here is that we find a characteristic of abstractness that can point 
us at least somewhat in the direction of what the explanatory roles of 
abstracta might be in a reliability explanation of methods for support-
ing modal beliefs about them.  
                                    
86 Consider for instance what Cowling (2017) calls the Way of Fundamentality and 
the Way of Indiscernibility, both worded in negative terms but arguably carrying more 
information than the Way of Causality.  
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I do not know what a good candidate for a positive Way might be. 
What it needs to do, in order to be of help to the modal empiricist 
gone non-uniformist, is this: first, tip us off about how to explain the 
reliability of some non-empiricist modal epistemology with respect to 
some modal matters; second, tip us off about why this method is not 
reliable with respect to other modal matters – in particular, those that 
the empiricist methods can deal with. The former point is important 
in order to present a genuine alternative to partial modal scepticism, 
and the latter is important in order to really establish strong non-
uniformism and so not risk having empiricism being crowded out by 
rationalism once we see how it too can deal with the integration 
requirement.  
The only attempt I know of in the literature, to provide something 
like a positive characterisation of abstractness that is supposed to be 
helpful for the non-uniformist modal epistemologist, is due to Roca-
Royes. I devote the subsection below to examining her suggestion.  
4.4.1. The Way of Essentialism 
In her (2018), Roca-Royes introduces a positive characteristic of 
abstractness, supposed to be relevant for the epistemology of 
modality. She suggests that abstract objects have “essentialist 
profiles”. This means that they have all their intrinsic and intra-
domain relational (i.e. to other abstract objects) properties essentially. 
They are, one might say, pure essences. This is not, the suggestion 
goes, true of concrete objects – they have most of their properties 
contingently. To be clear, I take it that on the view suggested, concrete 
objects do have essences – i.e. some properties of a concrete object are 
part of what it is to be that object. It is just that there is much more 
to them than their essences. Not so with abstract objects.  
The first thing to note about this, and perhaps about moving on 
to positive Ways of characterising abstractness in general, is that 
abstractness and concreteness themselves end up doing very little 
work. Other properties (or lack thereof) are apparently pulling all the 
explanatory weight. It is (partly) the causal efficaciousness of certain 
objects that allows beliefs about them to be justified by empiricist 
means, and it is the lack of this property in certain objects that is the 
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source of the Limitation Problem for modal empiricism. And if 
essentialism is the key to meeting the integration requirement given 
some non-empiricist modal epistemology, it is this feature, and not 
the abstractness of the object, that allow beliefs about them to be 
justified in such-and-such a way. Abstractness or concreteness them-
selves seem to be neither the source of the problem nor central to a 
solution, because the notions are so elusive. Strictly speaking, it does 
not matter for the problem whether or not an entity is abstract as long 
as it is causally inefficacious, and it does not matter for the solution 
whether it is abstract as long as it e.g. has an essentialist profile (or 
whatever other characteristic one appeals to). For this reason, one 
suspects that there is always going to be something else that is really 
doing the non-uniformist work when one tries to use this distinction 
in building an argument from heterogeneity. It might just be a more 
promising strategy to bypass the discussion of what an appropriate 
way to draw the abstract/concrete-discussion is, and go straight for 
whatever characteristic one finds promising, and suggest that the 
modal realm contains entities both with and without the characteristic 
in question.87  
With that, I turn to the question of whether the Way of 
Essentialism will be helpful in motivating non-uniformism quite 
generally, and in particular whether it will be helpful to the modal 
empiricist. Let me first note that there is some initial promise in the 
sense that the difference between objects with and without essentialist 
profiles seems to be a difference on the metaphysical level, and hence 
                                    
87 Roca-Royes is aware of this although she does not discuss it explicitly. In response 
to an anticipated objection to the effect that the Way of Essentialism classifies some 
allegedly abstract objects as concrete, she immediately concedes that if some abstract 
objects do not have essentialist profiles and we have modal knowledge pertaining to 
them, this only strengthens the case for non-uniformism in the sense that we will need 
more than one modal epistemology to account for our modal knowledge of abstract 
entities. In particular, we should expect one modal epistemology for abstract entities 
with essentialist profiles and one for abstract entities that have (some of) their 
properties accidentally. This shows that the point of invoking essentialist profiles is 
not that it should track the abstract/concrete distinction (which I think is just as well) 
or help characterise either notion, but that they are supposed to motivate non-




could potentially motivate a bifurcation of the integration challenge 
for modality in the sense discussed above. Moreover, this would seem 
to locate the relevant difference in the actual objects, making it an 
assumption that something about them ground modal truths about 
them. From the perspective of the modal empiricist, this seems a nice 
fit. 
But unfortunately, it is not clear whether it can do the work cut 
out for it. To see this, it will be useful to consider the sort of non-
uniformism Roca-Royes has in mind. In order to do so, I need to 
bring in a distinction between modal epistemologies with respect to 
their structure, due to Bob Hale (2002). Hale points out that modal 
epistemologies are either asymmetric or symmetric. There are two 
kinds of asymmetric modal epistemologies: necessity-based and 
possibility-based. Simply put, a necessity-based modal epistemology 
takes it that all modal knowledge can be explained in terms of a base 
class of justified modal beliefs that are all necessity beliefs. Possibility 
knowledge is epistemically downstream from knowledge of (some) 
necessities, that is. With a possibility-based modal epistemology, the 
reverse holds: all modal knowledge can be explained in terms of a 
base class of justified modal beliefs that are all possibility beliefs. 
Knowledge of necessity is downstream from knowledge of (some) 
possibilities, that is. What Hale calls symmetric modal epistemologies 
take neither to be true.88  
Now, Hale himself prefers a necessity-based modal epistemology 
(see e.g. his 2013, chapter 11), and Roca-Royes (2018) claims to agree 
with him, but only when it comes to (de re) modal knowledge about abstract 
objects. Given that abstractness is not really doing the work here, as we 
have seen, we might reformulate this like so: only when it comes to 
de re modal knowledge about objects with an essentialist profile.  
That is, Roca-Royes’ view is that we should be non-uniformists in 
the sense of taking both some possibility-based and some necessity-
based modal epistemology to be true. The difference makers are 
                                    
88 It is an interesting question whether a symmetric approach will necessarily amount 
to non-uniformism since it requires a modal epistemology of (some) possibility beliefs 
and a modal epistemology of (some) necessity beliefs. For simplicity, I will here take 
this to be the case (it also seems to be in line with how e.g. Roca-Royes as well as 
Fischer (2016a) sees it). 
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essentialist profiles: objects with essentialist profiles go with a 
necessity-based modal epistemology, objects without an essentialist 
profile go with a possibility-based epistemology, roughly speaking. 
Notably, the traditional, necessity-based modal epistemologies, 
against which Roca-Royes is reacting, are rationalist, so I take it that 
this is a way of creating space for empiricism in the sense that 
possibility-knowledge seems a more suitable target for modal 
empiricism. 
What motivates Hale’s view is his metaphysics of modality. He 
thinks that all objects, abstract as well as concrete, have essences, and 
that these determine what is possible and necessary. What is necessary 
and possible for my coffee mug is determined by its essence, just as 
much as what is necessary and possible for the number seven is 
determined by its essence. 
[G]iven that the metaphysical possibilities are just those which are left 
open by the nature of things, and so are determined by the metaphysical 
necessities, one might expect an essentialist explanation of modal 
knowledge to follow a necessity-first approach, treating at least some 
knowledge of necessity as prior to any knowledge of possibility. And 
second, given that metaphysical necessity is seen as having its source or 
ground in facts about the natures of things, one might expect an 
explanation of how we can have knowledge of the nature or essence of 
things to play a fundamental and central part in explaining knowledge 
of necessity (2013, 254). 
Thus, given that all objects have essences, it seems a necessity-based 
modal epistemology is appropriate across the board.89 But Roca-
Royes disagrees, so although she cites the above passage from Hale 
in order to state that they are in agreement, what motivates a 
necessity-based modal epistemology must be different for her than 
for Hale.  
For her, it is not the fact that an object has an essence which makes 
modal truths about it suitable for a necessity-based modal 
                                    
89 Of course, as far as the integration challenge is concerned, given a Halean picture, 
one must also show how it is that whatever method specified by the relevant 
epistemology (of essences) is an appropriate method for finding out about essences 




epistemology. It is the fact that the object has an essentialist profile, 
i.e. is a “pure” essence. While it seems clear enough that essentialist 
profiles motivate a necessity-based modal epistemology, it is not clear 
why it is motivated only for those objects and not for any object which 
has an essence. That is, there seems to be a problem in motivating 
non-uniformism in this respect: why is a necessity-based, rationalist 
epistemology not appropriate across the board if the metaphysics of 
modality is accounted for in terms of essences?  
A claim that might help is to say that essence is an all-or-nothing 
affair. Either an object is a pure essence, or it has no essence. As far 
as the metaphysics of modality is concerned, one then needs to say 
something about what modal truths concerning objects that lack 
essences are true in virtue of. But provided that one can, one could 
then perhaps suggest that since some de re modal facts depend on 
essentialist facts, while others do not (because they involve objects 
that have no essences) but instead are true in virtue of something 
quite different, we should expect different modal epistemologies to 
be correct. That is a metaphysical view you could hold, although I do 
not know whether it is an especially attractive one (and I do not think 
that it is Roca-Royes’ view). 
There is a problem with the second thing we wanted from the 
positive characterisation, given the empiricist’s point of view, namely 
a reason to think that necessity-based (and thus typically rationalist) 
modal epistemology is not appropriate across the board but only to 
objects that are pure essences. In addition to this, I do not think the 
first, and arguably most important, thing has been accomplished 
either. That is, we have not been tipped off about how the integration 
challenge can be met given modal facts involving objects with 
essentialist profiles and some rationalist modal epistemology.  
Recall that the problem, for empiricists, with modal knowledge 
about abstract – or rather, causally inefficacious – objects is that there 
are no non-modal “input” beliefs for which the integration 
requirement can be met in the way it is met for non-modal beliefs 
about concrete – or rather, causally efficacious – objects. Now, there 
is a sense in which there is no non-modal knowledge to be had about 
objects with an essentialist profile, so one thing that happens for these 
objects is that the modal and the non-modal integration challenge for 
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them is one and the same. But this is only helpful if we have some 
idea about how the integration requirement is met for methods for 
forming non-modal beliefs about these objects. And it is not clear 
that we do – indeed, that is why there was a problem in the first place. 
To conclude, it is not clear that essentialist profiles will be of help. 
For sure, it is not clear that they won’t be of help either, but so far, 
they are not quite there.  
In this section I have investigated the prospects of appealing to the 
abstract/concrete distinction in building an argument from 
metaphysical heterogeneity, and in particular how this could be 
helpful to the modal empiricist in view of the Tension Problem that 
arises when they go for non-uniformism in response to the Limitation 
Problem. The core point I have argued for is that the key to the 
solution is still missing, namely a suitable positive way to characterise 
the objects about which modal empiricists cannot explain justified 
modal beliefs. ‘Suitably positive’ in the sense of tipping us off not only 
about why empiricism cannot cover them but about how some 
alternative epistemology could. In general, it has become clear that 
arguing for non-uniformism from metaphysical heterogeneity in the 
modal realm might be more demanding than it first seemed. Again, 
what sort of realist modal metaphysics one subscribes to greatly 
influences the prospects of succeeding here.  
4.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter I have explored what promise going non-uniformist 
might hold for the modal empiricist who wishes to avoid the far-
reaching partial modal scepticism implied by her theory if it were to 
be put forward as an ambitious modal epistemology. I began by 
introducing two different ways of construing the uniformism/non-
uniformism conflict, which allowed both sides to argue for their 
stance rather than just assume one as the more natural. I gave reasons 
to prefer strong non-uniformism over weak non-uniformism, insofar 
as one wants to be a non-uniformist, but more importantly from the 
modal empiricist’s point of view, only SNU will do. 
The reason SNU is promising if the modal empiricist wants to 
avoid the Tension Problem that seemingly arises from her non-
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uniformist move, is that it is to be supported by an argument from 
metaphysical heterogeneity. Such an argument has two steps: first, 
identify an independently plausible distinction pertaining to the modal 
realm; second, argue that this distinction is epistemically relevant in 
motivating a bifurcation of the integration challenge for modality and 
in effect a pluralistic approach to modal epistemology, in order to deal 
with both challenges. This indicates that it is not so odd after all for 
the modal empiricist to claim that a non-empiricist modal epistemol-
ogy can also meet the integration requirement. However, in order for 
this to really help the modal empiricist avoid partial modal scepticism, 
the argument from heterogeneity that she employs needs to indicate 
what sort of integrative explanation we should expect of the modal 
justification outside the proper scope of modal empiricism. That is, 
we would need to have some idea of how to meet the integration 
challenge for modality involving abstract objects and/or extraordi-
nary claims. 
Initially, the prospects seem best for the abstract/concrete 
distinction, partly because it appears to be a distinction on the 
metaphysical level, which is traditionally taken to have 
epistemological import. However, as my discussion of this issue 
turned up, there are some obstacles yet to be overcome. In particular, 
the lack of good, positive characterisations of abstractness makes it 
difficult to see what sort of explanation we could expect. Moreover, 
it again became evident that modal metaphysics matters, for the claim 
that the modal realm is heterogeneous along the abstract/concrete 
dimension will only be plausible given certain specific metaphysics of 
modality. 
What is missing is what has been missing all along: a way to meet 
the integration requirement as placed on a rationalist modal 
epistemology, assuming some realist metaphysics of modality.90 
Empiricism was supposed to help with the issue of integration, but 
we found that it did so only to the price of a seriously circumscribed 
range of justified modal beliefs. Non-uniformism was supposed to be 
                                    
90 An option is of course to reject realism when it comes to abstract objects and/or 
extraordinary modal truths, which will probably make things easier. However, I am 
not going to consider that option further here.  
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a way out of such partial modal scepticism, but even then, empiricists 
are chained to the prospects of meeting the integration challenge 
given rationalism.  
Notably, this does not mean that there is anything wrong in general 
with the argument from metaphysical heterogeneity, or with strong 
non-uniformism. These are quite independent of any particular way 
of trying to cash out the heterogeneity. I still consider them the most 
straightforward understanding of the uniformism/non-uniformism 
issue, and a plausible strategy for supporting such a position, 
respectively. It is just that making it actually work in favour of the 
modal empiricist who wants to avoid the partial modal scepticism, 
apparently implied by her theory, when considered as ambitious is 
more complicated than it first appeared. 
In the next two chapters, I deal separately with two other moves 
that might be available to the modal empiricist in response to the 
Limitation Problem. In chapter 6, I turn to empiricism’s limitation 
with respect to extraordinary modal claims. Before that, in chapter 5, 
I consider a strain in the debate on the integration challenge which is 
interesting to consider because its main claim is that for certain 
domains, including the domain of modality, the integration challenge 
is much less demanding than one originally might have thought. In 
particular, combining a rationalist epistemology and a realist meta-
physics is not as difficult as it seems. This is worth some of our 
attention, given that a main upshot of this chapter has been that the 
modal empiricist is committed to indicating how we can expect that 
to happen.  
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5. A Rationalist Shortcut? 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine a somewhat unusual 
attempt to meet the integration challenge. In sketching it I draw on a 
line of argument in the literature on, especially, Field’s challenge for 
mathematics and its analogue in ethics, but the key thought behind 
the strategy goes back at least to David Lewis and his way of handling 
an epistemological objection, based on the integration requirement, 
against his genuine realism about possible worlds.91  
Some tweaking of the original formulations will be required, since 
the contexts in which this line of argument typically appears differ 
from the current one. But the central idea will remain essentially the 
same, only reframed in order to make it relevant from the perspective 
of a modal epistemologist. I am going to be interested in it insofar as 
it can provide a way for some rationalist modal epistemology to meet 
the integration requirement, assuming some realist modal metaphys-
ics, since that appears to be a central component of a full picture of 
our modal justification, even if we assume that modal empiricism is 
right for some cases of modal knowledge. I certainly do not mean to 
say that this is the last or best or only chance for rationalism, but given 
that it is part of the empiricists’ original case against rationalists that 
the latter have trouble with the integration requirement, this 
somewhat unusual approach is interesting to examine.  
At the heart of the strategy to be examined is the idea that when 
truths in a domain are metaphysically necessary, this very much 
impacts how integration-related matters play out for theories about 
this domain. Thus, the strategy will only be relevant for domains 
where we believe truths that are metaphysically necessary. This seems 
right enough for mathematical truths. Of course, few if any will think 
that particular moral truths about particular acts hold with metaphys-
                                    
91 Since then, similar lines of argument have also been taken up by for instance Joel 
Pust (2004) and Thomas Grundmann (2007) in relation to the integration challenge 
for modality.  
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ical necessity, but many moral realists accept that the most basic 
ethical principles, on which more particular moral truths depend, are 
metaphysically necessary.92 What, then, about the truths of 
metaphysical modality we are currently interested in? According to 
the commonly accepted S5, both truths about metaphysical possibility 
and truths about metaphysical necessity, are in turn necessarily true. 
That is, if it is possible that this lectern could have been made out of 
ice then it is necessarily possible that this lectern could have been 
made of ice. And if it is metaphysically necessary that Socrates’ 
singleton set exists only if Socrates exists, then it is necessarily 
necessary that Socrates’ singleton set exists only if Socrates exists.  
However, there are certain categories of modal claims that do not 
hold with metaphysical necessity. In particular, most counterfactual 
conditionals are not true with metaphysical necessity if true at all. 
According to a fairly standard treatment of counterfactuals (cf. Lewis 
1973), whether a counterfactual conditional like <If kangaroos had 
no tails, they would topple over> is true depends on what sets of 
possible worlds, accessible from the actual world, are considered 
relevant to the evaluation of that counterfactual. The worlds included 
in the relevant set of worlds are those that are similar to the actual 
world with respect to such-and-such facts, and what facts (and hence, 
what set of worlds) are relevant might vary between contexts. 
However, it is (typically) not the case that a counterfactual is to be 
evaluated with respect to the set containing all possible worlds. That 
is, in order for it to be true that <If kangaroos had no tails, they would 
topple over>, it need not be the case that kangaroos topple over in 
all worlds where they have no tails. In other words, even if <If 
kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over> is a modal truth – 
let’s for the sake of argument assume that it is – it is not metaphysi-
cally necessarily true.  
The culprit here is the fact that counterfactuals are true in virtue 
of a restricted modality. We get the same result with a claim of 
nomological necessity, such as <Necessarily, nothing can travel faster 
than the speed of light>. This is surely a modal truth, but it is not 
                                    
92 But see Kit Fine (2002) who argues that normative necessity cannot be understood 
in terms of metaphysical necessity.  
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metaphysically necessary. But presumably it is nomologically necessary 
that necessarily nothing can travel faster than the speed of light. And 
likewise, I guess that it is necessary-in-worlds-relevant-to-the-evalua-
tion-of-this-counterfactual that kangaroos would topple over if they 
had no tails. But as long as the sphere of nomological necessity 
and/or the sphere of worlds relevant to the evaluation of the 
counterfactual in question do not overlap completely with the sphere 
of all possible worlds (which we may assume they do not), their truths 
are not metaphysically necessary.  
The focus in this book is on knowledge of metaphysical modality 
rather than of restricted modal truths. For sure, some modal 
epistemologies attempt to explain our metaphysical modal knowledge 
in terms of our ability to gain modal knowledge of a more restricted 
variety, including our ability to evaluate more mundane counterfac-
tual conditionals (see especially Williamson 2007). I will briefly get 
back to discussing the impact (if any) that modal claims which do not 
hold with metaphysical necessity might have on the prospects of this 
strategy towards the end of this chapter. Presently I am going to focus 
on the conditional claim that if the truths in a domain are metaphysi-
cally necessary (as is the case for claims of metaphysical possibility 
and necessity) then there is an unexpected way to meet the integration 
requirement for a rationalist method supporting our true beliefs, 
assuming realism, and how this might or might not help the modal 
empiricist deal with the Limitation Problem.  
The plan for the chapter is as follows. I first describe the form of 
explanation, which I call a one-sided explanation, that is supposed to 
suffice for meeting the integration requirement when the domain is 
one of necessary truths. I explain why it is supposed to be sufficient, 
and why this is helpful to someone committed to modal rationalism’s 
meeting the integration requirement. Then, I put forward two 
possible objections to this strategy. First, I show that accepting a one-
sided explanation as sufficient comes at the price of rejecting META-
PHYSICS MATTERS, and hence to a very revisionary conception of the 
integration challenge. Second, I argue that one-sided explanations 
address a different explanatory task from the one involved in the 
integration requirement. In 5.4 I consider three different ways of 
handling these two objections. I raise some problems with each of 
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them, and end with a discussion of what, if any, of this might be 
helpful to the modal empiricist gone non-uniformist. 
5.1. The Role of Necessity and the One-Sided 
Explanation 
The key claim to be examined, at least to start with, is this: what I will 
call a one-sided explanation suffices for meeting the integration 
requirement in a domain where the truths are metaphysically 
necessary. This is an unusual approach to the integration challenge in 
the sense that one-sided explanations are often thought to be 
problematic in the sense of not explaining the reliability of a method 
in the right way. It is supposed to be helpful to rationalist modal 
epistemologies in the following sense: there is no particular reason to 
think that a one-sided explanation will not be available assuming a 
rationalist modal epistemology plus modal realism. But as we shall see, 
this comes at the cost of a seriously revised conception of the whole 
issue of integration.  
First, we need to know what this thing I call a one-sided 
explanation is. In a nutshell, it is a form of causal explanation that 
does not involve the facts in virtue of which our beliefs are true – 
hence “one-sided”. Such explanations are perhaps mainly familiar 
from so-called evolutionary debunking arguments. Debunking 
arguments are most prominently present in the literature on moral 
knowledge and robust moral realism in metaethics (see e.g. Joyce 
2005; Kahane 2011; Street 2006).93 Debunking arguments are 
sceptical arguments that target a metaphysical theory, e.g. robust 
moral realism, according to which moral statements are true in virtue 
of objective, mind-independent values or moral properties, for 
instance <It is wrong to kill one’s own children> is true in virtue of 
e.g. the fact that the act of killing one’s own children has the property 
of moral wrongness. In particular, they target them via an 
epistemological conclusion, namely that if moral realism is true then 
                                    
93 See also Clarke-Doane (2012) for a debunking challenge to mathematical realism.  
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our moral beliefs are not reliable (and, it is often assumed, hence not 
justified).94 So robust moral realism implies moral scepticism.95  
The centrepiece of an evolutionary debunking argument is the 
claim that there is a genealogical explanation of our moral beliefs that 
does not involve any (realistically construed) moral facts. Roughly 
speaking, evolutionary psychology suggests that we have the moral 
beliefs we do because they are adaptive. Not particular moral beliefs 
of course; more accurately, we have the moral beliefs we do because 
we were selected to have certain cognitive mechanisms that contain 
dispositions to form certain belief-like states in response to certain 
situations, or something along those lines. That our methods for 
forming moral beliefs track adaptiveness rather than moral truth does 
not mean that our moral beliefs are false, because adaptiveness and 
truth may well coincide. But, the argument goes, it means that they 
are not reliably true: we would have believed that it is wrong to kill 
one’s own children even if e.g. it were in fact right to kill at least one 
of one’s children, because (in the larger scheme of things) it is still 
conducive to the survival of our species to believe that it is wrong.  
It does not matter for my current purposes whether evolutionary 
debunking arguments are good argument against moral realism or 
not. I only want to illustrate what I mean by a one-sided explanation, 
and the genealogical explanation doing the debunking is an example 
of a one-sided explanation. I call it ‘one-sided’ because it only 
addresses one side of the correlation between truth and justified 
belief, namely the belief side. It makes no mention of the facts that 
these beliefs are putatively about. I call it ‘one-sided’ rather than 
‘evolutionary’ because the Darwinian trimmings are not essential to 
the point, which is rather with the threatening presence of some 
                                    
94 There is some disagreement in the literature over the exact structure and distinctive 
character of a debunking argument, see Shafer-Landau (2012) and Vavova (2015) for 
discussion.  
95 Note that this argument, contrary to what some philosophers have assumed, does 
not parallel Field’s argument against platonism. Here are two main differences: first, 
a debunking argument aims to establish that realism implies scepticism while a Field-
style argument aims to establish that realism fails to complete an important 
explanatory task; second, a debunking argument rests on an assumption about what 
it takes to have knowledge/be justified, while Field’s argument explicitly seeks to 
avoid such commitments.  
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explanation or other of why we have the beliefs we do that does not 
involve dependence on the facts that the beliefs are about.  
Now we know what a one-sided explanation is. The idea with the 
current strategy is that if there is a one-sided explanation one could 
give of our beliefs, such an explanation suffices to explain their 
reliability, even assuming realism about the facts in question, provided 
that the beliefs are necessarily true if true. That is, when the domain 
is one of necessary truths, a one-sided explanation is enough to meet 
the integration requirement.  
Why does necessity make this difference? Well, recall that the 
integration requirement (unlike a reply to a debunking challenge) does 
not require one to refute some sceptical threat. That is, the task is not 
to prove that the method in question is justificatory but to explain 
why it is, assuming that it is. This is old news, of course, in light of 
what was discussed in chapter 2. But it turns out that if we are allowed 
to assume that the beliefs are true, then insofar as they are beliefs 
about what is metaphysically possible or necessary, the believed truths 
are true with metaphysical necessity. And if a modal truth is 
necessarily true, then there is no way in which it could have been false. 
And if that is so, then it is enough to explain why a method supports 
the beliefs it does in fact support, as long as we are allowed to assume 
that they are actually true. 
Plausibly, there are constraints on a one-sided explanation. Justin 
Clarke-Doane (2015, 2017)96, for instance, who defends one-sided 
explanations as enough (mathematics and ethics are the domains he 
focuses on, but what he says is supposed to generalise to modality) 
given that the domain is one of necessary truths, has argued that it 
must be an explanation according to which the actual results are 
reasonably stable, modally speaking. It would not do if the method 
completely randomly delivers the results it does. It is just that the 
stability need not be sensitive to the modal facts. But as long as the 
one-sided explanation can explain the stability of the method vis-à-
                                    
96 See also e.g. Dan Baras (2017), who has a very similar conclusion and discussion, 
but chooses to express the constraints in terms of probability rather than modal 
(counterfactual) stability. Joel Pust (2004) also thinks that if there is an integration 
challenge for domains of necessary truths, it is the challenge to explain why we could 
not easily have had different beliefs than we actually do.  
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vis the actual beliefs, the integration requirement is met, assuming that 
the domain is one of necessary truth.  
To illustrate: when it comes to contingent facts and some method 
for justifying beliefs about them, an explanation of the method’s 
reliability needs to involve an explanation of why the method would 
support true beliefs even if the facts were different than they actually 
are. That is, it should be explained why the method supports my belief 
that figure f is spherical in a way that is sensitive to the fact of f’s shape. 
It will not do to give an explanation according to which the method 
would support my belief that f is spherical even if f had in fact been 
cylindrical. But necessary facts could not have been different than 
they are, so there is no need to explain how the method for forming 
modal beliefs is fact-sensitive. 
For instance, we are allowed to assume that it is indeed true that 
Aleister Crowley could have had a brother and we are justified in 
believing it. But if it is possible that Aleister Crowley could have had 
a brother, then it is necessarily possible. Let’s say that we are 
rationalist conceivability theorists, and therefore claim that Connor is 
justified in believing that it is possible that Aleister Crowley could 
have had a brother because he can conceive of a world in which it is 
true that Aleister Crowley has a brother. Now, perhaps there is a 
genealogical explanation of why Connor (and other human beings) 
can conceive of what he actually can conceive of, including why he 
can conceive of things like Aleister Crowley having a brother, which 
makes no reference whatever to in virtue of what it is true that it is 
possible that Aleister Crowley could have had a brother. Still, this 
explanation is enough to meet the integration requirement for the 
method in question, as long as it is an explanation of why the method 
delivers the results that it does with modal stability, even if that is 
quite independent of that in virtue of which the results are accurate. 
Or at least, that is the suggestion here.  
Now, assuming all this is right, why is it helpful to the rationalist 
modal epistemologist? Typically, this line of argument is supposed to 
be helpful to defenders of particular metaphysical theories that 
originally appear problematic when it comes to integration, such as 
platonism, moral realism, or possible worlds theories of modality. It 
is helpful to them in the following sense: if an explanation of the 
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reliability of the relevant method need not make any reference to the 
numbers, moral properties, or possible worlds, then it does not matter 
that it is unclear how any sort of evidence or method can depend on 
these entities, because of their nature. We can gear this as helpful to 
the modal rationalist in the following way: we do not need to wonder 
how the evidence or method can depend on or otherwise track realist 
modal facts, because the latter need not figure in the explanation of 
the method’s reliability. It is not uniquely useful to rationalists of 
course, but it removes an obstacle that has previously been though to 
stand in rationalism’s way, and has been developed in domains where 
the proper methods are often assumed to be a priori. As long as the 
rationalist can show that her method supports our actual beliefs with 
modal stability, she is good to go.  
Of course, whether there actually are some good, candidate one-
sided explanations available given some particular modal epistemol-
ogy, rationalist or otherwise, is an open question. Indeed, it is an 
empirical question which I will not discuss here. I will concentrate 
only on the more philosophical, conditional question of whether a 
good one-sided explanation, if there is one, would be enough to meet 
the integration requirement on a modal epistemology.  
5.2. Implication: METAPHYSICS MATTERS is 
False 
In this section I show that if it is enough to be able to give a one-
sided explanation in order for a modal epistemology to meet the 
integration requirement, then METAPHYSICS MATTERS is false. That 
is, what the correct modal metaphysics is assumed to be does not 
matter to the prospects of meeting the integration requirement for a 
given modal epistemology.  
Consider first the following toy example. Someone might put 
forward a view of modality according to which modal claims are made 
true by some facts that are on the one hand part of our world and 
not, in the sense of Lewisian possible worlds, spatiotemporally 
isolated from epistemic subjects in our world, and on the other not 
‘abstract’ in the sense e.g. a platonic number is typically taken to be 
abstract. On this modal metaphysics, there seems at least at first 
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glance not to be anything which obviously prevents these facts from 
being causally efficacious or accessible (directly or indirectly) to us 
through our senses.  
Now, let’s say we are contemplating how, assuming the above toy 
theory of modal metaphysics to be true, two different modal 
epistemologies do with respect to the integration requirement. The 
first, a modal epistemology according to which modal justification at 
bottom centrally relies on perception, can be well integrated with this 
picture of modal metaphysics. No matter what you would think of 
either theory here in other respects, it seems as if there is a possible 
causal explanation to be had here of the reliability of the method in 
question, vis-à-vis the modal facts. The other is a conceivability 
theory, and by assumption it is unclear in what way conceivability 
evidence should depend on the modal facts.  
Presumably, there is reason to think that the first does better than 
the second with respect to the integration requirement. But now, let’s 
say that there are one-sided explanations of why each of the two 
methods support the beliefs that they do with enough modal stability. 
If one-sided explanations are enough to meet the integration 
requirement, then we seem to no longer have reason to say that the 
first theory does better than the other, even when we hold the modal 
metaphysics in question fixed. This despite that the metaphysics 
obviously goes better with the first modal epistemology – because 
metaphysics does not matter. Whatever causal story we could tell 
becomes superfluous as far as the integration challenge is concerned.  
By the same token, there would be no reason to think that 
Peacocke’s modal epistemology has a better chance of meeting the 
integration requirement when considered in a specification with 
Peacocke’s own preferred linguistic ersatz theory of the metaphysics 
of modality than when considered in a specification with, say, 
Lewisian modal realism. But that seems wrong. As the reader will 
recall from chapter 2.5.1, the promise in Peacocke’s view lies in the 
dual role played by the principles of possibility which determine the 
space of possible worlds and the possession conditions for the 
concept ‘POSSIBLE’. As Peacocke himself says elsewhere of his 
account: 
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This is not only a matter of reliability. The judgement of the modal 
truth is explained by the thinker’s implicit grasp of principles which 
make the modal truth hold (2004, 162).  
But if the necessity of truths in a domain impacts the issue of 
integration so that a one-sided explanation will be enough, then this 
might well be beside the point and the only thing that matters to the 
prospects of meeting the integration requirement is whether there is 
an explanation of how Peacocke’s method stably delivers the beliefs 
that it does. In short, whether the integration requirement can be met 
given Peacocke’s modal epistemology depends on whether the “such-
and-such” part of e.g. the following claim can be filled out: it is 
counterfactually persistent due to such-and-such that I possess the 
‘POSSIBLE’-concept and hence arrive at the belief that <It is possible 
for this table to break> by concept-investigation, given that it is 
necessarily true that <It is possible for this table to break>. Crucially, 
that filling out need not involve any reference at all to what makes it 
the case that <It is possible for this table to break> is true. If such an 
explanation can be given, it stands no matter what the correct modal 
metaphysics are. So, we can evaluate the integrative success of a 
modal epistemology without attending at all to the modal 
metaphysics. 
An implication of the strategy currently under investigation then, 
is that METAPHYSICS MATTERS is false. Modal metaphysics does not 
matter to the integration challenge in the way we thought it did. All 
that matters is the necessity of the modal truths. That this should be 
the case is perhaps unsurprising given how I described the original 
context in which this sort of argument typically occurs: it is a way to 
save a particular sort of metaphysics from an epistemological 
objection, but it is now clear how it does so by rendering metaphysics 
irrelevant to epistemology. But that this nonetheless flies in the face 
of how the integration challenge is commonly conceived should 
hopefully be equally clear. Peacocke, of course, thinks it matters. 
Roca-Royes, who argues that Peacocke’s theory fails to meet the 
integration requirement as it stands, nevertheless also thinks that 
metaphysics matters to integration: she suggests that in order to see 
what an appropriate epistemology of the constitutive would look like 
“we should inquire about the nature of constitutive facts” (2010, 340). 
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For Biggs (2011), it matters greatly to the issue of integration that 
modal facts are unobservable, but if necessity is all that matters, then 
unobservability is beside the point. And so on. 
In fact, even someone like Justin Clarke-Doane who holds that 
one-sided explanations are sufficient when the truths believed are 
necessary, appears committed to METAPHYSICS MATTERS in some of 
his work. For instance, a key thesis in Clarke-Doane (2014) is that the 
domains of morality and mathematics are not analogous with regards 
to the integration challenge, contrary to what many in the 
epistemology of morality have thought (cf. Enoch 2010; Huemer 
2005, 99). But Clarke-Doane suggests it is not, because of what I can 
only read as a difference in the metaphysics. He writes:  
Moral claims are not about peculiarly moral entities, in the way 
mathematical claims are about mathematical objects. Moral claims are 
about the likes of people, actions and events. For example, the sentence 
“Osama Bin Laden is wicked” is not literally about wickedness in the 
way that “2 is prime” is about the number 2. (2014, 247) 
The idea, I take it, is that the problem is not as intractable in the case 
of morality, where the properties but not the objects of which they 
are predicated are causally inefficacious, as it is in the case of mathe-
matics where both properties and objects are causally inefficacious. 
Maybe the observation about a difference in metaphysics of morality 
and mathematics is right, and then there may be a difference in what 
kind of explanation one would need to produce in order to meet the 
intergation challenge. Maybe it is wrong, and the specifications of the 
integration challenge relevant for the two domains are quite alike after 
all. But the point is that whether there is a difference depends on the 
tenability of substantial metaphysical claims about the ontology of 
morality and the ontology of mathematics. 
In sum, metaphysics matters to the issue of integration as we know 
it: to the question of whether there will be a challenge or not in meeting 
the integration requirement given a certain epistemology; to what sort 
of explanation is available given a certain epistemology; to what 
epistemology we should take as being able to meet the challenge. But 
if the strategy examined in this chapter is on the right track, then it 
does not. It is thus clear that assigning this role to the necessity of the 
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truths in a domain implies a very revisionary conception of the 
integration challenge. 
5.3. Two Distinct Explanatory Tasks 
Another point that can be raised in objection to the one-sided 
explanation, which an astute reader might already have noted, is that 
the one-sided explanation just does not address the right question. It 
does not speak to the explanandum relevant given the integration 
requirement and so we can make short shrift of the claim that such 
explanations should be sufficient – they are not, because they do not 
address the issue.  
The original explanandum, as the reader will recall, was the fact that 
method M is a good method for supporting modal beliefs, given the 
truth-aim of enquiry. That is, what is to be explained is the assumed 
fact that M supports mainly true modal beliefs. Let’s call this original 
explanandum TMB for “true modal belief”. What the one-sided 
explanation addresses is the fact that M supports the modal beliefs 
that it does. Let’s call this AMB for “actual modal belief”. One way 
to put what is going on with the idea that the one-sided explanation 
is enough, is this: when the domain is one of necessary truths, TMB 
and AMB are the same fact, and so an explanation of AMB also 
sufficiently explains TMB.  
But I think that is a problematic conclusion, given how explanation 
is commonly understood. One way to see this is to think of the con-
trastive character of explanation (see e.g. Garfinkel 1981, chapter 1; 
Van Fraassen 1980, chapter 5).97 To say that explanation is contrastive 
is suggest that a “why x?”-question is typically elliptical for a particular 
“why x rather than y?”-question. We can take the vertical follow-up 
question and reformulate it slightly like so:  
Q: Why does suggested method m support mainly true 
modal beliefs?  
This is, according to the contrastive view of explanation, elliptical for 
a contrastive question. Which one? In principle, there are quite a few 
                                    
97 I do not mean to commit to the view that all explanation is always contrastive. See 
e.g. Ruben (1990, 35-40) for criticism of that stronger assumption.  
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different options – why is it the case that method m results in true 
modal beliefs rather than true non-modal beliefs, or; why is it the case 
that method m, rather than method n, results in true modal beliefs – 
but the most natural interpretation is clearly 
Q*: Why does m support mainly true modal beliefs rather 
than false ones? 
But consider the following alternative: 
Q**: Why does m support the modal beliefs that it does, 
rather than some other ones?  
Q* corresponds to explaining TMB and Q** corresponds to explain-
ing AMB. Prising them apart in this way shows that they are different 
questions, and the one-sided explanation addresses only the second 
of the two. Moreover, and relatedly, it is commonly accepted that 
explanation is hyperintensional. Thus, even if ‘true modal beliefs’ and 
‘actual modal beliefs’ are necessarily the same de re set of beliefs, AMB 
and TMB can be distinct explananda, requiring different explanations. 
We are dealing with two different explanatory tasks here, and the 
one-sided explanation only speaks to one of them. So, we might say 
that while METAPHYSICS MATTERS may well be false of the one 
addressed by a one-sided explanation, it is true of the original 
explanatory task, the one we identified with the integration challenge. 
The one-sided explanation then, whatever else it does sufficiently, 
does not help in meeting the integration requirement for a modal 
epistemology.  
But perhaps this shift from one explanatory task to another is not 
a bug as much as major feature. Perhaps the idea is not that the one-
sided explanation helps meet the integration requirement, but rather 
that there is no integration requirement – at least not one as we 
standardly conceive of it – on epistemologies when the domain is one 
of necessary truths. There might be another explanatory task to 
replace the integration requirement and this is the one addressed by 
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the one-sided explanation.98 In the next section, I examine that way 
of pitching the one-sided explanation and see how it fares.  
5.4. Why Switch Explanatory Tasks? 
In this section I examine the central claim of this chapter, about the 
one-sided explanation, in a slightly modified form, motivated by the 
discussion above. The new, modified claim is this: when the domain 
is one of necessary truths, there is no integration requirement (as 
standardly conceived) on epistemologies, but there is another explan-
atory task to replace it which is satisfactorily addressed by the one-
sided explanation. In particular, the other task is the one referred to 
as Q** and AMB above. The main question now is how the first part 
of the claim – the one about there not being an instance of the original 
explanatory task when the domain is one of necessary truths – could 
be motivated. I have identified three different ways of attempting to 
do so, and I discuss them below. 
5.4.1. Something Wrong with the Original 
Sometimes it sounds as if the necessity of the truths in the domain 
somehow corrupt the original explanatory task, and that this is why 
we have to go look for a distinct one. But it is unclear how that idea 
could be defended.  
Pust (2004) might be an example of someone who suggests that 
the problem is that the correlation between truth and beliefs is 
necessary, because necessary correlations are not apt for being 
explained (at least in the way relevant to the integration requirement, 
i.e. in terms of its metaphysical underpinnings). But I think that is a 
difficult claim to defend. Consider for instance the literature on 
metaphysical explanation – much of it is concerned precisely with 
spelling out the metaphysical underpinnings of correlations which 
obtains with metaphysical necessity. A paradigmatic case in that 
literature is the relation between Socrates and his singleton set. The 
two seems to co-exist with metaphysical necessity. If Socrates exists, 
                                    
98 Pust (2004) is clearly meaning to say something along these lines, and it might be 
a fair interpretation of Grundmann (2007) too. 
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then so does his singleton set. And if Socrates’ singleton set exists 
then so does Socrates. There is no world where one but not the other 
exists. Now, rather than concluding that this correlation is unapt for 
explanation in terms of a dependence relation, that is exactly what this 
is calling out for.99 We want to know in virtue of what this strong 
modal co-variation obtains. Someone wishing to take this route to 
motivating a shift in explanatory tasks would need to argue that this 
sort of explanatory task is not legitimate. 
A different tack is to suggest that there is no explanatory task if the 
relevant contrast fact is impossible, which is supposedly the case with 
Q*. But that is also implausible. Consider the case of explaining why 
a mother who tries to distribute twenty-three strawberries evenly 
among her three children without cutting any of the strawberries fails 
each time.100 Presumably, the relevant contrast here is the mother’s 
succeeding in distributing twenty-three strawberries evenly among 
her three children without cutting any of the strawberries. But that is 
impossible – twenty-three is not evenly divisible by three and there is 
no possible world in which it is. This doesn’t make the alleged 
explanandum unapt for being explained.  
Perhaps there are other ways of arguing that necessity hugely 
impacts what sort of explanatory tasks make sense, but I cannot think 
of any. Pending a better way of fleshing this idea out, it seems difficult 
to motivate the claim that something is wrong with the original 
explanatory task posed by the integration requirement, just because 
the truths in the domain are necessary.  
                                    
99 A favourite quotable in the recent literature on grounding and metaphysical 
explanation is Jaegwon Kim. He has pointed out that modal co-variation relations 
such as supervenience do not explain, but rather calls out for explanation. In his 
(1993, 167), for instance, he writes: “Supervenience itself is not an explanatory 
relation. It is not a ‘deep’ metaphysical relation; rather, it is a ‘surface’ relation that 
reports a pattern of property covariation, suggesting the presence of an interesting 
dependency relation that might explain it”. 
100 I adapt this case from Marc Lange (2016, 6) who uses it to make a slightly different 
point.  
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5.4.2. NEUTRALITY is Misguided 
A different strategy is to try and argue that the idea that there is an 
integration requirement on epistemologies of domains where the 
truths are necessary can be traced to NEUTRALITY, which in turn is 
misguided. Once we see that the integration challenge is the challenge 
to spell out the causal dependence relations between beliefs and facts, 
we can also see that there cannot be such a challenge when the 
domain is one of necessary truths.   
In the introduction to this chapter I said that the guiding thought 
behind this line of argument can be traced back to David Lewis. That 
is especially true of this attempt to motivate a shift to another 
explanatory task (although this is not how he puts it). In the relevant 
passage, Lewis is responding to an epistemological objection against 
his genuine realism about possible worlds, analogous to Field’s 
argument against platonism, already familiar from chapter 2 of this 
book. Given Lewisian modal realism, how can the fact that we have 
justified modal beliefs be explained? While these worlds are concrete 
– or at least not abstract in the way, say, a natural number is abstract 
– they are causally cut off from us, and so no causal explanation is 
available. The upshot is supposed to be that on no specifications of 
the integration challenge for modality, involving Lewisian modal 
realism on the metaphysics-side, can the challenge be met, and hence 
the Lewisian modal realist fails to discharge that explanatory burden. 
Lewis’ central point in response to this objection is this: what the 
domains of mathematics and modality have in common is that both 
mathematical and modal truths are necessary. This is the source of 
the apparent trouble with the integration requirement in both cases – 
it is why it seems there cannot be a solution. The reason it seems 
difficult to meet the integration challenge in these domains is the 
apparent unavailability of a causal explanation (this seems to square 
with CAUSAL BLUEPRINT). We know what a causal solution would 
look like, but it seems we cannot have that here, or in the domain of 
mathematics, so we are puzzled. But the reason there cannot be a 
causal explanation is not, as one might think, that according to 
prominent metaphysical theories of the facts in question they are 
“abstract” in some sense or other (as in the case of platonic numbers 
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or Ersatz worlds) or too “far away” or “closed off” (as in the case of 
Lewisian possible worlds). The reason is the necessity of the truths in 
the domain. 
In order to see how one might arrive at that conclusion, we need 
two assumptions in hand. The first is that of what it sometimes re-
ferred to as “vacuism” about counterpossibles. A counterpossible is 
a counterfactual conditional with an impossible antecedent, such as 
this one (due to Daniel Nolan):  
If Hobbes had secretly squared the circle, all sick children 
in the mountains of South America at the time would not 
have cared.  
Vacuism is the view that all such counterfactual conditionals are 
vacuously true. That is, the example counterfactual just mentioned is 
vacuously true, but so is:  
If Hobbes had secretly squared the circle, all sick children 
in the mountains of South America at the time would have 
cared,  
since the antecedent, i.e. Hobbes’ squaring the circle, is impossible. 
Vacuism is part of the traditional, Lewis-Stalnaker style analysis of 
counterfactuals, but has come under criticism from e.g. Berto et al. 
(2018), Brogaard and Salerno (2013) and Nolan (1997). I will not dis-
cuss vacuism any further (although I agree with the counterintuitivity 
of saying that both of the above claims are vacuously true when in 
fact it seems as if the latter is false and the former is true but not 
vacuously so).  
The second assumption we need to have in hand is of the view of 
causality to which Lewis subscribed. On this view, causality is to be 
analysed in terms of counterfactual conditionals. For instance, an 
event e causes another event d to occur just in case the following 
counterfactual is true: if it were not the case that d occurred, e would 
not have occurred. In the same way, S’s belief b causally depends on 
the fact f just in case the following counterfactual is true: if it were not 
the case that f, S would not have held b. 
The reason there cannot be a reliability explanation in terms of 
causal dependence then, for a domain like modality or mathematics, 
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is that when the relevant f is necessary, the counterfactual in question 
will be vacuously true since the antecedent is impossible. So, the 
necessity of the truths is the source of the apparent trouble with the 
integration challenge. 
There is a sense then, in which CAUSAL BLUEPRINT is false in the 
context of epistemology of modality. Consider again the toy example 
from above, with the non-abstract, non-isolated modal facts and the 
perception-based modal epistemology. Again, it seems that there is a 
possible causal explanation to be had here of the reliability of the 
method in question, vis-à-vis the modal facts. But if the above is right, 
then this judgement is wrong. Modal facts, being necessary, cannot 
stand in genuine causal dependence relations, and so no such 
explanation could be correct. 
I do think this verdict seems a bit odd. But I do no fancy that Lewis 
would find it a very impressive objection. Rather, the very point is 
that CAUSAL BLUEPRINT is true of the integration requirement, while 
NEUTRALITY is false, and that is why the integration requirement does 
not apply in domains where the truths are necessary.  
The point is, our clearest idea of what would do the trick with the 
integration challenge is an explanation in terms of a causal 
dependence. The reason we cannot see what a non-causal alternative 
following the same pattern could be, is because there is no sufficient 
alternative, and it is a mistake to think that one ought to be provided. 
The integration challenge is the causal challenge, and once we 
understand causality in the right way, we see that this is not a relevant 
explanatory task when the truths in question are necessary.  
If we still think there is an important explanatory task here, it must 
be a different one – such as AMB/Q**, i.e. the one addressed by the 
one-sided explanation. Claims in response to this question will not, in 
contrast to one in response to the original explanatory task (which is 
now identified with a request for a causal story) be vacuously true.  
I have two things to say about this. First of all, it clearly requires 
one to assume vacuism and a counterfactual analysis of causality as 
correct. Both of these are perfectly legitimate views, but none of them 
is without detractors. But then again, few views are. Secondly and 
more importantly, the above turns out to be dialectically problematic 
in the following way.  
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Recall that there is in fact a perfectly respectable alternative, non-
causal, way of meeting the integration requirement, namely in terms 
of a constitutive dependence relation. This alternative is often 
disregarded because it is assumed to require an unattractive metaphys-
ics of modality according to which modal facts are not mind-
independent. But there is surely nothing wrong with it in principle. 
As I have stressed, the question of whether two theories together can 
meet the integration challenge is distinct from whether we would 
want to accept that pair of theories at the end of the day. Rejecting 
NEUTRALITY, however, implies that a constitutive dependence 
relation could not be the metaphysical underpinnings in virtue of 
which a method is reliable with respect to modal truth.  
Having to make that assumption, in order to make plausible that 
NEUTRALITY is misguided, seems very unattractive. It would be less 
unpalatable if it could be argued that this sort of explanation is ruled 
out on similar grounds as a causal explanation when the domain is 
one of necessary truths. That could be accomplished if one were to 
extend the metaphysical claim about how to understand causality – in 
terms of counterfactual conditionals – to dependence relations more 
generally, including constitutive dependence. That is, one could 
assume that dependence relations generally should be analysed in 
terms of counterfactual conditionals. Again, this is a metaphysical 
claim and it is a view one could have, but I think it is considerably 
more difficult to defend. For instance, think again of the literature on 
metaphysical explanation. The cases there often concern dependence 
relations that are precisely not analysable in modal terms, but they still 
underwrite explanation. In fact, that is a common way to characterise 
the relation of so-called metaphysical grounding, typically the centre 
of interest in the debate on metaphysical explanation. Relatedly, the 
claim that necessary facts cannot enter into dependence relations at 
all seems more controversial than the claim that necessary facts 
cannot enter into causal relations does. Even if it has some plausibility 
that a necessary fact does not depend on anything – one could argue 
that this is part of what it is to be necessary – it is another thing 
entirely, and much more controversial, to say that nothing can depend 
on a necessary fact. Hence, modifying the strategy, in order to deal 
with the problem presented by the seemingly perfectly acceptable 
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alternative of an explanation in terms of constitutive dependence, 
requires one to defend substantial and relatively controversial claims 
about metaphysics.  
In sum, the strategy examined in this subsection was to identify the 
integration requirement with the requirement to provide an explana-
tion in terms of causal dependence, and since this is obviously not an 
explanatory task that could receive a substantial, non-vacuous answer, 
when the truths are necessary (given some metaphysical assumptions 
about causality, plus vacuism), we should turn to another explanatory 
task. The main problem with this is the identification of the 
integration challenge with the causal challenge, which only works if 
one ignores what seems to be in principle perfectly good non-causal 
alternatives. This would be an unattractive, ad hoc move. It could be 
made less ad hoc if one adopts a view of dependence relations quite 
generally, matching one’s view of causality, but one should be mindful 
that this might be more difficult to defend than the corresponding 
view of causality.  
5.4.3. The Sceptical Framing 
The last attempt at motivating a shift in explanatory tasks that I will 
mention is this: what we care about is the sceptical threat from 
undercutting defeaters, and a one-sided explanation is enough to 
deflect this threat. The idea then, is that our interest in fending off a 
potential undercutting defeater should decide what sort of question 
we need to answer, and as it turns out, an explanation of AMB gives 
us all we need in order to rest assured that the threat from the 
potential undercutting defeater is gone.  
Take Clarke-Doane’s case for the sufficiency of a one-sided 
explanation. He thinks that the absence of a reliability explanation 
gives us reason to doubt that the method in question is reliable, and 
that amounts to an undercutting defeater for the prima facie 
justification based on said method. For him, reliability is a purely 
modal notion, and his point is that an explanation of why AMB 
obtains is enough to show that the method is reliable. That is, an 
explanation of AMB is enough deflect threat from the potential 
undercutting defeater, and a one-sided explanation does explain why 
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AMB obtains, assuming that the relevant truths are necessary. On this 
view, the importance of explaining the reliability of a method is tied 
up with the importance of avoiding the threat from an undercutting 
defeater (2017, 30; 32). In fact, Clarke-Doane concedes that there may 
well be other senses of “explain the reliability” on which the one-
sided explanation might not suffice, although he complains he does 
not know what sense that would be and how its relevance could be 
supported. 
My only quarrel is with the crucial claim that the only relevant 
sense of “explain the reliability” is a sense which invited what I in 2.4 
called the sceptical framing of the integration requirement. I have 
specified and motivated the relevance of another sense of “explain 
the reliability” which the one-sided explanation does not address, 
namely the one I outlined in chapter 2: the integration requirement as 
understood on the meta-theoretical framing.  
If one were to press Clarke-Doane’s line of thought here, one 
would have to argue that we should give up on the task of meta-
theoretical justification in terms of meeting the integration 
requirement, and focus on the sceptical threat from undercutting de-
featers in its place – even if it is meta-theoretical justification in the 
epistemology of modality that we are primarily interested in. That 
presumably involves arguing that there is something wrong with the 
latter interest. Clarke-Doane himself, of course, does not provide 
such an argument because he was only interested in undercutting 
defeaters in the first place – and likewise for others who take a similar 
tack, see e.g. Baras (2017). And given that it is hard to see that there 
is something wrong with the distinct, original explanatory task just 
because the truths in question are necessary, as I argued above, it is 
not easy to see what that answer would look like.  
5.5. Conclusions 
It is time to take stock of what has been said in this chapter and of its 
relevance to the bigger picture. As I mentioned at the outset of the 
chapter, the reason it is interesting to look at the prospects of one-
sided explanations, as far as this book is concerned, is because it might 
provide a way for modal rationalism to meet the integration 
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requirement while assuming some form of modal realism, something 
which has so far seemed problematic. This is interesting in general of 
course – and it should certainly be of interest to rationalists – but I 
am investigating it with a special eye to the modal empiricist who does 
not want to accept the partial modal scepticism implied by her theory. 
She is thereby committed to the following: some rationalist theory, 
which can account for the cases of justified modal belief outside the 
explanatory scope of modal empiricism, can also meet the integration 
requirement. And clearly, it needs to do so in a different way from 
that utilised by modal empiricism. 
The key assumption behind the strategy examined here was that if 
the believed truths in a domain are metaphysically necessary, then this 
impacts issues to do with integration. In particular, it renders a one-
sided explanation sufficient to meet the integration requirement for 
epistemologies in these domains.  
I first argued that if this is right, then METAPHYSICS MATTERS is 
false, and so it requires one to assume a seriously revisionary 
conception of the integration challenge, compared to the one laid out 
in chapter 2. I also pointed out that it seems one-sided explanations 
address a distinct explanatory task from the one identified with the 
integration challenge. This led me to consider the idea that revision-
ism is the very point of the strategy, so that we need to change 
explanatory tasks. In particular, we need to give up the original one 
(where METAPHYSICS MATTERS is true) in favour of the one addressed 
by one-sided explanations (where METAPHYSICS MATTERS is false) 
when the domain is one of necessary truths. I argued that there is 
nothing obviously wrong with the original explanatory task, and that 
we lack a reason to change from the meta-theoretical to the 
undercutting defeater framing. One could use the Lewisian strategy 
in its more general form, but it depends on some contentious 
metaphysical claims that would need to be defended.  
What does all this mean for the modal empiricist gone non-
uniformist, who is looking for a way to meet the integration 
requirement assuming a non-empiricist modal epistemology for 
abstracta and/or extraordinary modal claims, and realism about such 
modal facts? Since I have argued that a one-sided explanation at most 
addresses a distinct explanatory task than the one specified by the 
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integration requirement as standardly conceived, it turns out that the 
best the modal empiricist can hope for is that when it comes to those 
modal beliefs – but not the ones empiricism targets – we need to 
change to another explanatory task, i.e. the one addressed by a one-
sided explanation (and of course, there would have to be a good one-
sided explanation to point to).  
It is important that we do not need to switch in the case of modal 
beliefs targeted by modal empiricism, because then the goodness of 
modal empiricism in virtue of its ability to meet the integration 
requirement would be undermined. It would be undermined because, 
again, the integration requirement as I sketched it in chapter 2 is tied 
to the original explanatory task. By way of illustration, consider the 
following: it might be suggested that this could be used to patch up 
the argument from heterogeneity along the abstract/concrete dimen-
sion, using the Way of Essentialism to understand abstractness. If one 
embraces the Way of Essentialism, then an abstract object has all its 
properties essentially. Claims about abstract objects and their 
properties then, hold with metaphysical necessity. And assuming we 
have true beliefs about abstract objects and their properties, their 
content is necessarily true, and we need to switch from the integration 
requirement to another explanatory task when we ask about the 
reliability of methods that support (modal) beliefs about abstracta. But 
even if that is true, the beliefs targeted by modal empiricism – 
certainly by the two varieties I considered in detail in chapter 3 – are 
metaphysically necessary too. So, there is an overgeneralisation prob-
lem with embracing this line of thought.  
In relation to this, the reader may recall that I flagged in the 
introduction to this chapter that not all modal truths are 
metaphysically necessary. In particular, counterfactual conditionals 
and necessity claims that are true in virtue of a restricted necessity are 
not. Assuming that one could use the metaphysical necessity of 
believed truths to motivate a change of explanatory tasks, this might 
mean that for modal truths that are necessarily true there is a change 
of tasks, and hence no integration requirement applies to theories 
targeting them, while on the other hand the integration requirement 
does apply to theories targeting beliefs in modal truths that are not 
metaphysically necessary. Could this be of help in avoiding overgen-
MODAL EMPIRICISM MADE DIFFICULT 
166 
eralisation and enforcing a non-uniformist picture helpful to the 
empiricists? Perhaps if it was suggested that the difference between 
ordinary and extraordinary modal claims was that they are true in 
virtue of a restricted and an unrestricted modality, respectively. That 
is, ordinary modal claims fall within the sphere of nomological neces-
sity whereas extraordinary modal claims go beyond that. Then it could 
perhaps be claimed that there is an integration requirement on modal 
epistemologies targeting ordinary modal claims, because these claims 
are not necessarily true if true, while there is no integration 
requirement as standardly conceived on modal epistemologies 
targeting extraordinary modal claims. There are some problems with 
taking the ordinary/extraordinary distinctions in this way, to be 
discussed in the next chapter, but even setting those aside there seems 
to be a problem from the point of view of the empiricist theories 
considered in this book. Induction-based modal empiricism targets 
ordinary possibility claims, and they are metaphysically necessarily true 
if true, even if they also hold true under some restricted modality: a 
nomological possibility is metaphysically necessarily possible. Abduc-
tion-based modal empiricism is difficult to assess when it comes to 
what it can handle, but the only example Biggs gives us is certainly 
one that is necessarily true if true.  
But there is a bigger problem that is prior to all of these worries 
about overgeneralisations, and it concerns how the metaphysical 
necessity of truths in a domain is supposed to motivate the switch to 
another explanatory task, and in particular one which one-sided 
explanations address. All three motivations examined in sections 
5.4.1-5.4.3 were problematic, so it is highly doubtful that necessity of 
modal truths can make this difference after all.  
The only approach of the three I examined that holds some sort 
promise, in my view, is a revised version of the last one: the one which 
insists that what we ought to be interested in is the sceptical threat 
from undercutting defeaters, not meta-theoretical justification in 
terms of providing a certain sort of explanation. However, instead of 
insisting that we have to switch from one explanatory task to another 
– we were missing an argument for that anyway – one could say that 
there are two perfectly legitimate explanatory tasks in play. On the 
sceptical framing of integration, an explanation which addresses AMB 
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is perfectly sufficient, whereas on the meta-theoretical framing of 
integration outlined in chapter 2, it is TMB that needs to be addressed. 
Whether or not there is an integration requirement on a modal 
epistemology, depends on whether we are interested in the sceptical 
(then, no) or the meta-theoretical (then, yes) framing.  
Which question we should be interested in depends on what sort 
of modal beliefs we are considering the justification of, it could be 
suggested. In particular, what the modal empiricist would want is 
something like this: what we are interested in when it comes to modal 
matters within the explanatory scope of modal empiricism, is the issue 
of meta-theoretical justification. When it comes to certain other 
modal matters, we are interested only in issues to do with a sceptical 
threat from undercutting defeaters. Modal empiricism – and any other 
theory targeting certain cases of modal justification – is thus subject 
to the integration requirement, and modal empiricism is an attractive 
theory partly because it can meet this requirement. Other theories, 
targeting other cases of modal justification, are not subject to the 
integration requirement and can thus be attractive without meeting it. 
On this line of thought, whether or not there is an integration 
requirement depends not on whether or not truths in the domain are 
metaphysically necessary (although they need to be in order for a one-
sided explanation to be sufficient when the sceptical task is the 
relevant one), but on whether we are interested in meeting the 
integration challenge. That is an interesting suggestion, generally 
speaking. In the next chapter, I am going to discuss a more radical, 
but in my view also more plausible and useful, version of an approach 
that brings our meta-epistemological commitments and interests to 
the forefront. In fact, as it turns out, it will amount to a new and dif-
ferent way of construing a strong non-uniformist claim, which 






6. Avoiding the Tension: Axiological 
Non-uniformism 
In this chapter I turn to the aspect of the Limitation Problem that 
concerns extraordinary modal beliefs. I noted in chapter 3 that given 
how modal empiricism meets the integration requirement by way of 
integrated non-modal input-beliefs (bracketing worries about the 
integration of ampliative principles), there are reasons to think that 
(at least some) modal empiricists are also committed to scepticism 
with respect to extraordinary modal matters (in addition to modal 
matters pertaining to abstract entities). 
I have presented strong non-uniformism, based on an argument 
from metaphysical heterogeneity, as a potential way for a modal 
empiricist to avoid the partial modal scepticism implied by the 
Limitation Problem. This seemed a good fit in the case of avoiding 
modal scepticism with respect to abstract entities (although we still 
need a modal epistemology of abstracta that meets the integration 
requirement, given a suitably informative understanding of 
‘abstractness’). The modal empiricist could try this strategy out as a 
way to avoid scepticism with respect to extraordinary modal matters 
as well. This would involve arguing first that there is a metaphysical 
difference between the facts that ordinary and extraordinary modal 
claims are about, and second that we have some reason to think this 
difference is epistemically relevant. Moreover, in order to really 
present an alternative to scepticism about extraordinary modal 
matters, this should also give us some idea of what a promising non-
empiricist epistemology of extraordinary modal matters could be like.  
I will not investigate that strategy here, for reasons that will soon 
become clear. Instead I will sketch a version of strong non-uniform-
ism, based on an argument from heterogeneity, but not metaphysical 
heterogeneity. The strategy explored here makes use of two ideas 
flagged towards the end of chapter 5: the idea of a partial rejection of 
the integration requirement that tracks the distinction along which 
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one wants to be a non-uniformist, and the idea to motivate this with 
an appeal to what we, as theorists, are interested in capturing, doing, 
accounting for.  
6.1. The Ordinary/Extraordinary Distinction 
What I have decided to call the ordinary/extraordinary distinction is 
elusive in the sense that it is unclear exactly what sort of difference it 
is supposed to be tracking. As I already mentioned, it is often 
introduced by way of examples that illustrate an intuitive difference 
which many philosophers apparently “get”. But as soon as one seeks 
to go beyond that intuitive difference things become messy. The 
ordinary/extraordinary distinction has this in common with the 
already discussed abstract/concrete distinction. As I shall presently 
suggest, however, they are different in the sense that while it is 
reasonably clear that the abstract/concrete distinction tracks a 
metaphysical difference (it is just not clear which one), the 
ordinary/extraordinary distinction is better read as tracking a more 
lightweight difference. 
Think about it this way. Ordinary and extraordinary modal claims 
are supposed to be intuitively different. Let’s say we sort a whole lot 
of modal claims into two piles on the basis of whether we judge them 
to be ordinary or extraordinary. Once we sit with these two piles, 
there are two different questions we can ask about them. First, we can 
ask on what basis we place a given modal claim in one category rather 
than the other, i.e. we might ask what properties of a modal claim are 
guiding our intuitions. Second, we can ask what actually grounds the 
difference between modal claims in each category. These two may, 
but need not, coincide.  
As I mentioned in chapter 3, it is rather common to characterise 
the distinction in “sociological” terms: extraordinary modal claims are 
philosophically interesting, controversial, subject to widespread 
disagreement, and so on, while ordinary modal claims come across as 
mundane and rather uninteresting; they are uncontroversial, and 
subject to widespread agreement. Again, I use (generally) ‘contested’ 
and (generally) ‘uncontested’ as shorthand for these types of 
differences. I suggest that this is what guides intuition when we 
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classify a modal claim as ordinary or extraordinary. If we judge it to 
be generally uncontested, we classify it as ordinary. If we judge it to 
be generally contested, we classify it as extraordinary. 
So far, so good. Now, for the second question, we ask whether 
there is a deeper difference, a difference which perhaps explains the 
“sociological” properties we go by when we judge whether a claim is 
ordinary or extraordinary. Is there, for instance, a metaphysical dif-
ference between the contents of ordinary and extraordinary modal 
claims, i.e. between the facts that they are about? Looking at lists of 
examples of ordinary and extraordinary modal claims it is tempting to 
say that yes, there is a difference in subject matter. But the question 
is how to cash this out metaphysically, and that is trickier than it 
seems.  
First of all, it is tricky because distinctions between entities or facts 
that differ metaphysically tend to be exclusive and exhaustive. Think 
of the distinctions between abstract and concrete, between universal 
and particular, between complex and simple. In all of these cases, any 
given entity is either one or the other, and no entity is both. It is not 
at all obvious that the ordinary/extraordinary distinction is like that. 
For one, Leon (cf. 2017, 252; 259) very clearly takes the difference to 
be a matter of degree. That is, some extraordinary modal claims are 
less extraordinary than others, in the sense of being “closer” to being 
an ordinary modal claim. Additionally, it seems plausible that there 
may exist genuine borderline cases, where there is no objective fact 
of the matter of whether a claim is ordinary or extraordinary.  
Second, it is also difficult to find a metaphysical difference which 
gets the paradigmatic cases right. The two best candidates, mentioned 
briefly in chapter 3, both fail. Consider first the idea that the ordi-
nary/extraordinary distinction tracks the difference between 
nomological and metaphysical modality. That is, all ordinary modal 
truths fall within the sphere of nomological modality, or are true in 
virtue of whatever nomological modal truths are true in virtue of, while 
extraordinary modal truths are outside the scope of nomological 
modality, or are true in virtue of whatever metaphysical modal truths 
are true in virtue of. This seems like a metaphysical difference indeed 
(provided that one takes nomological and metaphysical modality to 
have different grounds). But this interpretation does not allow for 
MODAL EMPIRICISM MADE DIFFICULT 
172 
borderline cases of differences in degree: either something is in 
accordance with the laws of nature or it is not. And crucially, it fails 
to get the cases right. Certainly, all paradigmatic ordinary modal 
claims seem to fall within the scope of nomological modality. But 
what about many of the claims that interest metaphysicians, such as 
the claim that the world is possibly gunky? This claim seems 
paradigmatically extraordinary. But whether the world actually has 
gunky mereological structure is not settled – some people argue that 
the world is gunky. If it does, then it is certainly not outside the scope 
of nomological modality, since it is actual and, hence, nomologically 
possible. 
It is slightly more promising to try and understand the difference 
between ordinary and extraordinary as tracking degree of resemblance 
to the actual world. One would then divvy up possible worlds into 
those similar to the actual world and those very different from the 
actual world, and suggest that ordinary modal truths are those that are 
true in possible worlds similar to the actual world, and extraordinary 
modal truths are true in comparatively remote possible worlds. This 
may allow for a difference in degree and for borderline cases, but it 
does not get the paradigmatic cases right, for exactly the same reason 
as above: some modal claims that seem distinctively extraordinary 
might be close to home indeed in the sense that they might pick out 
an actualised possibility for all we take ourselves to know. 
The problem with understanding ‘extraordinary’ in terms of 
objective differences from the actual world (or the laws of nature that 
govern it) is that we do not know which possible world is the actual 
one. That is just another way of saying that there are a lot of things 
we do not know about the actual world and what the laws that govern 
it allow and preclude. But our classifications of modal claims into 
ordinary and extraordinary must proceed from what we take 
ourselves to know.  
Of course, one way to react in response to this, is to hold on to the 
claim that one of these metaphysical differences underwrites the 
ordinary/extraordinary distinction, and suggest we revise our lists of 
paradigmatic examples accordingly. After all, as in the case of the 
abstract/concrete distinction, any way to try and specify what sort of 
difference it tracks will plausibly make some allegedly abstract object 
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come out as concrete, or the other way around. On this view, what is 
going on with seemingly extraordinary modal claims that turn out to 
be true of the actual world (whether or not we will ever be aware of 
it) is that we are simply mistaken about them being extraordinary, 
because the properties we go by (i.e. their being generally contested) 
track the underlying difference imperfectly.  
For sure, one is perfectly free to argue that either of the two 
metaphysical differences is epistemically relevant and able to motivate 
non-uniformism in an argument from metaphysical heterogeneity. 
But insofar as we want to capture the intuitive difference between 
ordinary and extraordinary, this has its problems, as suggested above. 
I suggest instead that we take the ‘generally contested/uncontested’ a 
bit more literally, and see whether and how this could help motivate 
non-uniformism. Understanding of the ordinary/extraordinary 
distinction in these “sociological” terms seems prima facie plausible. It 
easily accommodates genuine borderline cases and the idea that the 
difference is one of degree. And since “sociological” properties like 
these reflect what we take ourselves to know, it avoids the problems 
of not doing justice to the cases.  
Now, whether claims about certain modal matters have these 
“sociological” properties or not, is intuitively subject to change over 
time and perhaps also context. A claim that some particular state of 
affairs is possible may be generally contested at one point, but gener-
ally uncontested at a later time, or vice versa. I think this sounds right. 
To be clear, it is not the truth value of metaphysical modal claims that 
vary over time or between contexts. What might vary is on what side 
of the ordinary/extraordinary distinction a given modal claim 
belongs. 
Two other clarificatory points are in order. First, remember that 
‘contested’ and ‘uncontested’ are labels for clusters of “sociological” 
properties, and I do not see that every extraordinary, or contested, 
modal claim needs to have all relevant properties. Conversely, being 
extraordinary, or contested, is also not just a question of being “con-
tested” in the sense of being subject to wide disagreement regarding 
its truth value. Take a claim like “It is metaphysically possible that 
David Lewis could have been a poached egg”. Intuitively, this is an 
extraordinary modal claim. Let’s, for the sake of argument, say that 
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most philosophers agree that this is false. But this would still be a 
‘generally contested’ claim, if philosophers were disinclined to 
attribute knowledge of this claim to themselves and/or others, if it 
would be controversial to claim knowledge of the matter, if they were 
comparatively unconfident in making this modal claim, and so on. 
Second, I am not saying that what one means when one says “Modal 
claim C is extraordinary rather than ordinary” is that “C is generally 
contested”. I am not denying that we may be trying to approximate 
some deeper, underlying difference with our grouping claims into 
ordinary and extraordinary, based on whether or not they are gener-
ally contested. What I am suggesting is we stay agnostic about what, 
exactly, this difference is, and try to make the distinction work in 
favour of a non-uniformist picture of the epistemology of modality 
anyway. Because as I shall presently argue, there are ways in which 
the “sociological” properties that I refer to by ‘contested’ and 
‘uncontested’ are epistemically relevant.  
6.2. A Tale of Two Epistemological Projects 
In the previous section, I proposed to understand the ordi-
nary/extraordinary distinction in a lightweight fashion that does not 
claim it corresponds to a difference between two kinds of facts. The 
aim of this chapter is to use the lightweight distinction to motivate 
non-uniformism. This section gives a first taste of how the properties 
I collect under ‘contested’ and ‘uncontested’ could motivate a non-
uniformist picture according to which more than one modal 
epistemology is correct.  
6.2.1. Van Inwagen’s Analogy 
The use of something like the ordinary/extraordinary distinction in 
the epistemology of modality can be traced back at least to Peter van 
Inwagen (1998). It will be useful to consider how he introduces it. 
The paper in question is rich and full of loose, but highly interesting, 
ends, and I will only consider a small part of it here.  
Van Inwagen invites us to recognise the difference between 
ordinary and extraordinary (or “basic” and “remote” as he prefers to 
call them) modal beliefs by way of an analogy with judgements of 
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distance by the naked eye. We are quite good at judging, just by 
looking, close but not remote distances. For instance, I can judge, just 
by looking, that the window is about 1,5 meters from where I am 
currently sitting, or perhaps that the foot of the hill over there is about 
2 kilometres away. These judgements are not infallible, but reliable. I 
cannot, however, judge with any reliability, the distance between the 
moon and the earth just by looking. Modal beliefs intuitively fall into 
two categories in a similar way. We are quite good at making 
judgements with respect to some modal matters, but not others. For 
instance, I can somehow reliably judge, quite directly, that it is 
possible for the screen of my phone to break but not whether there 
could be a perfect being. Or at least, that is van Inwagen’s point. 
What kind of difference is van Inwagen after here? Since van 
Inwagen’s articulated goal in the paper is to defend partial modal 
scepticism, it is tempting to read the ordinary/extraordinary distinc-
tion as a distinction between knowable and unknowable truths. But 
that is not quite right. First, the analogy does not suggest that: we can 
be justified in beliefs about very remote distances, just not based on 
naked-eye judgements. So as far as the analogy goes, we may well be 
justified in extraordinary modal beliefs based on some other method 
than whatever method we base ordinary modal beliefs on. Second, 
van Inwagen thinks we can be justified in holding some extraordinary 
modal beliefs.101 On van Inwagen’s picture then, there are ordinary 
modal matters, and then there are knowable extraordinary modal 
matters and unknowable extraordinary modal matters. 
The difference between ordinary and extraordinary, as van 
Inwagen presents it, rather concerns method. What is common to the 
modality-case and the distance-case is this: we have a method for 
forming beliefs about subject matter sm, but it is only reliable with 
                                    
101 His examples include things he has himself argued for, namely that it is impossible 
for the moon to be made out of blue cheese and that “bodily transfer” cases (like the 
ones discussed in work on personal identity) are impossible. Among the extraordinary 
modal claims we cannot be justified in claiming anything one way or the other with 
respect to, he mentions: whether it is possible for there to be naturally purple cows; 
whether there could be an additional, pure phenomenal colour; whether the laws of 
physics could be different; whether transparent iron is possible; whether there could 
be a perfect being; whether it is possible for me to exist without anything material 
existing. 
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respect to some sm-cases and not others. For the rest of the sm-cases 
we need something else, or something more. Interestingly, van 
Inwagen pleads ignorance about what method we use to come by 
ordinary modal knowledge, although it is allegedly beyond doubt that 
we do have ordinary modal knowledge (1998, 74-75). But whatever 
this method – let’s call it method x – is, method x does not justify 
beliefs about a certain kind of modal matters, namely the 
extraordinary ones.102  
Since we are not told anything about method x beyond that it 
justifies ordinary modal beliefs “directly” or non-derivatively103, it is 
impossible to say anything about why method x can justify ordinary 
but not extraordinary modal beliefs.104 We are just supposed to get 
                                    
102 When van Inwagen goes on to argue for scepticism with respect to some 
extraordinary modal matters, he assumes that if we were justified in beliefs about these 
matters it would be on the basis of conceivings. It is not clear from the text whether 
van Inwagen is now withdrawing his claim to ignorance and suggesting that our 
ordinary modal knowledge is based on conceivings. But I do not think he is, and at 
the very least that would be a bad move. Van Inwagen thinks the reason we cannot 
be justified is that we cannot conceive in sufficient detail (1998, 79), but that seems 
to hold across the board. I certainly cannot conceive in the required detail of a world 
in which my phone screen is cracked, and even if we can it is clear that such detailed 
conceivings are not typically performed and so cannot be the explanation for all the 
ordinary modal knowledge we clearly have. (Geirsson (2005) raises similar worries in 
response to van Inwagen, whom he interprets as endorsing conceivings as the right 
method across the board.) Perhaps the idea is that in ordinary cases we do not need to 
imagine in that much detail in order to be justified – that is only required when the 
cases are extraordinary. But if the justificatory power of conceivings is connected to 
their level of detail, then something else, not the conceiving, is doing the real 
justificatory work in the ordinary cases anyway.  
103 The analogy with naked eye judgements of distance certainly suggests this: we just 
see approximately how far away something is; we just “see” that such-and-such is 
possible. A bit, perhaps, like the perceptual judgements of nonactual possibility 
described by Strohminger (2015). 
104 According to van Inwagen, the way in which we can know some extraordinary 
modal truths is derivatively, based on ordinary modal knowledge supported by method 
x, plus other (non-modal, I take it) knowledge we have, of “facts about the way the 
world is” (1998, 70). We are also not told why this method x +, as we may call it, can 
justify only some extraordinary modal beliefs. Presumably it has to do with limits in 
what method x can deliver and with limits in our supplementary non-modal knowledge, 
but looking at the cases (see footnote 101 above) it is hard to discern an obvious 
difference maker.  
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the difference between beliefs that are and beliefs that are not 
supported in this unknown but direct way. Now, this is what is going 
on with the van Inwagean ordinary/extraordinary distinction as I see 
it: it is supposed to be a distinction between modal truths of a kind 
that we obviously know/are justified in believing, in some way or other 
even if we are yet to figure out exactly what is underwriting this fact, 
and between those where it is much less obvious that we know/are 
justified. It is a distinction that trades on our pre-theoretical 
assessment of our own epistemic situation, we might say.  
6.2.2. The Relevance of Being Extraordinary 
This way of viewing the upshot of van Inwagen’s analogy is in line 
with my lightweight reading of the ordinary/extraordinary distinction 
in terms of generally uncontested/contested. The fact that a given 
modal claim is contested or uncontested tells us something about 
what we assess our own epistemic situation to be like with respect to 
that claim. In particular, for modal claims that are generally 
uncontested, we consider our epistemic situation with respect to them 
to be pretty good. We assume that we are right about these things. 
For modal claims that are generally contested, on the other hand, we 
do not take ourselves to be in that good a position. This does not mean 
that we think we are always as likely to be wrong as we are to be right. 
It means that we are not inclined to just assume that we, or others, 
are generally reliable about these matters.105  
Next, recall the following aspects of the explanatory challenge 
posed by the integration requirement. The integration requirement on 
a modal epistemology is “activated” because one puts forward a 
method as truth-conducive towards (some) modal matters. In 
meeting the integration requirement, i.e. in providing an explanation 
of the alleged reliability of a given method, one proceeds under the 
assumption that the method is in fact reliable. That is, we assume we 
                                    
105 Importantly, I do not understand the fact that we assume our own epistemic 
situation to be generally good to mean that we are justified, and the fact that we do 
not make this assumption to mean that we are unjustified. Our own assessment of 
our epistemic situation does not necessarily track the actual epistemic situation. But 
it does influence what we take to be the relevant epistemic project, as I shall presently 
argue. 
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generally believe the truth and our beliefs are based on such-and-such 
a method. That is the setup. The reliability of the method, or the truth 
of the beliefs it allegedly supports, does not need to be proved, only 
explained.  
This setup is borrowed from Field’s challenge in mathematics. 
When it comes to the mathematical beliefs of mathematicians, the 
assumption of reliably true beliefs seems overwhelmingly plausible. 
And it arguably seems pretty plausible for some modal beliefs too. 
Some – but not all. In particular, it seems plausible for ordinary be-
liefs. But it is likely to strike many as a highly contentious assumption 
when it comes to extraordinary modal beliefs. Why? Because ordinary 
modal claims are uncontested, and extraordinary ones are contested. 
That is, we are inclined to assume that we generally have true ordinary 
modal beliefs and but not that we generally have true extraordinary 
modal beliefs.  
This means that the starting assumption of the explanatory 
challenge, posed by the integration requirement, is suitable in the case 
of ordinary modal beliefs, but not in the case of extraordinary modal 
beliefs. I submit that for us to find a task with the setup of the 
integration challenge at all relevant, this starting assumption should 
appear somewhat plausible to us as a description of our actual 
epistemic satiation. If we do not think that the beliefs allegedly 
supported by such-and-such a method are reliable, there arguably is 
no need for explanation of the kind the integration requirement asks 
for. Only assuming the explanandum does a request for explanation 
arise. In short, the fact that some modal beliefs are generally contested 
makes it inappropriate to evaluate the methods that support them for 
reliability explanation. 
To be clear, it is not that we cannot evaluate a modal epistemology 
of extraordinary modal claims for integration. We certainly can. There 
is nothing that prevents us from assuming that a particular method is 
reliable and thus confers justification in the sense of reliability on 
extraordinary modal beliefs. We can assume just about anything for 
the sake of argument, even if we are not at all inclined to believe or 
accept it – as we do when we are constructing a reductio, for instance. 
It is rather that we do not seek an explanation because we are not 
convinced that the explanandum fact obtains, so it feels quite irrelevant 
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to do so. If we think there is general epistemic success in the sense of 
a lot of true beliefs, we want to know why, we want to describe and 
explain the workings of this great position we are in. It is a fact, as 
Field puts it, “so striking as to demand an explanation” if it obtains. 
But if we do not feel at all certain that we are typically reliable, there 
is no striking success to explain. 
That an assumption of general reliability does not appear right to 
us when it comes to certain modal matters and our beliefs thereof, 
does not mean that we never consider ourselves in some sense 
justified in making extraordinary modal claims. And it does not mean 
there is no interesting epistemological project to pursue in relation to 
these cases of modal belief.  
For instance, it needs to be elucidated in what sense we are justified 
in making certain extraordinary modal claims, and what method we 
rely on in doing so. Moreover, improvement of our epistemic situa-
tion may appear a pressing issue. If so, it will be suitable to engage in 
an ameliorative epistemological project, that can, in the long run, assist 
us in becoming better epistemic subjects and advance our epistemic 
positions.106 Thus, it will be good if the sense of justification relevant 
for extraordinary modal beliefs is able to provide us with guidance in 
settling on what to believe in other extraordinary matters. Pollock’s 
(1986) description of epistemology’s central question seems quite apt 
here (my emphasis):  
I have taken the fundamental problem of epistemology to be that of 
deciding what to believe. Epistemic justification (…) is concerned with this 
problem. (…) We might call this the ‘belief-guiding’ or the ‘reason-
guiding’ sense of justification (10). 
This sense of ‘justification’ as a tool for deciding what to believe is 
much more acutely relevant when we do not already think our 
epistemic situation is generally favourable, i.e. when we are not 
                                    
106 Philosophers who emphasise this perspective include Kvanvig (1992, chapter 7) 
on “genetic epistemology” which focuses on epistemic development over time, and 
Roberts and Wood (2007, 21-23) on “regulative epistemology” which “is a response 
to perceived deficiencies in people’s epistemic conduct, and thus is strongly practical 
and social”, in contrast to an attempt to, by analysis, produce a complete theory of 
knowledge or justification. See also Bishop and Trout (2005). 
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already sure about what to believe. We need guidance when we are 
insecure, of two minds, or in disagreement with each other. And this 
is precisely the case with extraordinary modal matters.  
In sum then, the integration challenge is an explanatory task that 
strikes us as relevant when it seems plausible enough to us that the 
method we are looking for, which supports beliefs about these mat-
ters, is reliably truth-conducive. That is, this is a relevant constraint 
on modal epistemologies that seek to account for the justification of 
beliefs we take to be reliable. But it is not a relevant constraint on 
modal epistemologies that seek to account for the justification of 
beliefs that we feel reluctant to assume to be reliable.  
 Whether or not the integration requirement is a constraint on 
modal epistemologies influences what turns out to be the right modal 
epistemology, since some modal epistemologies are rejected because 
they cannot meet the integration requirement. The ordi-
nary/extraordinary distinction pinpoints just the sort of difference 
between modal beliefs that matter to whether or not we will take the 
integration requirement to pose a relevant explanatory task. Hence, 
the lightweight difference between ordinary and extraordinary modal 
claims seems to matter to the question of what the right modal 
epistemology is (and in the long run, whether or not we should think 
there needs to be more than one).  
6.3. Lightweight but Strong Non-Uniformism 
I have suggested a lightweight understanding of the ordi-
nary/extraordinary distinction in terms of clusters of “sociological” 
properties, for reasons having to do with the distinction itself. As it 
turns out though, it is also not favourable from the modal empiricist’s 
point of view to go for a heavyweight, metaphysical interpretation of 
the distinction.  
To see this, recall that a modal empiricist who embraces non-
uniformism as supported by an argument from metaphysical hetero-
geneity, in order to avoid the Limitation Problem, is proposing a split 
of the integration challenge for modality. The reason empiricism 
cannot meet the integration challenge in relation to some modal facts 
is because these modal facts are metaphysically different from the 
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ones where empiricism can meet the integration challenge. So a modal 
epistemologist really faces two different integration challenges, and in 
order to avoid having to endorse partial modal scepticism she is 
committed to a non-empiricist modal epistemology that can also meet 
the integration requirement. This is all in order. But now consider 
someone107 who holds both that we need different modal 
epistemologies for abstracta and concreta, and different modal 
epistemologies for ordinary and extraordinary modal claims. Since the 
two distinctions cut across each other, she seems to be facing at least 
three integration challenges that might need to be met by different 
sorts of epistemologies.108 In order to avoid modal scepticism with 
respect to both abstracta and extraordinary claims about concreta, she is 
committed to at least two non-empiricist modal epistemologies being 
able to meet the integration requirement. I am not going to say one 
absolutely couldn’t pull this off, but it does seem a cumbersome 
commitment that threatens to weigh down the modal empiricist gone 
non-uniformist a bit.  
Luckily, the non-uniformist move only generates more integration 
challenges that need to be met if it is supported by an argument from 
metaphysical heterogeneity. If one proposes to split up the integration 
challenge for modality, one does so because one holds that there are 
two very different kinds of modal facts, on the metaphysical level. But 
as I explained in 6.1, I do not think the ordinary/extraordinary 
distinction tracks a deep, metaphysical difference, in which case there 
is nothing to drive an argument from metaphysical heterogeneity. All 
in all, we have reason to explore something else. First, because the 
ordinary/extraordinary distinction does not motivate metaphysical 
non-uniformism (because it is not a metaphysical distinction). Sec-
ond, even when regarded as a metaphysical distinction, it spells 
trouble for the modal empiricist gone non-uniformist.  
                                    
107 Roca-Royes (2017, 2018) tentatively gestures towards this sort of view, although 
while it is clear she envisions modal knowledge of both abstracta and concreta, she 
appears to remain somewhat undecided with respect to extraordinary modal 
knowledge. Still, she repeatedly mentions the possibility of “more than one fold” in 
our epistemology of modality.  
108 Assuming for the moment that we only need one modal epistemology for abstracta, 
which is far from clear. 
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What kind of non-uniformism can we get from the lightweight 
ordinary/extraordinary distinction then? I have already hinted at this 
in the previous section. There I suggested that different “sociological” 
properties like the ones pointed to by the ordinary/extraordinary 
distinction motivate us to undertake different epistemological 
projects, of which the integration challenge is not always a suitable 
part. The hope is to show how this distinction can motivate a non-
uniformist picture where there are two different modal epistemolog-
ical projects, and the integration requirement applies to one but not 
to the other. In particular, a modal epistemology that targets the 
justification of extraordinary modal beliefs does not need to meet the 
integration requirement, while a modal epistemology that targets 
justified ordinary modal beliefs does need to meet the integration 
requirement. The latter is important, because the modal empiricist still 
wants it to be a crucial advantage that her theory can meet the 
integration requirement, so a wholesale rejection of the integration 
requirement is not a good idea, as we already saw in chapter 5.  
The plan is to anchor this loose idea of different “interests” that 
motivate different epistemological projects to the notion of final 
epistemic value(s). The idea, in short, is as follows. Whether a modal 
belief is judged to be ordinary or extraordinary influences what sort 
of epistemological project we are interested in pursuing. An 
epistemological project is guided by some aim or other, an aim that 
can be understood in terms of an epistemic good or value, and 
different projects can be guided by different values. And what 
epistemic value we understand justification in terms of, influences 
what kind of modal epistemology will count as correct. I call the view 
to be explored here axiologically motivated non-uniformism, in 
contrast to the metaphysically motivated non-uniformism explored in 
previous chapters.  
6.4. Epistemic Value Pluralism 
In this section I am going to specify why and how what I call 
epistemic value pluralism can provide the background against which 
an argument for non-uniformism can be played out.  
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Up until now I have assumed truth monism to be correct. That is, 
I have worked under the assumption that true belief (and error 
avoidance, although I am going to drop out this latter clause for ease 
of expression in what follows) is the final epistemic good in relation 
to which we must understand justification. In the previous section I 
suggested that we should not understand non-uniformism along the 
ordinary/extraordinary distinction as a bifurcation of the integration 
challenge. Instead, we are looking for a way to restrict the integration 
requirement so that it only applies to some modal epistemologies. 
Since truth monism is the doctrine which drives the integration 
requirement, the natural move is to reject truth monism. Or rather, to 
reject the “monism” part of it.  
I said that truth monism is a rather powerful and popular doctrine 
in analytic epistemology. But it is certainly not mandatory, and there 
are alternatives. One is to remain a monist about epistemic value but 
replace true belief with another final epistemic good.109 This is not an 
option I will explore. Since the integration requirement is tied to the 
idea of truth as a final epistemic good, it would undermine the claim 
that being able to meet the integration requirement is a point in favour 
of modal empiricism. A more promising option is to be a pluralist 
about epistemic value, while keeping true belief as one of, but not the 
sole, final epistemic good.110 One would then have two different 
epistemic goods in relation to which justification can be understood, 
and then it seems at least prima face plausible that quite different 
theories might be correct.  
To be clear, I am not going to suggest that we should embrace 
epistemic value pluralism just in order to be able to avoid partial 
modal scepticism. I am merely arguing that if one is open to a view 
like this, one can use it to motivate non-uniformism along the ordi-
nary/extraordinary dimension. I am not going to argue for epistemic 
value pluralism, but I have not argued for truth monism either, only 
demonstrated the relationship between this doctrine and the integra-
                                    
109 Feldman (2002) might be an example of this. See Ahlström-Vij and Grimm (2013, 
336-338) for a critical discussion.  
110 In principle, it is of course possible to be a pluralist and accept multiple epistemic 
goods but deny that true belief is one of them. Again, that position will not be relevant 
to the current discussion.  
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tion requirement. Defending a general view of epistemic value is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
6.4.1. Another Isomorphism Assumption 
A key ingredient in an argument from heterogeneity is a plausible 
isomorphism assumption. An argument from metaphysical heteroge-
neity can only succeed if it is prima facie plausible that differences in 
the metaphysics are reflected on the level of epistemology (and then 
there is the further task of elucidating how the particular difference 
one is appealing to is epistemically relevant). But there are other 
things that plausibly also impact what the correct epistemology is. 
What I am suggesting here is that just as it is plausible that differences 
on the level of metaphysics will call for differences on the level of 
epistemological theorising, differences on the level of epistemic value 
will call for such differences too. That is, what theory of justification 
is correct depends not only on the metaphysics, but also on facts 
about epistemic goods. This is the isomorphism claim central to an 
argument from axiological heterogeneity. Actually, if you buy into the 
idea that the integration requirement is motivated by truth monism, 
you are already on this bandwagon. But in order to further bolster 
this quite general claim, it will be useful to consider an example.  
The example consists in a possible diagnosis of the long-winded 
and entrenched debate between internalists and externalists about 
epistemic justification. It is intended to illustrate how differences on 
what the epistemic good(s) are influence what sort of theory of 
justification seems appropriate. Internalists and externalists favour 
different accounts of what a justificatory method ought to be like. 
Internalism, as I understand it (which is a fairly standard way), is the 
view that a belief can only be justified in virtue of facts that are 
internal to the epistemic subject in the sense that the subject must 
have some cognitive access to them.111 Internalists then typically think 
that being justified requires having a coherent belief set, or behaving 
rationally and/or responsibly in response to evidence available to one, 
                                    
111 This is what is known as “access internalism”. An alternative view of what 
characterises internalism is the “mentalism” of Feldman and Conee (2001), where 
‘internal’ to the subject means, roughly, being a mental state of the subject. 
CHAPTER SIX 
185 
or similarly.112 Externalism is the denial of this thesis; some facts in 
virtue of which a belief is justified may be external in the sense that 
the subject does not have internal access to them. Externalists 
typically think that being justified requires using a method which 
reliably delivers true beliefs, or believing on the basis of evidence 
which is objectively indicating the truth of the belief.113  
It has often been observed that internalists and externalists arrive 
at their respective conclusions because they emphasise or care about 
different aspects or dimensions of a given epistemic situation (see e.g. 
Alston 2004; Vahid 1998, 2011). Externalists are concerned primarily 
with capturing the objective, third-personal dimension of an 
epistemic situation, such as what it is that ensures that there is an 
objectively “good match” between the belief and the world. 
Internalists mainly emphasise the importance of capturing the first-
personal, perspectival dimension of an epistemic situation. Indeed, 
many of the classical arguments in the internalism/externalism debate 
boil down to the claim that the theory on the receiving end of the 
criticism fails to do justice to some intuitions associated with the 
dimension of an epistemic situation promoted by the critic’s own 
preferred theory.114 
One way of understanding what is going on here is in terms of 
different epistemic goods. Someone who is mainly concerned with 
the objective dimension of an epistemic situation is naturally thought 
of as openly embracing truth monism and the associated 
instrumentalist view of justification, since whether or not some 
method is generally truth-conducive is an objective fact (and not one 
which lies within the epistemic subject’s ken). Now, it is certainly not 
                                    
112 For some paradigmatic internalist theories see the coherentism of BonJour (1985) 
and Lehrer (1986) and the internalist foundationalism of Chisholm (1966) and 
Fumerton (1995). 
113 For some paradigmatic externalist theories see the process reliabilism of Goldman 
(1979) or Bach (1985), the truth indicator theory of Swain (1981), the proper 
functionalism of Bergmann (2006), or the tracking theories of Dretske (1971) and 
Nozick (1981). 
114 Examples of this from the internalist side include BonJour’s (1980) clairvoyance 
cases and the New Evil Demon case due to Cohen (1984). Externalist arguments 
press the intuition that justification must be truth-conducive in various ways. 
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the case that internalists typically deny truth monism. For instance, 
BonJour, at the time a prominent coherentist internalist, writes that  
any sort of justification which is not (…) truth-conducive would be 
simply irrelevant to the standpoint of cognition (1985, 157).  
Similarly, Lehrer – also a coherentist internalist – writes that  
the objective of justification, to wit, [is] accepting something if and only 
if it is true (1990, 82). 
But internalists who are truth monists certainly face a difficulty in 
trying to square the requirement that justification must be truth-
conducive with the requirement that it must be internally accessible. 
This is a well-known difficulty that internalists wrestle with (cf. 
Madison 2010, 846; Schantz 2004, 5-6). And it certainly seems to be 
the case that internalists must be motivated by something different than 
externalists, given the emphasis they place on the first-personal aspect 
of justification. In terms of epistemic goods, internalists take some-
thing other than true belief – whether in addition to or instead of it – 
to be an epistemic good, and it is that other good which motivates the 
accessibility-condition they place on justification. Take coherence, 
which is a typical example of an internalist condition of justificatory 
methods. Why might that seem to be a suitable characterisation of 
what it takes to be justified? Well, perhaps because coherence could 
be argued to satisfy the twin aims of truth-conduciveness and, say, 
internal rationality (or whatever other good motivates the internalist 
accessibility-requirement). If you take only true belief to be a final 
epistemic good, there is little reason to look for something which is 
internally accessible, and hence reliabilism or a truth-tracking theory 
will seem like a good way to characterise justification.  
6.4.2. Disjunctive Epistemic Value Pluralism 
In the previous subsection I argued that differences on the level of 
epistemic value impacts what will seem like a good move on the level 
of first-order theorising about justification. Now, the idea is that if 
there is a plurality of final epistemic values in terms of which we may 
understand justification, this can plausibly result in quite different 
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theories of justification both being correct. This is a potential road to 
non-uniformism. But in order for it to be so, the epistemic value 
pluralism needed here is a disjunctive one. This is important to stress 
because the claim that we value true beliefs and that we also value 
beliefs that relate to some other epistemic good is compatible with a 
view according to which a method must be related to both values in 
order for it to count as justificatory, even if the two aims are 
independently valuable.  
Indeed, that (assuming we accept the construal in terms of 
different epistemic aims) might be the way many internalists, such as 
e.g. BonJour, have conceived of the situation. That is, they hold that 
something is justificatory only if it is related to both truth and some 
other epistemic good which licences the accessibility-requirement. 
That sort of view seems wholly unhelpful for current purposes, 
whatever the other epistemic good is taken to be. What is required is 
an epistemic value pluralism and a corresponding understanding of 
justification according to which a method might be justificatory 
because it relates to either one of the final epistemic goods.  
Interestingly, some authors have flirted with a more careful version 
of this idea in response to the long-winded internalism/externalism 
debate. Noting that both sides capture something interesting and 
relevant in its own right about how we conceive of the nature of 
justification, they suggest what is in effect a bifurcation of the concept 
of justification. Most prominently perhaps, Alvin Goldman, in one of 
his conciliatory streaks, suggests that we should distinguish between 
“strong” and “weak” justification. Roughly, a belief is justified in the 
weak sense “as long as it is blameless or nonculpable” (1988, 56), and 
justified in the strong sense if it is formed through a reliable process. 
Only the latter is obviously in virtue of being truth-conducive. Others 
have also gone along with the prising apart of two senses in which a 
belief can be justified, such as Keith Lehrer who contrasts “verific 
justification” with “personal justification” (Lehrer and Cohen 1983, 
194), and Ernest Sosa (1991) who suggest we distinguish between 
“aptness” of a belief and “justification” of a belief. With Sosa 
however, “justification” involves aptness plus something more, and 
that is precisely what will not help here. Here we need the disjunctive 
view where two senses of justification are distinguished, such that one 
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can be justified in one sense without being justified in the other, and 
this goes both ways.115  
The view on epistemic value I have sketched here can be 
summarised as follows. There are two senses or forms of justification, 
both of them epistemically valuable, but in virtue of being related to 
distinct final epistemic goods. A belief can thus be justified either 
because it is supported by a method which is truth-conducive or 
because it is supported by a method which is conducive to some other 
epistemic good. If we are enquiring whether a particular method m is 
capable of conferring justification on a belief, the answer might be: 
“yes and no depending on what sense of ‘justification’ you have in 
mind”. For instance, if one has in mind justificatory qua truth-
conducive, the answer might be “no”, but if one has in mind 
justificatory qua conducive to the other epistemic good, the answer 
might be “yes”. And for a distinct and potentially very different 
method n, it might be justificatory qua truth-conducive but not qua 
conducive to the other epistemic good. Given this, one is allowed to 
say that both m and n are justificatory methods, and that a belief based 
on m is justified, and a belief based on n is also justified – albeit in 
virtue of different epistemic goods. Note though that we do not need 
anything as strong as an exclusive disjunctive epistemic value pluralism. 
In theory, a given method can certainly be justified in both senses, in 
virtue of being favourably related to both final epistemic goods. 
6.4.3. An Argument from Axiological Heterogeneity 
I have provided the contours of a view on epistemic value that one 
might hold – disjunctive epistemic value pluralism – and demon-
strated how this impacts first-order theories of justification. If one is 
open to a pluralistic view somewhere in the neighbourhood of this, it 
can help form the basis for an argument from axiological heterogeneity 
                                    
115 For Goldman, a strongly justified belief is always weakly justified since being 
reliably formed and not undermined entails being blameless, in his view. But that is a 
different thing and not problematic per se from the current perspective. Similarly, for 
Lehrer, verific justification presupposes personal justification. Again, no problem 
from my present point of view – what is important here is the notion of a form of 
justification that is not to be understood in terms of truth-conduciveness.  
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for a version of strong non-uniformism. Let me clarify just how that 
works. 
In chapter 4, I tied SNU and the argument from heterogeneity very 
intimately to the idea that the modal realm is metaphysically non-
uniform, and epistemology needs to follow suit. Now we can instead 
plug in a non-uniform picture of epistemic value, and the isomor-
phism assumption that what the epistemic value(s) are influences 
what first-order modal epistemologies will be correct. Instead of 
anchoring non-uniformism in a thesis about modal metaphysics, it is 
anchored in a thesis about epistemic value. The resulting picture is a 
version of SNU in the following sense. For one, the non-uniformist 
thesis is still that we should expect more than one modal epistemol-
ogy to be correct. Not because modal reality is heterogeneous, mind, 
but because there is more than one final epistemic good and we hold 
theories to different standards, expect different things of them, 
depending on what the relevant epistemic good is. For another, the 
non-uniformist claim resulting from this sort of argument would still 
be normative, and in principle prior to any particular modal 
epistemology. 
Still, while strong, a non-uniformist claim supported in this way is 
distinctively more lightweight in the sense that no assumptions about 
modal metaphysics enter into the case for non-uniformism.116 This 
lightweight character of the non-uniformist thesis matches the light-
weight understanding of the ordinary/extraordinary distinction.  
Of course, as far as providing this kind of argument from axiolog-
ical heterogeneity in favour of a non-uniformism along the 
ordinary/extraordinary distinction goes, everything remains to be 
done. It must be argued that the ordinary/extraordinary distinction 
marks a difference in epistemic values which in turn motivates differ-
ent modal epistemologies. I spend the rest of this chapter outlining 
this kind of argument.  
                                    
116 Of course, it will enter into the epistemology of modality insofar as true modal 
belief is in some cases at least a relevant epistemic good and we care about integration, 
but it is not part of the case for non-uniformism. 
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6.5. Axiological Heterogeneity Along the 
Ordinary/Extraordinary Distinction 
The aim of this section is to outline an argument from axiological 
heterogeneity for non-uniformism along the ordinary/extraordinary 
distinction. There are several pieces needed to complete this puzzle. 
It needs to be argued that the ordinary/extraordinary distinction, 
understood as a distinction between certain generally uncontested and 
contested modal claims marks a difference in epistemic value. That is, 
it must be argued that different epistemic goods govern our theorising 
about justification when it comes to ordinary and extraordinary modal 
claims, respectively. That true belief is the relevant epistemic aim for 
ordinary modal belief is the hypothesis, although we still need some 
reason to think that this is indeed the case. But there also needs to be 
some idea about what epistemic value, if not true belief, could be the 
relevant one for extraordinary modal claims.117 I begin with 
presenting my candidate for this in 6.5.1 and 6.5.2.  
6.5.1. If Not Truth, Then What? 
Where to look for a complementary final epistemic good in addition 
to true belief? A useful place to start is among the many complaints 
and concerns that have been raised in response to truth monism and 
the related focus on reliability as the central concept for epistemic 
evaluation. Internalists about justification are behind one of the main 
attacks on that picture, as we have already seen, urging that 
justification must be accessible or available to the epistemic subject 
who holds the belief in question. I suggested one might understand 
this in terms of being motivated by an additional epistemic good, 
from which the accessibility criterion flows.  
A candidate epistemic good in terms of which this can be made 
sense of is epistemic responsibility. The idea would be that epistemically 
responsible conduct is also a final epistemic good. The reasoning, 
                                    
117 Lam (2017) is the only example I am aware of, of someone who argues against 
truth monism and the associated conception of justification in the context of the 
epistemology of modality (quite generally, not in relation to any particular subclass of 
modal beliefs). However, he offers no alternative to the truth-aim and no clear 
alternative conception of justification. 
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from an internalist perspective, would then be something like this. 
Epistemic subject S should only be held responsible in relation to 
what S ought to believe, and S ought to believe only what she is 
justified in believing. But ought implies can, and S can only take into 
account facts that are accessible to her, so what S ought to believe, 
and hence what S is justified in believing, can only be understood in 
relation to what is accessible to her. Hence, the accessibility criterion.  
It has been questioned whether the notion of an epistemic 
obligation implies the accessibility criterion (e.g. Goldman 1980), but 
the prospects of access internalism are not important to the current 
discussion. The important thing now is the idea of epistemic 
responsibility as an interesting and relevant additional epistemic good. 
To this end one may also note that the notion of epistemic 
responsibility is emphasised by others who claim to offer an 
alternative to classic reliabilism about justification, such as virtue 
epistemologists118 and others who feel strongly for the idea that 
epistemology is a normative discipline, concerned with rights, duties, 
obligations, requirements, blame(lessness) and (non)culpability but 
think this is not sufficiently captured by a focus on mere truth-
conduciveness. 
I am going to explore the pluralistic idea that the two final 
epistemic goods are true beliefs and responsible epistemic conduct. 
That is, we value (from an epistemic point of view) true beliefs and 
we value epistemically responsibly formed and sustained beliefs 
(whether or not they are true).  
In itself, the notion of ‘epistemic responsibility’ can appear to be 
something of an empty vessel, meaning that there are several ways to 
cash out what it involves. In order for it to be of any use here, of 
course, this cannot be done in terms of truth-conduciveness, because 
what is required is an epistemic good that does not have its value 
derivatively of the epistemic value of true beliefs. One option is to try 
                                    
118 In particular virtue epistemologists belonging to the strain which Axtell (1997) calls 
“virtue responsibilism”, such as Lorraine Code (1987), James Montmarquet (1992) 
and Linda Zagzebski (1996) (in contrast to virtue reliabilism as defended, most 
notably, by Ernest Sosa, see e.g. the papers collected in his (1991)). Note though that 
virtue epistemology in this sense does not necessarily, or even commonly, involve the 
rejection of truth as the ultimate aim of enquiry.  
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and plug in the notion of internal coherence119, so that it is 
epistemically responsible to believe that which is coherent with one’s 
other doxastic states. I will not go for that option here.120 Instead, I 
draw on a different point, namely the social nature of epistemology’s 
subject matter.121  
Every now and then, some philosopher will stress the importance 
of proceeding from the fact that epistemic phenomena are social 
phenomena (cf. Fricker 2007; Goldberg 2010; Kawall 2002; Kvanvig 
1992, chapter 7; Longino 2002; Morton 2012), and it is sometimes 
complained that this is neglected by much of mainstream 
epistemology, with its synchronic and individualistic focus on 
determining whether a subject s is justified in holding some particular 
belief b at some one particular time t. Of course, social epistemology 
is a rapidly growing research field so this neglect is far from 
ubiquitous. The social aspect of epistemology’s study objects comes 
out in a number of different ways. For instance, epistemic subjects 
often commit to a sort of common project to which they (hope to) 
contribute (e.g. advancing science), and we value knowledge that is 
new to a community more than knowledge that is just new to one 
individual, which indicates that not only individual epistemic subjects’ 
belief-sets ought to be of interest to the epistemologist. Moreover, we 
value abilities to spread and transmit knowledge to other epistemic 
subjects, and so on. Far from being interesting primarily in isolation 
from one another epistemic subjects are very much embedded in 
social contexts and practices of various sorts – in epistemic communities 
– and this likely shapes the phenomena that epistemologists are 
interested in studying.  
In a community, you cannot just do whatever you like at all times. 
Social contexts are infused by, amongst other things, rights and 
                                    
119 There are different ways of understanding what ‘coherence’ requires. It might be 
mere logical consistency, but the more interesting coherence accounts of justification 
tend to require something much stronger; that beliefs in a coherent set to some degree 
mutually support one another, cf. for instance C. I. Lewis’ term “congruence” (1946, 
338) and Roderick Chisholm’s “concurrence” (1966, ch. 3). 
120 See e.g. Kornblith (1983) for criticism.  
121 This is not in itself incompatible with a reliabilist approach, although reliabilism 
tends to have an individualistic focus. See e.g. Goldberg (2010) for discussion.  
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obligations, things you owe to others as well as to yourself, and things 
others owe to you. That is true of epistemic communities too. That is 
to say, some obligations are plausibly epistemic obligations. Epistemic 
obligations might involve knowing certain things or having certain 
evidence, defending and giving reasons for one’s beliefs, collecting 
(additional) evidence for some beliefs, examining one’s motives in 
defending this or that belief, testifying honestly to other epistemic 
subjects, take into account other subjects’ comments on our 
reasoning or evidence, checking a belief for coherence with one’s 
other beliefs, and so on. That is not supposed to be anything like a 
complete or non-negotiable list, more like a bunch of examples. 
The idea, in short, is that epistemically responsible conduct is to 
be understood in terms of complying with one’s epistemic 
obligations. The claim that epistemically responsible conduct is a final 
epistemic value can thus be read as the claim that it is finally 
epistemically valuable to comply with one’s epistemic obligations.  
What epistemic obligations do we have then, the above provisional 
list of examples aside? Rather than looking for a complete list, we 
should note two important things about epistemic obligations. First, 
that what is required for responsible epistemic conduct may vary 
between contexts, i.e. one does not have all epistemic obligations at 
all times just in virtue of being an epistemic agent (cf. Roberts and 
Wood 2007, 41-42). Some may be activated only under circumstances 
when one’s belief is challenged, or when one is in a particular context 
such as a courtroom or a philosophy seminar. Second, social contexts 
involve various social roles. Some obligations that we have are 
associated with particular social roles. This idea of connecting 
obligations with social roles should be familiar – think for instance of 
the specific duties that come with being a parent or a police officer. 
Again, some obligations specific to a role might also be epistemic in 
nature, and some social roles might be more saliently characterised by 
epistemic obligations than others. A GP is under the obligation to 
know how to recognise and treat certain health conditions; a barrister 
is supposed to be aware of (relevant parts of) the law; when I accept 
to teach an undergraduate class on the metaphysics of time, I am 
obliged to be familiar with and have sufficient understanding of the 
central research questions and main positions in that philosophical 
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debate. In short, there might be general epistemic obligations we have 
just in virtue of being epistemic agents (associated with the role of 
‘epistemic agent’ quite generally, if you will) but that may be 
“activated” only under particular circumstances, and there might be 
epistemic obligations specifically tied to a social role, that are 
“activated” when this role is taken on or accepted.  
In light of these two points, the idea can be made more precise in 
the following way. Epistemically responsible conduct is to be under-
stood in terms of complying with one’s epistemic obligations as 
applicable in the relevant context (circumstantial and/or role-
specific). Justification, in turn, can be understood in terms of this 
epistemically responsible conduct. That is, one is justified in holding 
a belief if one has behaved responsibly, epistemically speaking – i.e. 
complied with relevant epistemic obligations – in forming/sustaining 
it.  
I hope this initial sketch makes enough sense. In the next subsec-
tion I will introduce what I take to be a potentially interesting way to 
say a little bit more about what sort of epistemic obligations one might 
need to fulfil in order to be justified in making an extraordinary modal 
claim. But the central suggestion here is that the twin epistemic goods 
are true beliefs and epistemically responsible conduct in agents, and 
that a method might be justificatory because it relates to either one of 
the final epistemic goods. That is, a method might be justificatory in 
virtue of being conducive to true modal belief or in virtue of being 
part of responsible epistemic conduct.122 This suggestion is independ-
ent of the particular way of cashing out ‘epistemic obligations’ below.  
6.5.2. The Context of Extraordinary Modal Claims  
One way to view the epistemic obligations involved in making an 
extraordinary modal claim, is in terms of what I will call intersubjective 
justification. It is an interesting approach in the current context for 
several reasons which I will get to shortly, but it also dovetails nicely 
with my point of departure above: the social nature of many things 
that epistemology ought to cover. The notion of ‘intersubjective 
                                    
122 It is most natural to think of this in terms of one consequentialist (truth 
conducive) and one procedural, or deontological (responsible), sense of justification. 
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justification’ is inspired by two separate, although very similar, ideas 
from moral philosophy on the one hand and political philosophy on 
the other.123, 124  
In the moral case, Scanlon (1998), but also e.g. Darwall (2005), 
have put forward theses to the effect that morality is a matter of 
justifying one’s actions to other agents. Acting morally is understood 
in terms of being able to recognise the need for, and offer, 
justification (Scanlon) or “second-personal reasons” (Darwall) for 
one’s actions to others. And, importantly, the relevant justification 
one owes of one’s actions is of a special kind: it needs to appeal to 
principles no one can reasonably reject.  
In the political case, there is a major strain in the literature on 
justice, proposing we understand justice in terms of “public reason” 
or “public justification” (cf. Forst 2011; Gaus 2011; Rawls [1993] 
2005). The basic idea is that a moral or political rule can only be justly 
imposed on a community if it can be “publicly” justified, i.e. if it is 
licenced by arguments or principles acceptable to each reasonable 
person in that community.  
Slightly simplified, to be morally justified in φ-ing is to recognise 
the need for and be able to offer reasons for φ-ing that others cannot 
reasonably reject; for political rule r to be justifiably imposed on a 
community c, r must be supported by reasons that all reasonable 
members of c can accept. That there are affinities here should be fairly 
obvious. What I find interesting is the understanding of ‘being 
justified’ in terms of recognition for and ability to provide reasons 
that other subjects can reasonably accept – a view on which justification has 
a distinctively social nature as something that partly depends on and 
relates to others. I am going to refer to this as intersubjective 
justification.125  
                                    
123 See e.g. Freeman (2007) for a discussion of how the public reason tradition in 
political philosophy and the contractarian approach to morality of e.g. Scanlon 
compares.  
124 Analogies between moral philosophy and epistemology are common, so this is not 
a strange place to look. 
125 This in order to avoid the more specific thesis associated with “public” 
justification, that is supposed to apply only under particular circumstances having to 
do with e.g. political justice or similarly.  
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Adapting this idea to the case of epistemic obligations involved in 
holding an extraordinary modal belief would yield something like the 
following. One’s epistemic obligations relevant to holding an extraor-
dinary modal belief b involve (implicitly or explicitly) recognising the 
need for and being able to offer reasons in support of b that are 
acceptable to other reasonable epistemic subjects. If one has fulfilled 
those epistemic obligations, one is justified in holding b.  
This is an interesting approach to spelling out which epistemic 
obligations are relevant for extraordinary modal beliefs, because there 
are several similarities between extraordinary modal claims and the 
contexts in which they typically occur on the one hand, and political 
or moral contexts on the other. These similarities are taken to 
motivate an intersubjective justification doctrine in the moral and 
political cases, and might help do so in the case of extraordinary 
modal matters too.  
First, a cornerstone of motivating public justification theses is the 
recognition of so-called reasonable pluralism or reasonable 
disagreement (Quong 2018; cf. Rawls [1993] 2005, 36-37, 55-57). 
Reasonable disagreement means that rational and/or reasonable 
people will disagree, in a deep and intractable sense that is not due to 
e.g. prejudice or preoccupation with self-interest, about a number of 
moral, political, and other philosophically interesting matters. It is 
also a characteristic of extraordinary modal matters that there is 
persistent disagreement about them, between what we must assume 
are reasonable epistemic agents earnestly engaged in intellectual 
debate.  
Second, and relatedly, for e.g. Rawls the practice of public 
justification doctrine is explicitly independent of questions of moral 
truth. Faced with persistent reasonable disagreement, and no 
independent means of checking what is truly just, we need a method 
independent of truth to adjudicate between claims, and that is where 
public justification comes in. This is interesting from the current 
perspective of a disjunctive epistemic pluralism, where it is required 
that epistemically responsible conduct is valuable independently of 
any connection with truth. Additionally, there is, again, persistent 
disagreement regarding extraordinary modal matters, and so a similar 
need arises if we want to make headway.  
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Third, some additional ways in which the intersubjective justifica-
tion approach in morality and/or political philosophy has been 
motivated can be nicely translated to fit the current project.126 For 
example, there is a popular approach that appeals to the nature of 
moral and/or political discourse. Taking on the obligation to justify 
oneself in these intersubjective terms is part of what it is to engage in 
moral/political discourse, it is suggested. Similarly, Habermas (e.g. 
1996) is often construed as proposing that taking on the obligation to 
justify oneself in intersubjective terms, is part of what it is to be a 
rational127 agent, and Forst (2011, 1-3), starts his case for public justi-
fication from the idea that human beings are essentially “justificatory 
beings”. The axiological non-uniformist does not need to embrace 
such ambitious claims about what it is to be human or rational, 
however. The analogous claim she would need is that having 
obligations to (be able to) provide intersubjective justification for a 
claim is part of what it is to be an epistemic agent in the sort of context where 
extraordinary modal claims are typically made; or, recognising and 
taking on these obligations is part of what it is to engage in the forms 
of discourse where extraordinary modal claims are typically made. 
And this I think is quite plausible, especially when we consider the 
discourses or contexts where extraordinary modal claims are made.  
Paradigmatically extraordinary modal claims virtually only occur in 
a particular sort of context, namely philosophical – or at least 
academic – contexts.128 Ordinary modal claims, in contrast, are made 
                                    
126 See e.g. Quong (2018) for an overview of ways to motivate a public reason 
doctrine.  
127 Note that the most central figure in this tradition, Rawls, forcefully distinguishes 
between “rational” and “reasonable”, see e.g. (Rawls [1993] 2005, lecture II, sec. 1). 
128 Talk about the possibility of gunk or the metaphysical necessity of water’s chemical 
makeup is presumably rare outside our seminar rooms. But do not other academics 
and scientists discuss some extraordinary modal claims? For instance, what about 
scientists who discuss the possibility of, say, using CRISPR to resurrect the woolly 
mammoth from extinction? First, it is not obvious that scientists are then interested 
in the principled possibility of this as much as the nomological or technical possibility. 
But assuming that they are discussing whether it would be possible in some 
unrestricted sense, I suggest that what they are doing is very much like what 
philosophers are doing, and the context they “create” by having this discussion is very 
much like a philosophical context.  
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by all sorts of people in all sorts of much more epistemically relaxed 
social roles and contexts.129 Philosophical, or otherwise academic, 
contexts are populated by people in a particular role, i.e. the role of 
an academic. That social role, if any, is shot through with distinctively 
epistemic obligations, obligations that we are familiar with and that 
plausibly involve something like being able to provide intersubjective 
justification for the philosophically interesting and substantial claims 
one makes.  
Another, although much less explored, approach seeks to motivate 
a public reason doctrine by arguing that the obligation and right to 
intersubjective justification is an important constitutive part of a form 
of valuable relationship of mutual respect (e.g. “civic friendship”) or 
of membership in a (political, moral) community more generally 
(Leland and van Wietmarschen 2017; Rawls [1971] 1999, 5; [1993] 
2005, xlix). This could also translate nicely to the case of epistemic 
obligations relevant to making extraordinary modal claims. I find it 
plausible that certain epistemic duties are constitutive of the 
relationship between fellow academics engaged in debate or 
discussion (somewhat similar to the notion of civic friendship and 
how it relates to public justification in political philosophy).  
Now, any one of these ways to motivate an understanding the 
obligations relevant to making an extraordinary modal claim, in terms 
of intersubjective justification, would need to be spelled out in much 
more detail in order to be convincing. I will not do that here. But if 
the epistemic obligations related to extraordinary modal beliefs 
involve giving intersubjective reasons, that would tell us some 
interesting things. For instance, justificatory reasons need to be 
accessible to the epistemic agent who holds the belief, but also 
articulatable so that others can assess them. Coherence might play a 
part too – in one’s own and/or in a more “common” belief-corpus. I 
am not going to defend or commit to the intersubjective justification 
track here. I merely note that this is a way of cashing out the epistemic 
duties associated with extraordinary modal claims, and an interesting 
one too, which merits serious further exploration in the future.  
                                    
129 To be sure, ordinary modal claims occur in philosophical contexts too – the point 
is that extraordinary modal claims occur virtually only in these contexts. 
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6.5.3. The (Ir)relevance of Epistemic Responsibility 
The picture we are working with is this. There are two separate final 
epistemic goods – true belief and epistemically responsible conduct – 
in terms of which we may understand ‘justification’. Now it is time to 
really hook up the ordinary/extraordinary distinction to this. In 
particular, it needs to be hooked up in a manner that yields the 
following result: when we consider the justification of extraordinary 
modal belief, the relevant epistemic good is epistemically responsible 
conduct, but when we consider the justification of ordinary modal 
belief the relevant epistemic good is true belief.  
This task can be divided into two parts for clarificatory purposes, 
where the initial step involves arguing that epistemically responsible 
conduct is the aim primarily relevant for extraordinary modal enquiry, 
but not so much when it comes to ordinary modal matters. I attend 
to this in the current subsection. The subsequent step is, I believe, a 
bit more challenging. It involves arguing that true belief is not a salient 
aim for extraordinary modal enquiry while it is for ordinary modal 
enquiry, and I turn to that in 6.5.4 below.  
Actually, I already did a bit to make plausible that it is useful to 
think of the justification of extraordinary modal beliefs in terms of 
epistemic obligations in 6.5.2, where I suggested a particularly 
interesting way of understanding the obligations involved. These 
reasons largely drew on the kind of context or discourse in which 
extraordinary modal claims typically occur. In this section, I will give 
four additional arguments. They all proceed from observations about 
the consequences of understanding ‘justification’ in terms of 
epistemic responsibility. Some of these are stressed by critics of 
general theories of justification that appeal to responsibility. My 
strategy is to show that even if these critical points are essentially right, 
they are only troublesome if justification is always to be understood in 
terms of epistemic responsibility. On a non-uniformist picture, they 
are not problematic. Quite to the contrary; these points reinforce the 
suitability of understanding justification of extraordinary but not 
ordinary modal beliefs in terms of epistemically responsible conduct. 
First argument: In some cases of justified belief it does not make 
sense to speak of epistemically responsible conduct. That is, it appears 
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one can be justified without having recognised or fulfilled any 
epistemic obligations. As e.g. Roberts and Wood (2007, 41) remark,  
[i]t does not make sense to speak of intellectual duties in every case of 
knowledge. In knowing that the lights have gone out, by virtue of 
having open, properly functioning eyes in a room where the lights have 
just gone out, it seems a stretch to say that I have fulfilled any 
obligation.  
Many of 20th century mainstream epistemology’s favourite cases 
appear to be like this. They concern the justification of things like the 
belief that there is a barn in front of one, or the belief that one’s wife 
is at home. The message one is supposed to take from this remark is: 
it is not appropriate to understand justification in terms of epistemic 
obligations. Understanding justification in terms of e.g. truth-
conducive methods, like reliabilists do, seems much more suitable. 
However, our intellectual life is (thankfully!) not limited to beliefs 
of that very basic kind, and neither can epistemology be limited to the 
study of such beliefs. And once we move up the ladder to more 
sophisticated and complex enquiry, we will need to bring in more 
reflexively demanding conditions that lend themselves nicely to talk 
in terms of epistemic obligations and responsible conduct. This has 
been pointed out by e.g. virtue epistemologists of the “responsibilist” 
kind (cf. my footnote 118, p. 191) who emphasise the importance of 
so-called “trait-virtues” (e.g. epistemic conscientiousness, intellectual 
perseverance) in addition to “faculty-virtues” (e.g. excellent percep-
tion or good memory), especially in accounting for the more 
sophisticated part of our intellectual achievements (see also Baehr 
2006). Roberts and Wood (2007) also take care to note the diversity 
of intellectual life, and the importance of analysing some of it in terms 
of e.g. epistemic obligations.  
The upshot is that while the initial, critical remark is true – it is not 
appropriate to understand all cases of justification in terms of 
epistemically responsible conduct – this is only a problem for theories 
that claim that justification always involves epistemically responsible 
conduct on behalf of the believer. Moreover, as I pointed out, it is 
also problematic to think that it never does. Rather, in some cases we 
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do need that notion in order to capture what is going on, in others we 
do not.  
This, in turn, can be made into an argument that supports the claim 
that justification of ordinary and extraordinary modal claims 
respectively should be understood in relation to different epistemic 
values. Extraordinary modal claims arguably fall on the side of more 
sophisticated enquiry, where we do need to understand justification 
in terms of epistemically responsible conduct. One way to see this is 
to think about what it means to make a claim about a contested 
matter. It is difficult to get away with making e.g. the claim that “It is 
possible that the laws of nature could have been different”, in the 
sense that other epistemic agents will not easily grant you knowledge 
or justified belief in this. They will assume that you are able to present 
reasons for thinking so, and if you should fail to present such reasons 
when challenged to do so, they will probably not grant that you are 
justified in making the claim. In short, there are certain things, 
epistemically speaking, that your epistemic peers will expect of you in 
order for a claim like that to count as justified. Talk of obligations 
captures this nicely.  
But it is much less called for with ordinary modal claims, as they 
are generally uncontested. One thing that this means is that it is 
comparatively easy to get away with claiming that <This mare could 
possibly have another foal>. I take it that people will typically not 
inquire into your reasons for believing this (unless there is some 
particular reason for doubt in a specific case). In fact, even if you fail 
to come up with some good reasons in support of your modal claim, 
they might maintain that you are justified in believing it; they might 
even still be inclined to say that you know. This situation is rather apt 
to be captured in terms of having formed this belief in some reliably 
truth-conducive way or other that we as theorists might want to 
explain, but that the epistemic subject making the claim need not take 
any notice of.  
Second argument: justified beliefs are possessed by a rather wide 
range of cognisers, including less sophisticated ones like small chil-
dren or animals. But such cognisers lack reflective abilities, and so 
they cannot be said to have or fulfil any epistemic obligations in any 
interesting sense of the word. It even seems inappropriate to speak of 
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them as occupying the role of epistemic agents (hence “cognisers”). 
If justification is understood in terms of epistemically responsible 
conduct, being justified is implausibly demanding since it renders 
some who clearly have justified beliefs unjustified. 
This too is a point often raised against attempts to analyse 
justification in terms of epistemically responsible conduct. The 
intended conclusion is that justification must involve something else, 
something requiring less reflective abilities. For instance, it might 
involve possessing some cognitive machinery that reliably connects 
one to the world in the right way. This can all be carried over to modal 
justification since it is not implausible that small children or even 
animals, have some modal knowledge. For instance, we might want 
to say that a four-year old knows whether it is possible for them to 
reach the mug or for an item to break, that a cat knows whether it is 
possible for it to climb that tree in the back-garden when chased by 
the neighbours’ dog. 
But since we are currently operating with the idea that there are 
two senses of justification, we can grant this and turn it into a point 
in favour of the claim to be defended here. We can recognise that 
some cases of modal justification do not involve epistemic 
responsibility, while others do, and point to the fact that the sort of 
justified beliefs attributable to unsophisticated cognisers will be 
ordinary modal beliefs. So, for ordinary modal beliefs, the relevant 
sense of justification should not appeal to epistemically responsible 
conduct. In contrast, however, for extraordinary modal beliefs, it 
seems exactly right to reserve justification for high-level cognisers 
capable of donning the role of epistemic agent with certain epistemic 
duties to be fulfilled. It is, I think, very much in line with our intuitions 
that animals, small children or even some random person on the 
street lack justified beliefs about extraordinary modal matters. Quite 
plausibly, most people have no beliefs one way or the other with 
respect to many extraordinary matters at all, let alone justified ones. 
The result that justified extraordinary modal beliefs are exclusive to 
quite advanced cognisers is just what we would have expected. 
Third argument: talk of epistemic obligations and epistemic 
responsibility imply doxastic voluntarism. The doctrine of doxastic 
voluntarism assumes that we as epistemic agents can decide what to 
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believe. But doxastic voluntarism is implausible. We typically cannot 
decide what to believe, and since it is widely supposed that “ought 
implies can” and we cannot decide whether we are to believe p or not, 
it is inappropriate to say that one ought to believe that p, or that one 
is blameworthy in believing that p, and so on (Alston 1989 has an 
influential version of an argument along these lines).  
Again, this is supposed to make us reject attempts to understand 
justification in terms of epistemically responsible conduct. To begin 
with, it is far from uncontroversial that there really is an implication 
relation between talk of epistemic responsibility and doxastic 
voluntarism (see e.g. Adams 1985; Hieronymi 2008; Smith 2005 for 
discussion). But even if there is, we can grant the point while turning 
it into an argument for the bifurcation of the notion of ‘modal 
justification’ that the non-uniformist wants. Because while doxastic 
voluntarism is implausible as a general claim about how we form and 
sustain beliefs, it is much less implausible when considered only in 
relation to extraordinary modal beliefs. It seems right that there is a 
sense in which I cannot decide whether to believe e.g. that it is 
metaphysically possible for my phone screen to break, but it seems 
much more plausible that I can decide what to believe with respect to, 
e.g. whether it is possible for there to exist an extended simple. 
Extraordinary modal claims do not force themselves upon us as true 
in the way ordinary modal claims might (Leon (2017, 247-248) also 
notes this difference in “doxastic force”). Rather, the picture where 
we might deliberate and then decide whether or not to accept an 
extraordinary modal claim into our belief corpus appears fairly 
accurate. So even if it is true that talk of epistemic responsibility 
implies doxastic voluntarism, it is not a problem, since this talk is 
limited to extraordinary modal beliefs, and in those cases doxastic 
voluntarism is more plausible.130 
                                    
130 An alternative way to make sense of the difference in doxastic force would be to 
say that ordinary modal claims are typically believed while extraordinary modal claims 
are, if anything, accepted. See Van Fraassen (1980, 12-13) for a notion of ‘acceptance’ 
(of, in his case, scientific theories) that incidentally chimes very well with the 
intersubjective justification picture sketched in 6.5.1 and 6.5.2. See Tuomela (2000) 
for discussion of the difference between belief and acceptance more generally. 
MODAL EMPIRICISM MADE DIFFICULT 
204 
My fourth argument is a little different. Rather than turning a 
negative point against responsibility-accounts of justification into a 
positive one for non-uniformism, I wish to indicate how an account 
of justification in terms of epistemic obligations suits the kind of 
epistemic project that extraordinary modal claims seem to call for. I 
noted that the explanatory challenge, imposed on a theory of modal 
justification by the integration requirement, only comes out as 
appropriate when we consider modal beliefs to be reliable. If we do 
not think they are, there is nothing to explain. Arguably, given that 
extraordinary modal claims are generally contested, we think the latter 
is the case for them. But again, that does not necessarily mean there 
are no justified extraordinary modal claims. It is just that they need to 
be theorised about in a different way, with a different aim. I indicated 
that a suitable sense of ‘justification’ in these cases should be one that 
is capable of providing us as epistemic subjects with guidance, making 
clear to us how we can improve. To this end, talk of epistemic 
obligations and epistemically responsible conduct is a potentially 
fruitful strategy, since obligations are often thought to be the sort of 
thing that we can become aware of and then strive to fulfil and believe 
in accordance with.  
If we adopt the ‘providing intersubjective reasons’ way of thinking 
about obligations, they are also the sort of thing that other subjects in 
the epistemic community can help with by checking and monitoring. 
In the case of ordinary modal beliefs, which are generally uncon-
tested, the need for subjects themselves and for the rest of the 
epistemic community to consciously contribute to a project of 
improvement is not relevant in the same way. Again, we do not need 
to “decide what to believe” because we already feel pretty sure that 
we believe the right thing. Perhaps these beliefs even force themselves 
upon us in a way which makes complying with obligations in making 
doxastic decisions odd to speak of (see my previous point above). 
Epistemology in these cases is about reconstructing success, rather 
than seeking to improve our situation. 
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6.5.4. Against the Truth-Aim 
The next step is to make plausible that what interests us in cases of 
extraordinary modal justification is not responsibility plus truth-
conduciveness. That is, the disjunctive picture must be defended. 
Otherwise, the integration requirement (which is tied to the truth-aim 
of enquiry) has not gone away for theories of extraordinary modal 
justification. Rather they would have been laden with an even more 
demanding version of it, one which also requires the responsibility-
aspect to be included into it. 
This is a task which is, I believe, slightly trickier. Nevertheless, 
there are some things to be said in favour of it. But before I move on 
to that, it is important to be aware of what is needed here. Given the 
non-rigidity of the ordinary/extraordinary definition, one does not 
need to argue that there are absolutely no circumstances under which 
truth-conduciveness is the relevant measure on an allegedly 
justificatory method for extraordinary modal beliefs. It is enough if 
one can make plausible that responsibility rather than truth is generally 
the relevant epistemic good. Note also that the point here is not about 
what sort of accounts will come out as justificatory in either sense, 
but about what kind of epistemic values are relevant to the evaluation 
of the justificatory status of ordinary and extraordinary modal beliefs 
respectively. I will get to the former point in the next section. For 
now, I concentrate on reasons to think epistemically responsible 
conduct and not true belief is generally the salient epistemic good for 
evaluating the justification of extraordinary modal beliefs.  
The point already raised about the conditions under which the 
integration requirement applies can be stressed here yet again: the 
integration requirement is not suited for theories about the 
justification of extraordinary modal beliefs, because our pre-
theoretical assessment of our own epistemic situation with respect to 
extraordinary modal matters does not match the initial assumption 
which gets the integration requirement going. That is, we do not 
consider our extraordinary modal beliefs to be reliable. However, we 
might still think that they sometimes are, and certainly can be, 
epistemically justified in some other sense. For instance, in the sense 
of being in line with epistemically responsible conduct.  
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In addition to this, we may consider the following point about how 
epistemic goods are related to other things we value. As was briefly 
but duly noted in chapter 1, final epistemic values may or may not be 
intrinsically valuable, and whether or not they are they may (also) be 
related (e.g. instrumentally, constitutively) to other, non-epistemic 
values, such as practical or prudential values. Epistemically responsi-
ble conduct and true beliefs, while both finally epistemically valuable, 
are importantly different in how they relate to non-epistemic values. 
And since justified ordinary and extraordinary modal beliefs relate 
differently to things and aims that are non-epistemic yet important to 
us in other ways, this matters for what the relevant sense of 
‘justification’ is.  
Ordinary modal beliefs, to a higher extent, occur in contexts where 
their truth-value matters to us in a practical sense. It matters because 
we tend to act upon them. Not always of course, but generally 
speaking. What we believe with respect to ordinary modal matters 
(e.g. whether it is possible for one to cross a particular river without 
getting wet above the knees, or whether it is possible to fit the new 
couch through the doorway), is important for our prospects for acting 
successfully in the world. In order for them to play this role – for us 
to act successfully upon them – it is important that they are true. 
Ordinary modal beliefs are valuable to our practical aims insofar as 
they are true. Differently put, the idea is that if they are not true, we 
will not succeed; I will get wet, or have to return the couch to the 
store. In light of this one could claim some plausibility for the idea 
that this influences what final epistemic good mainly governs 
justification of ordinary modal beliefs, i.e. that true belief is the 
relevant one.  
Extraordinary modal beliefs are different in that they appear quite 
irrelevant to most of our practical aims; generally, we do not really act 
upon them in any interesting sense.131 It is a good question why we 
value “purely” intellectual activities like this, but we clearly do. 
Perhaps merely for its own sake, but it is certainly possible to relate 
                                    
131 A possible and interesting counterexample: Pascal may, as a result of his famous 
wager, have acted on the belief <It is possible that God exists>. However, I take it 
that this example is an exception from a general tendency. 
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them to other non-epistemic aims. Think again of the contexts in 
which extraordinary modal claims are made – almost exclusively in 
philosophical or academic contexts. While such contexts and the 
social roles that populate them are significantly epistemic, that is not 
all there is to them. We have personal aims – for instance we might 
consider it important to be accepted, respected, or admired as e.g. an 
intellectually honest and conscientious agent in the academic 
community (that in turn might or might not be part of something 
grander, like a way of striving for the Good Life, or similarly). For 
one’s extraordinary modal claims to contribute to these aims, it is 
important that they are justified. And the relevant sense of 
justification in e.g. a philosophy seminar room, is plausibly in terms 
of being able to articulate reasons for one’s claims (perhaps 
intersubjective reasons in the sense of acceptable to other reasonable 
agents in the epistemic community, as mentioned in 6.5.2 above), 
respond to challenges and comments, revise in light of apt criticism, 
and so on. This is in turn nicely captured by talk in terms of 
justification as fulfilling certain epistemic obligations, and by doing so 
acting in an epistemically responsible way. 
I am sure there are other, perhaps better, ways to cash this out. But 
the general point is two-fold. First, having justified extraordinary 
modal beliefs, while epistemically finally valuable, might also be 
instrumentally important to other non-epistemic aims. But these non-
epistemic aims are different from the non-epistemic aims to which 
justified ordinary modal beliefs relate. Second, this role for justified 
extraordinary modal beliefs fits with understanding their justification 
in terms of – you’ve guessed it – epistemically responsible conduct, 
as in the fulfilment of epistemic obligations arising out of the relevant 
role and/or context.  
Some will raise the objection that this gets things precisely 
backwards. On the one hand, what matters to action is not truth but 
success in reaching our practical aims. Of course, the idea is that true 
beliefs are instrumental to reaching those practical aims, but the 
problem is that it need not be. We may well reach them even when 
we base our actions on false beliefs. For instance, let’s say my aim is 
to get unharmed out of an encounter with the neighbours’ aggressive 
dog. I decide to climb a tree and wait for my neighbour to come 
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around and calm the dog down, instead of trying to run for and 
scramble over the fence to my own garden, based on my belief about 
how fast I can run. This belief is false though, since I underestimate 
my abilities, especially as they are when fuelled by adrenaline. But as 
long as I do escape the encounter unharmed by climbing the tree, it 
does not matter that I base this decision on a false belief about 
whether it is possible for me to outrun the dog to the fence. On the 
other hand, in the contexts where extraordinary modal claims are 
typically considered – philosophical and certain scientific contexts – 
we do care about the truth. Having true beliefs about these matters 
might not be related to any practical aims, but it is intrinsically 
valuable. Indeed, I have been told that if truth is important to anyone 
it is to philosophers, and also to scientists.  
What to reply? I am not unsympathetic to this criticism, but I also 
do not think it suffices to dismiss the original point. First, it is right 
that it is not necessary for action to be based on true belief in order 
to be successful in reaching our practical aims. But recall that I am 
concerned with arguing that the relevant sense of ‘justification’ for 
ordinary modal beliefs is generally the one understood in relation to 
the aim of true belief, given our pre-theoretical interests, roughly 
speaking. From the perspective of an agent who is to act on a justified 
modal belief, it is important that justification is truth-conducive, 
because if the agent does not think the belief is (likely to be) true, she 
will probably not act upon it in her attempt to reach her practical aims. 
So, it matters that she takes the method she uses in forming and/or 
sustaining beliefs to be truth-conducive. Hence, if a reliable connec-
tion to truth is what we as agents take to be important for some beliefs 
to count as justified (and liable to be acted upon, as it were), then that 
motivates an epistemic project where reliability is the central sense of 
‘justification’. That is the suggestion.  
In connection with this, I also want to flag that to the extent that 
the truth of ordinary modal claims matters to us for e.g. practical 
reasons, they are very unlikely to matter qua metaphysically modal 
truths. It matters to my undertaking a certain action whether or not it 
is a metaphysically modal truth that <It is possible to fit a couch 
through the doorway> only in a derivative sense. What really matters, 
CHAPTER SIX 
209 
of course, is whether I think it is true in a restricted sense of ‘possible’ 
(plausibly more restricted than e.g. nomological possibility).  
The second point, about what philosophers and perhaps also 
scientists are after in making extraordinary modal claims, is tricky. 
Partly, the question is tricky because there is no single, correct answer. 
As for the epistemic aims and achievements of science, philosophers 
differ on how to regard it and likely scientists themselves do too. 
Scientific realism is only one view out of several here.132 The nature 
of philosophy’s epistemic aims, achievements, and the status of claims 
philosophers make, are sure to be subject to similar disagreement.133  
But note that even if philosophers ideally want to make true 
extraordinary modal claims, this does not mean they take the reasons 
they offer for such claims to be reliably truth-conducive. The current 
suggestion is compatible with the claim that ultimately, from an 
epistemic perspective, we would very much like to have true beliefs 
with respect to extraordinary modal matters too. It is just that we, for 
various reasons, do not think of extraordinary modal justification in 
relation to this, but have settled for something different and 
independently valuable, in order to be able to tell the justified from 
the unjustified in an orderly, functioning manner. The point is that 
whether or not justified extraordinary beliefs are more likely to be 
true, this is not why we value them from an epistemic point of view. 
Instead, we value them because they are formed and sustained in 
accordance with relevant epistemic obligations – whether or not 
complying with these obligations is related to the likelihood of having 
a true belief about the modal matter in question.  
But importantly, this does not mean that we have to assume that 
the methods we value epistemically because of their being in line with 
relevant epistemic obligations are not (also) connected to the truth-
aim. They might be, or they might not. The above is all perfectly 
compatible with epistemically responsible beliefs being more likely to 
be true. But no claim to that effect is made, that is the important thing. 
                                    
132 See Bas Van Fraassen (1980) for a prominent alternative.  
133 For instance, Helen Beebee (2018) has recently proposed that knowledge production 
is not the aim of philosophical (and in particular, metaphysical) inquiry, and supports 
this with arguments roughly to the point that we have no reason to think that 
important philosophical methods are truth-conducive. 
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Because if no such claim is made, there is no integration requirement, 
i.e. no requirement to make good on such a claim by explaining why 
that should be the case. Instead, the epistemic value of these methods 
is explained independently of whatever its relation to truth might be. 
An interesting analogue here is Helen Longino’s (2002) work on 
procedural social epistemology in the philosophy of science. She de-
fends an account on which what counts as a “knowledge-producing” 
(or “justificatory” we might say, for current purposes) social 
procedure depends not on whether it tends to produce a certain result 
(e.g. true beliefs) but on whether it fulfils certain criteria. These 
criteria are not, in turn, defined or motivated in terms of what counts 
as a good result (e.g. true belief), but are instead concerned with 
creating space for, and ensuring responsiveness to, orderly and 
constructive critical discourse.134 That does not mean that social pro-
cedures which fulfil these conditions are not in fact truth-conducive 
– perhaps they are. And it certainly does not mean we do not care 
about getting at the truth when we engage in these procedures for 
enquiry. But it is not claimed that they are truth-conducive, and even 
if they are, this is not why we value them from an epistemic point of 
view. 
It is also interesting to consider, in relation to this, an argument in 
the epistemology of modality literature due to Bob Fischer. Fischer is 
a non-uniformist along the ordinary/extraordinary dimension. He 
holds that some modal beliefs are justified experientially (i.e. modal 
empiricism is correct), while others – the extraordinary ones, basically 
– are justified if their content is part of or is implied by theories that 
we justifiably believe. In support of this view, he offers an analogy 
with trying to figure out the rules of a board game while watching 
                                    
134 Incidentally, the criteria Longino sets up are quite interesting in the current context. 
Some of them are rather similar to the understanding of epistemic obligations that 
might flow from the notion of ‘intersubjective justification’ discussed above. One 
criterion  demands  that the procedure should involve “publicly recognised forums 
for the criticism of evidence, methods, and of assumptions and reasoning”; another 
that is that it should involve mutual “uptake of criticism”; and a third that it should 
involve “publicly recognised standards by reference to which theories, hypotheses, 
and observational practices are evaluated and by appeal to which criticism is made 




other play it (Fischer 2016b; 2017b, chapter 2). What we would do, 
Fischer suggests, is rely on experience together with e.g. analogy, 
induction, or abduction in order to figure out whether this or that 
particular move is permissible according to the rules of the game. 
When we ponder whether a far-out move, unlike anything we have 
actually seen, is permissible or not, we would instead rely on some 
“theory” or other that we have made up about what the rules are, in 
making up our minds about this. We are justified in the resulting belief 
about the far-out move if the theory on which we base it is justified. 
Fischer’s idea is that the epistemology of modality works in the same 
way: we rely on experience as much as we can, and when experience 
will not help us, we turn to theories.  
Now, there is an assumption underlying this analogy to the effect 
that experientially based justification is the best we can get, and 
justification via theories is what we have to make do with when we 
the best thing is out of reach. The reason we rely on theories for 
justification is that relevant experience is lacking. This is interesting 
from the point of view of the current suggestion, since it highlights 
how we can turn to a second sense of ‘justified’ if a first sense fails. If 
it is obvious to us that justification in the first sense is not going to be 
something we can assess at all for a certain category of cases 
(extraordinary, say), we might just bypass the first sense and go for 
the second sense directly. 
That concludes my case for the idea that extraordinary modal 
justification should not be understood in terms of truth-
conduciveness (but rather, epistemically responsible conduct). Of 
course, I have not presented any conclusive reasons, but I hope to 
have done something to suggest that it is an interesting proposal 
deserving of more thorough investigation and treatment in the future.  
6.5.5. Rationalist Methods and Epistemic 
Responsibility 
Saying that a method is truth-conducive imposes the integration 
requirement on the theory making that claim. Saying that a method is 
part of or in line with epistemically responsible conduct does not. But 
it does raise another question. Given our current understanding of 
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epistemically responsible conduct in terms of epistemic obligations, 
one wonders for instance about how the method in question relates 
to those obligations. In order for this whole machinery to be of use 
to the modal empiricist gone non-uniformist in response to the 
Limitation Problem, things must look more promising for rationalist 
epistemologies with respect to answering that question than they did 
with respect to the integration requirement.  
So, is the outlook more promising? I think this issue deserves to 
be discussed at much greater length than what I can provide here, and 
exactly how the chips fall will depend on how one chooses to develop 
the answer to the question of what the relevant epistemic obligations 
are in contexts where extraordinary modal judgements are typically 
made. Here I will content myself with making three points that might 
guide such further discussion.  
Consider two paradigmatic examples of rationalist modal episte-
mologies: conceivability theory and modal intuitionism. Is it plausible 
that one has complied with one’s epistemic obligations (in the context 
of a philosophy seminar, say) when one holds, for instance, the belief 
that extended simples are possible based on conceivability evidence, 
or the belief that a table’s origins are essential to it based on modal 
intuition?  
First: on the one hand, it might seem plausible on the grounds that 
intuitions and conceivability evidence traditionally have compara-
tively good standing in the context of philosophical debate, at least 
according to some. It is part of the common lore that philosophers 
rely frequently on intuition as evidence in various contexts.135 As for 
conceivings and/or imaginings, these are similarly thought to be very 
common to appeal to. For instance, Lam (2017, 2166) suggests that 
“appealing to conceivings to justify beliefs about possibility is our 
current epistemic practice”, and Yablo (1993, 1) opens his paper with 
a similar observation. And while such claims remarkably often go 
unaccompanied by references to actual appeals to conceivings or 
imaginings from the literature, there are examples to be found. Of 
                                    
135 Although see e.g. Cappelen (2012) for an extensive discussion of and a case against 
this assumption. Cappelen’s introductory chapter also provides a host of quotes 
backing up the claim that philosophers’ reliance on intuitions is part of the common 
lore, among friends and foes of intuition-based ephilosophy alike.  
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course, there is Chalmers’ (1996) conceivability argument for the 
possibility of zombies, and Putnam’s (1975) perfect actor argument 
against behaviourism. Schaffer (2010, 61) says he does not think that 
conceivability entails possibility, but that inconceivability entails 
impossibility, and takes the fact that gunk is conceivable to be some 
evidence of its possibility.136 Descartes’ argument for mind-body 
dualism is often classified as a conceivability argument, since it rests 
on the premise that it is conceivable that the mind could exists 
without the body, which is supposed to entail that it is possible that 
the mind could exist without the body (which in turn is supposed to 
support the actual distinctness of mind and body).  
Second: on the other hand, conceivings and intuitions might be 
problematic due to what we may call their private nature. This prob-
lem emerges when we recognise the social and dynamic nature of 
justified belief as emphasised by this responsibility-track. Given that 
we understand obligations also in relation to other epistemic agents, 
it might be a problem that a conceiving or an intuition is difficult for 
another epistemic agent to assess. For instance, one cannot simply 
peek into the conceiving of another and check whether one finds it 
sufficiently detailed, coherent, or whatever other conditions need to 
be fulfilled. For similar reasons, it is difficult to defend one’s 
conceivings or intuitions in a way that others who might not initially 
share them will find acceptable. This is a problem that would need to 
be dealt with. That is, the practice of appealing to e.g. conceivings 
would need to be regulated in a way which makes it possible for other 
epistemic subjects to assess and scrutinise them. But there is already 
a substantial discussion going in the literature (involving both friends 
and sceptics of conceivability) on the role of conceivings in 
philosophical argumentation. There is a lot written on what makes an 
imagining or a conceiving a ‘good’ (i.e. justificatory) one, and/or 
whether ‘bad’ ones follow a certain pattern (see e.g. Barnes 2002; 
Chalmers 2002; Geirsson 2005; Kung 2010; Tidman 1994; Yablo 
1993; and many others). This literature has emerged in response to 
                                    
136 He accepts that it is conceivable both that atomism is true and that everything is 
extended but divisible, but takes the fact that there is no “inconceivability argument” 
against gunk as some sort of evidence for its possibility. (Schaffer also has other 
arguments for the possibility of gunk that do not involve appeal to conceivability.) 
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the undeniable fact that sometimes, conceivings lead us astray. In 
addition, there is a related literature on the argumentative and 
justificatory (or not) role of thought-experiments in philosophy (see 
e.g. Cohnitz and Häggqvist 2018; Elster 2011; Häggqvist 2009; 
Williamson 2007, chapter 6), which may also be of service in explor-
ing this idea a bit further.  
Notably, when considered only in relation to a truth-aim, some of 
the suggested restrictions on conceivings that supposedly help us sort 
them into ‘useful’ and ‘useless’ from an epistemic point of view, 
appear unmotivated. This, for instance, is part of Lam’s (2017) 
criticism of Kung’s (2010) claim that only “sensory imaginings” are 
evidence of possibility: Kung does not provide a story about why we 
should think that the restriction to sensory imaginings should make 
imaginings any more truth-tracking. But if we drop truth monism and 
instead consider conceivings and imaginings from the point of view 
of responsible epistemic conduct, various suggestions of regulations 
and restrictions might come out as more well-motivated. That 
remains to be seen of course, but it is a project to pursue if one finds 
the solution attractive.  
Third: another interesting possibility would be to consider a modal 
epistemology like Bob Fischer’s (2016b, 2017b) TEM (theory-based 
epistemology of modality), already mentioned in the previous section, 
in relation to the aim of epistemically responsible conduct. Fischer’s 
central idea is this: our theories (scientific, philosophical, metaphysi-
cal, etc.) have modal content and modal implications, sometimes of 
the extraordinary variety. The justification that we can have for 
extraordinary modal claims is via the justification we have for our 
theories. This is interesting from the current perspective since we do 
have a practice for defending and justifying theories in philosophy. 
We do have ideas – if not always as articulated as one might have 
hoped for – about what is and what is not responsible epistemic 
conduct, in the sense of epistemic obligations fulfilled. Moreover, the 
justification of philosophical theories is arguably to a large extent a 
priori, in particular considering theories in e.g. metaphysics, 
philosophy of mind, and metaethics, where extraordinary modal 
claims are most common. And although it is perhaps not Fischer’s 
intention that we should understand the justification of theories, and 
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hence of extraordinary modal claims, as independent of truth-
conduciveness, this is certainly a possible construal.137 
I am not suggesting that those who defend rationalist accounts of 
modal justification typically reject truth monism. But accounting for 
the relation to truth – i.e. meeting the integration requirement – is 
often supposed to be a difficulty for rationalist modal epistemologies, 
as we have seen already. Certainly, the modal empiricist whose point 
of view has guided us through this book, thinks that rationalists have 
a problem with integration, and dropping the requirement of a link to 
truth is a way to make such a theory acceptable.  
6.6. Conclusions 
In this chapter I have outlined a version of non-uniformism along the 
ordinary/extraordinary dimension. That is, a non-uniformist view of 
the epistemology of modality according to which different modal 
epistemologies are needed to account for the justification of ordinary 
and extraordinary modal beliefs respectively. I sketched a defence of 
this view in the form of an argument from axiological heterogeneity, 
according to which more than one modal epistemology will be correct 
because there is more than one final epistemic good in relation to 
which we may understand ‘justification’, and which are relevant in 
modal enquiry.  
From what I have argued here and in chapter 4, a map of the 
uniformism/non-uniformism issue emerges, one which is much 
improved both in terms of structure and detail, compared to what the 
literature to date has offered. This map is useful and informative quite 
regardless of how helpful any given option is to the empiricist gone 
non-uniformist in response to the Limitation Problem. One 
important insight concerns the difference between strong and weak 
                                    
137 In his (2017b, chapter 5) Fischer markets his theory-based modal epistemology as 
an attractive way to support scepticism about extraordinary modal claims of a 
distinctively metaphysically interesting character, since it is difficult to account for our 
justification of the sort of metaphysical or philosophical theories that imply such 
claims. But he also notes that with a more optimistic view of the justificatory status 
of such theories, TEM is a way of accounting for the justification of extraordinary 
modal claims. What I have suggested in this chapter might be one way of framing 
such a more optimistic version of theory-based modal epistemology.  
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non-uniformism, and the reasons I presented to prefer the former. 
Another insight, which also demonstrates how versatile the 
understanding of non-uniformism I advocate is, concerns the fact 
that one may draw on different sources in building an argument for 
strong non-uniformism (or uniformism for that matter, although I 
will continue to focus on what things look like from a prospective 
non-uniformist’s point of view). The strategy of arguing from 
heterogeneity on a distinct level to non-uniformism on the level of 
first-order theories of modal justification is independent of any 
particular isomorphism assumption. I have concentrated on 
metaphysical heterogeneity and pluralism about epistemic value, but 
there may well be other sources of non-uniformism. Relatedly, meta-
physically motivated non-uniformism is in principle independent of 
any particular metaphysical distinction one might want to appeal to, 
e.g. there might be other ways to cash out metaphysical heterogeneity 
in the modal realm than the abstract/concrete distinction. And 
likewise, axiologically motivated non-uniformism is in principle 
independent of any particular epistemic values one might endorse and 
of any particular groups of modal beliefs one might want to associate 
them with.  
Arguments from axiological and metaphysical heterogeneity 
respectively make for rather different non-uniformist claims, and 
which strategy to go for depends on what sort of distinction one is 
concerned with, i.e. along what dimension one thinks we ought to be 
non-uniformists. As we have seen, the modal empiricist might need 
non-uniformism along both dimensions if she finds both aspects of 
the Limitation Problem incriminating. Luckily for such an empiricist, 
there is no problem in principle at least with combining 
metaphysically and axiologically motivated SNU. The fact that the 
modal realm is metaphysically heterogenous is completely orthogonal 
to whether or not there is more than one final epistemic value in terms 
of which we may understand modal justification. The two arguments 
for SNU represent two different ways in which considerations that 
do not belong to first order modal epistemology impacts the proper 
scope of theories in first order modal epistemology. That 
metaphysical considerations have an impact, does not in any way 
preclude that considerations about epistemic value also do, or vice 
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versa. It is just that metaphysical considerations might only come in 
when the focus on true belief as the relevant epistemic value makes 
the integration requirement a salient issue. 
I recognise that much remains to be done if one were to seriously 
take on the strategy of arguing for non-uniformism along the 
ordinary/extraordinary dimension that I have outlined in this chapter. 
But I do think it carries enough potential to warrant further 
investigation, at least for philosophers who are not completely 
opposed to a more pluralistic picture of epistemic value and/or 
justification quite generally. Let me just end by stressing one particular 
thing that this strategy highlights, which I find interesting, and 
essentially correct.  
On the understanding of the ordinary/extraordinary distinction in 
terms of “sociological” properties, it is sometimes not clear whether 
a particular modal claim is ordinary or extraordinary. Whether a 
particular claim is ordinary or extraordinary, moreover, may vary over 
time, and sometimes between contexts. If one uses these lightweight 
properties to generate non-uniformism – i.e. if one argues that 
ordinary and extraordinary modal claims call for ‘justification’ in 
different senses – one ends up with a picture according to which the 
kind of justification a claim calls for is also sometimes indeterminate, 
sometimes variant over time or context. This highlights that there is 
an important sense in which what is in the nature of justification is 
partly up to us and due to our interests, unlike the answers to 
metaphysical questions about the nature of fundamental reality for 
instance. If we settle on truth as the relevant good, then there are 
objective questions about whether or not and, in particular, why any 
given method is justificatory. But whether this is what we care about 
or not is a different question. And what we care about and value, what 
we find interesting to theorise about in epistemology – in general and 
in relation to particular categories of beliefs – may change and vary 





7. Concluding Discussion 
In the chapters preceding this one, I have argued that the life of a 
liberalised modal empiricist is less easy than it might initially have 
seemed. Or at least it is if we hold on to the integration requirement 
as a rule to abide by in the epistemology of modality. It is often 
indicated that it is a great advantage of empiricist theories that they 
rely on methods we know and trust in areas outside of modality, 
methods that we are almost forced to assume are reliable. I do not 
deny this – such things may perhaps be brought to bear on the issue 
of whether a particular method is plausibly the method we actually use 
in order to form our supposedly mainly true beliefs, and that is 
ultimately an important question. But as far as meeting the integration 
challenge and hence fulfilling the integration requirement is 
concerned, these things are somewhat beside the point. Because for 
one thing, we can evaluate pairs of theories for integration, assuming 
for the sake of argument that they are the right pair but without 
knowing or even thinking that they are the right pair. And for another, 
the integration requirement demands an explanation in terms of the 
metaphysical underpinnings of an assumed reliability fact, no matter 
how humdrum or familiar-feeling the method one appeals to is. As 
things currently stand, it is far from clear that empiricist modal 
epistemologies comply with BULGE IN THE CARPET and 
METAPHYSICS MATTERS, and certainly whether they do so to a larger 
extent than competing theories – despite the familiarity of the 
methods they appeal to in explaining modal knowledge. In short, 
modal empiricism is not on easy street.  
My main point with stressing this has not been to suggest that 
empiricists are worse off than non-empiricists with respect to the 
integration requirement, or even to deny that they are (potentially) 
better off. Because as I have already noted, there is nothing in 
principle preventing empiricists from filling in the gaps and complet-
ing the picture. What I have wanted to highlight can rather be put as 
a point about fairness. If we accept the integration requirement as a 
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desideratum governing theorising in the epistemology of modality – 
which we might if we think that getting at modal truth is the aim of 
modal enquiry – then this requirement applies to all theories that 
claim to outline a reliable method for supporting modal belief. The 
fact that we have the intuition that a method is reliable, or that a 
method is allegedly familiar from other instances of justified belief, 
does not itself mean that the reliability of this method is readily 
explainable. And even it if is, it is not obvious that the explanation is 
automatically going to carry over to beliefs about the modal domain. 
Maybe it is, maybe it does – but then that must be shown.  
In this last and comparatively brief chapter, I tie up some loose 
ends by discussing what one should make of the integration challenge 
and its role in the epistemology of modality, given what I have argued.  
7.1. The Role of Scepticism  
It has been put to me that the proposal I explore in chapter 6 seems 
to be an uncomfortable fit with my insistence that if we take the 
integration requirement to be a central rule of the epistemology of 
modality, then it is a rule that everyone needs to follow. Because 
doesn’t the axiological non-uniformism of chapter 6 say precisely that 
the rule does not apply to everyone?  
It does, but not in a way that contradicts my point about fairness. 
Because the integration requirement is, again, tied to the idea that true 
belief is the aim of enquiry. Modal empiricists need to meet the 
integration requirement just as much as their non-empiricist 
competitors, because they all take true belief to be the aim of modal 
enquiry – or so I have assumed in chapters 1 to 5. The proposal in 
chapter 6 proceeds from a view that challenges the assumption that 
truth is the only final epistemic good in terms of which we may 
understand ‘justification’. This is not cheating or changing the rules 
during the course of the game. Rather it is an invitation to recognise 
that there need not be just the one game. There may be two different 
ones. The integration requirement is a rule in one of the games – the 
one where truth is the epistemic good in terms of which ‘justification’ 
is to be understood – but not in the other one.  
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This brings up another objection that I have encountered 
concerning the proposal in chapter 6, and with it the need to say 
something more about the role assigned to modal scepticism in the 
epistemology of modality. I will start with the latter, and get to the 
objection shortly.  
While I said only a few pages into the book that I would ignore 
full-blown modal scepticism, and throughout I have promoted the 
meta-theoretical framing of the integration challenge as more 
interesting than what I called the sceptical framing, partial modal 
scepticism has played an important role. In particular, scepticism was 
key in my discussion of non-uniformism, since I held the threat of 
being committed to partial modal scepticism up as a problem for the modal 
empiricist who faces the Limitation Problem. Of course, as I have 
acknowledged, it is not mandatory for a modal empiricist to find the 
implied partial modal scepticism problematic. Indeed, some 
philosophers consider it a virtue of modal empiricism that it implies 
that our modal knowledge has rather limited scope. If one is 
committed to a naturalistic view of knowledge more generally, 
according to which empirical knowledge is the only kind of 
knowledge there is, then non-uniformism in the sense of allowing for 
a non-empiricist modal epistemology to (also) be correct, is going to 
be a nonstarter. That is a perfectly legitimate position to adopt, and if 
adopted there is little else to say on the matter of justification of 
modal beliefs about abstracta, and extraordinary matters: we just do 
not have it if experience cannot provide it. I have instead focused on 
what one can say if one is convinced that a modal empiricist theory is 
correct (for a subclass of our justified beliefs about metaphysical 
modality), but also finds the partial scepticism one then appears 
committed to problematic. 
I explored two options. One can either tell a non-uniformist story 
that amounts to splitting the integration challenge for metaphysical 
modality up into more than one integration challenge, properly 
speaking. This is a way of avoiding modal scepticism (although that 
involves saying that some non-empiricist modal epistemology can 
also meet the integration requirement). Or one can tell a non-
uniformist story that amounts to circumventing the relevance of the 
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integration requirement. This, of course, is the alternative I sketched 
in terms of axiological non-uniformism.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, it has been put to me – and this is the 
objection I promised I would get to – that the latter is not a way to 
avoid partial modal scepticism, but rather to concede the implication 
of the Limitation Problem. The reasoning then goes something like 
this: since the “justification” we can have of e.g. extraordinary modal 
beliefs is not to be understood in terms of truth-conduciveness, and 
truth is the aim of enquiry, the lightweight non-uniformism outlined 
in chapter 6 is just dressed-up modal scepticism, and we are not really 
epistemically justified in holding those beliefs after all. But this 
objection clearly begs the question against the axiological non-
uniformist, since it assumes the falsity of a key ingredient in her view, 
namely that true belief is not the sole aim of enquiry. Relatedly, it is 
sometimes remarked that even if we understand justification in terms 
of epistemic responsibility, epistemic responsibility must in turn be 
understood in terms of truth-conduciveness. Again, one might think 
so, but that is just to hold a different (although no doubt rather 
common) view from that explored in chapter 6. 
Put in slightly different terms, you might think the “game” outlined 
in terms of epistemic responsibility as the relevant epistemic good, 
where the integration requirement does not apply, is not worth 
engaging in, or is not an epistemic game. But presumably you would 
need to argue for that. Of course, I happily concede that I have by no 
means provided a satisfying defence of disjunctive epistemic value 
pluralism here. The debates over epistemic value, the aim of enquiry 
and/or belief are vast, intricate, and far from settled, and it would be 
crazy of me to attempt to settle any of them here. So, whether or not 
a disjunctive epistemic value pluralism of the sort indicated is, at the 
end of the day, an overall attractive view is certainly up for debate. 
But it is unfair to just assume that it is false, especially in light of the 
fact that views of justification as just instrumental to true belief, also 
suffer from certain problems.  
To be clear, what I am calling ‘scepticism’ is the view that not only 
can we never have knowledge of the facts in question but we cannot be 
(epistemically) justified in any of our beliefs or claims about them. 
Conversely, avoiding scepticism is compatible with claiming that we 
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cannot have knowledge, only justified belief. Now, I said in the intro-
ductory chapter of this book that I would use ‘justified modal belief’ 
and ‘modal knowledge’ interchangeably, because I take the interesting 
and difficult things about the epistemology of modality to all lie with 
issue of modal justification, and modal knowledge will, on most 
accounts, require justification in some form or other. But in light of 
chapter 6 and the remarks above, let me now briefly revisit this issue. 
If the sense in which we are/can be justified in making extraordinary 
modal claims is not a truth-conducive sense, does this not mean that 
we do not/cannot have extraordinary modal knowledge?  
Think of Eamon who believes that it is possible for the laws of 
nature to be different, has conducted himself epistemically responsi-
bly in his forming and sustaining this belief, in the sense of fulfilling 
all his relevant epistemic obligations, and as it turns out (although 
there is no way for him, or anyone else, to independently confirm 
this), it is possible for the laws of nature to be different. (Remember, 
there is nothing in the suggestion of chapter 6 that threatens the idea 
that extraordinary modal claims have an objective truth-value that is 
settled by some mind-independent fact. Truth is not the problem.) 
Does Eamon know that it is possible for the laws of nature to be 
different? If we know our Gettier, it initially seems as if the answer is: 
no. What Gettier cases are intended to show is that true, justified 
belief is not sufficient for knowledge. On a fairly standard 
interpretation of what has gone wrong in a Gettier case, the problem 
is that the reasons that appear to be justificatory with respect to the 
belief in question, have nothing to do with the belief’s actually being 
true. Does the case of the justified-in-the-sense-of-chapter-6 Eamon 
not parallel such Gettier cases exactly?  
Well, there is an important difference. In the Gettier cases, which 
are thought experiments designed to pump certain intuitions, it is 
obvious from the example that the reasons on the basis of which the 
subject holds her belief are in fact not connected to the truth of the 
belief – that is arguably what drives the intuition that the subject does 
not know. But as for epistemically responsible conduct, we have not 
claimed that it is not truth-conducive. Maybe it is, maybe not. What 
we have said is that responsible conduct is epistemically valuable for 
an independent reason. But if it is not, and if it is right that verific 
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epistemic luck is knowledge-destroying, then Eamon does not 
know.138 If it is (even if that is not why epistemically responsible 
conduct is epistemically valuable), then maybe he does – that depends 
on whether there are further conditions on knowledge, and if so, what 
these are. Either way, I am perfectly fine if it should turn out, given 
the suggestion in chapter 6, that Eamon does not and cannot know 
that it is possible for the laws of nature to be different. Again, to fend 
off scepticism, as I have been using the word here, it is enough that 
he can be epistemically justified in holding such a belief.  
Moreover, I am not even strongly wedded to the claim that the 
lightweight non-uniformism sketched in chapter 6 is not a form of 
partial modal scepticism. What counts as ‘scepticism’ presumably 
depends on taking a stance on what is required for knowledge and/or 
justification, which in turn will depend partly on ideas about epistemic 
goods. If one absolutely cannot make sense of the notion of epistemic 
justification independently of truth-conduciveness, then it will be a 
form of partial scepticism. With a different idea of final epistemic 
goods – e.g. disjunctive epistemic value pluralism – it will not be. But 
you can certainly call it partial modal scepticism if you find that an 
informative label.  
Indeed, that might be one way to make chapter 6 interesting even 
to a modal empiricist who does not exactly feel threatened by partial 
modal scepticism. Because even if the view of extraordinary modal 
justification is a form of scepticism about extraordinary modal 
matters, it is a different and, in my view, more philosophically fertile 
claim than the partial modal scepticism “proper”, which is just the 
claim that we can have no epistemic justification for modal beliefs 
that fall outside the explanatory scope of modal empiricism. It allows 
one to make sense of the fact that we attempt to justify the extraor-
dinary modal claims we make, that we take some philosophers to be 
better justified in their extraordinary modal claims than others, and it 
                                    
138 A subject is epistemically lucky in believing that p in the verific sense just in case, 
given the subject’s reasons for believing that p, it is just a matter of luck that the 
subject’s belief that p is true. This is arguably what is going on in the classical Gettier 
cases. See Engel (1992) for a classical distinction between this kind of epistemic luck 




does justice both to the fact that we are typically less confident and 
more self-conscious regarding the epistemic status of some modal 
beliefs than others, and to the fact that we keep investigating these 
issues in philosophy, hoping to improve the epistemic status of our 
beliefs with respect to these matters. In short, it is a philosophically 
interesting alternative or complement to just accepting the partial 
modal scepticism one is committed to, whether one is bothered by 
being thus committed or not. 
7.2. Should We Care About Integration? 
I have connected the integration requirement with the idea that true 
belief is the epistemic good in terms of which we should understand 
(modal) justification. As I stressed above, there may be other 
epistemological projects to engage in regarding (modal) justification, 
where it is not a rule that the integration requirement must be met, 
because true belief is not the (only) aim. In this section I will instead 
discuss the question of whether we really should care for an 
integration requirement at all, even if we are truth monists. Because, it 
might be objected, while there is no integration requirement without 
a truth-aim, there can surely be a truth-aim without an integration 
requirement. So why bother? 
When it comes to integration, metaphysics matters. But outside 
“special” areas like the epistemology of modality, epistemologists in 
general, and epistemologists interested in reliability in particular, tend 
not to worry about metaphysics. Consider for instance what one of 
the main figures of reliabilism, Alvin Goldman, says about the 
method of epistemology in Epistemology and Cognition (1986).  
For him, settling the question of epistemic justification consists in 
deciding on what he calls a “criterion of rightness”, a standard against 
which to measure a given method to see whether or not it is 
justificatory. That is a different way of basically saying that we have 
to decide on what I have called the question of final epistemic 
good(s). It is a philosophical, and largely a priori matter, according to 
Goldman. Once we have decided on a criterion of rightness, 
epistemology is a matter of investigating whether or not particular 
candidate methods live up to this “criterion of rightness” and hence 
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can be said to be justificatory. Goldman is a truth monist, so whether 
a method is justificatory depends on whether it is truth-conducive. It 
is an empirical question whether or not a particular method, or 
“process” as Goldman prefers to call them, is actually truth-
conducive. The goal is to specify what the reliable processes are, and 
articulate what they involve, and here the epistemologist needs to 
delegate the job to, or at least engage with, the empirical sciences. But 
through all this, Goldman makes no mention of the question of why 
a particular process is a reliably truth-conducive way of forming and 
sustaining beliefs about some subject matter or other. What matters, 
once we have decided that truth-conduciveness is the final epistemic 
good, is just that a method is truth-conducive. So why should modal 
epistemologists, who take reliability to be important, worry about 
integration in the sense of explaining the reliability of a given process, 
and hence have to worry about the nature of modal facts? 
First of all, reliabilism in general epistemology typically uses 
perception as an example of a reliable process (or memory, or 
testimony, which are both arguably derivative sources of justification 
that depend on e.g. perception). And when we talk about this 
epistemic source, people tend to feel things are fine, integration-wise, 
because we take ourselves to roughly know what grounds that 
reliability, namely causality. Modal empiricism and the lack of talk 
about how the integration challenge is to be met given such an 
epistemology is symptomatic of this. But, as I have endeavoured to 
argue throughout this book, relying on a method that we intuitively 
take to be reliable does not mean that one has dealt with the 
integration requirement. In short, the fact that reliabilists do not talk 
about integration does not mean that they are right to avoid that topic, 
just as little as modal empiricists are, if what I have argued is correct. 
And even if we can let them off the hook because they focus on 
processes that are relatively unproblematically grounded in a causal 
dependence relation that we know enough about already, this does 
not automatically mean we can also let epistemologists of modality 
off the hook, as I argued in chapter 3.  
It is tempting to try and bolster the claim that epistemologists of 
modality (together with certain other “specialist” epistemologists 
perhaps) do need to worry about the integration challenge even when 
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many “regular” reliabilist epistemologists do not, by saying something 
like the following: what we want is to have support for the claim that 
such-and-such a method is reliable. One way to gain support is by 
empirical testing, as just noted. When that sort of empirical evidence 
of reliability is not available or attainable, we instead hope for a story 
that tells us in virtue of what the prospective reliability is supposed to 
obtain. Together with some reasons to think that the method in 
question is the actual method, such an explanation is an indirect 
reason to think that the method is in fact reliable. So, in short, if there 
are other ways to support the claim that a method is reliable, the 
integration requirement is indeed otiose, but in the case of methods 
for knowing modal truths, the assumption is generally that we do not 
have other available evidence of reliability. The integration require-
ment is important, in the absence of testability, so to speak.  
However, I think we should resist the temptation to motivate the 
integration requirement in this way. It invites the wrong idea of why 
we should care about integration. Because as I have stressed multiple 
times, there is a subtle but important difference between supporting 
the claim that there is reliability and explaining why there is reliability. 
I have nothing against the idea that a good reliability explanation of a 
method provides a reason to think that reliability obtains. That is, 
meeting the integration challenge may well be a way to support such 
a claim. But notably, one can support the claim that reliability obtains 
without explaining why it obtains. Subjecting a method to empirical 
testing for reliability is one way of supporting the claim that it is 
reliable without having explained why. Or one can give a one-sided 
explanation, familiar from the discussion in chapter 5. But if what I 
have argued is right, the integration requirement is not the 
requirement to show that there is reliability but to explain why there is 
reliability given the epistemology and metaphysics purportedly 
involved. Doing the latter can surely be (part of) a way of indirectly 
doing the former, but to do the former is not automatically to do the 
latter. But the integration challenge is about explaining why there is 
reliability (assuming that there is).  
Why then, should we take the integration requirement to be 
important? Why not just settle for the former, i.e. for “integration” 
on the sceptical framing? I mentioned some problems with the 
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sceptical framing in 2.4. The central problem was that it is hard to see 
why not meeting the integration challenge as standardly conceived (in 
particular as involving POSITIVE) should present one with a sceptical 
challenge at all, i.e. with a threatening undercutting defeater. Put a bit 
differently, the sceptical framing does not match the way the 
integration challenge features in the literature, it is not what we are 
interested in. But that is not a problem if we are considering getting 
rid of the integration requirement as standardly conceived anyway.  
Here is one thing I take to be rather nice about the task to explain 
reliability, rather than showing that reliability obtains (even if, again, 
the former can be a way of doing the latter): it is a distinctively 
philosophical project. That is, even if we can subject methods to 
empirical testing for their reliability vis-a-vis (some) modal truths, 
there is something for modal epistemologists qua philosophers to do. 
If you are like Goldman, of course, you will think it proper to 
outsource a good deal of epistemology to e.g. cognitive scientists, who 
are better suited to individuate, study, and empirically test various 
cognitive processes for reliability. But detractors of the reliabilist 
movement in epistemology like to complain about this consequence 
of externalism in general and reliabilism in particular as it leaves 
philosophers largely unsuited to do theory of justification (even if they 
can have some input). A way to keep epistemology philosophical while 
remaining convinced that reliability is the key concept in 
understanding justification, is to inquire into the explanation of a 
reliability that we assume (whether there is empirical evidence of it or 
not), given the metaphysics of the subject matter our beliefs are about. 
Hence, if you think it is important to keep (modal) epistemology a 
distinctively philosophical subject, it is sensible to promote the 
integration challenge as an important and interesting part of the 
epistemology of modality.  
Of course, it might turn out that showing that there is reliability is 
what is important to some, perhaps many, epistemologists of 
modality. What we are interested in is not set in stone, and whether 
or not the integration requirement is important and should be applied 
in the epistemology of modality depends on that. Philosophers may 
also be interested in different things, different sorts of projects, as I 
have also noted already. At the very least, I hope that some of the 
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findings in this book will be of help in making an informed decision 
on the matter.  
Given what I have said about the integration requirement then, is 
there any particular reason to actively set the project of meeting the 
integration challenge as standardly conceived aside, in favour of some 
other project, like ensuring reliability and deflecting threat from an 
undercutting defeater? For instance, I have stressed throughout this 
book that modal metaphysics is important for the epistemology of 
modality if we take the integration challenge to be an important issue. 
Indeed, it also turned out to be very important for issues to do with 
the question of uniformism/non-uniformism. In light of that, one 
might worry that if the question of the correct modal epistemology is 
so tightly knit together with the question of the correct modal 
metaphysics, i.e. if we accept that theory-evaluation here will be the 
evaluation of a package deal, we will never get to modal epistemology 
since we will be stuck doing modal metaphysics. Perhaps that is a 
reason to not even begin with this integration business?  
Not really. First of all, as Peacocke says, the integration challenge 
is a “problem of reconciliation”. This suggests that metaphysics 
matters to epistemology, but also the other way around. We must 
work with both sides in order to be able to meet the challenge. 
Second, even if metaphysics is somehow prior to epistemology (an 
idea that may certainly appeal to the kind of modal epistemologist 
who enthusiastically applauds METAPHYSICS MATTERS), it does not 
follow that we will not get to do modal epistemology until we are done 
with the metaphysics. Because, again, the proper approach here is of 
constructing and evaluating hypothetical combinations: what if this is 
the right epistemology and that is the right metaphysics, what can we 
say about that combination in terms of integration? Well, they 
integrate quite well, but there are other reasons to think this is not the 
right metaphysics of modality. What then, if this other modal 
metaphysics is right and we assume that this is the right modal 
epistemology, what happens then? And so on. Some pairs will be 
more interesting than others, for independent reasons. But the fact is 
that we do not know what the right metaphysics is, and we do not 
know what the right epistemology is. There are arguments in favour 
of and against any given theory. Some of these have to do with the 
MODAL EMPIRICISM MADE DIFFICULT 
230 
issue of integration, and we can evaluate that without knowing which 
pair is the actual pair, and more specifically without knowing which 
modal metaphysics features in the actual pair.  
Another thing that has emerged from my discussion is that the 
integration requirement appears pretty demanding, also from the 
modal empiricists’ perspective. I have not said very much about how 
various non-empiricist or rationalist modal epistemologies do with 
respect to the integration requirement. For the sake of argument, I 
have granted the empiricist that her rivals have a hard time, but of 
course, proponents of these competing theories might not necessarily 
agree. Since I have not reviewed the prospects of rationalism in 
relation to the integration requirement in any detail here, it would be 
wrong to suggest that we can draw any conclusions, on the basis of 
this, about whether empiricist or non-empiricist alternatives are to be 
preferred. What we can conclude is that there is still some ground for 
liberalised empiricists to cover, before they can discharge the 
explanatory burden of the integration requirement, in a way that is 
obviously superior to what competitors accomplish in that 
department. But if we allow ourselves to hold on to this assumption 
about non-empiricists (also) having a difficult time with integration, 
provided that we want to also be modal realists, then it seems the 
integration requirement is quite demanding, generally speaking. Is it 
perhaps too demanding, and should be given up for that reason? I do 
not find the idea that if a task seems very difficult, there must be 
something wrong with it, very convincing. Some might think that if it 
turns out that all alternatives are equally bad off with respect to 
integration, and there is no hope for improvement, then the 
integration requirement will be of little practical use in theory-
evaluation. Even so, nothing I have said implies that there is no hope 
for meeting the integration requirement given modal empiricism – it 
is just that there is more work to be done in order for that task to be 
completed. And as for non-empiricist alternatives, I have not even 
examined them here – for all I have said there may, contrary to what 
the traditional criticism suggests, be promising candidates.  
Finally, I return to my point about fairness again. If one decides to 
give up the integration requirement, for whatever reason, this will 
have consequences not only for the prospects of one’s own favourite 
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theory, but also for those of one’s least favourite theory. If the 
integration requirement is discarded and no longer a demand that we 
place on candidate modal epistemologies, then one cannot complain 
that one’s competitors cannot deal with the integration challenge. 
And if one switches to another task, it may well turn out that 
competing theories that seemed to have a hard time with the 
integration requirement as standardly conceived, may be better off 
than what the common lore of contemporary epistemology of 
modality tells us. 
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